Knowledge and Thinking Producing in The Holy Qur’an

Tefsir Araştırmaları dergisi, 2020

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Logic examines and teaches the rules of true, coherent and argumentative thinking. These rules have known since Aristotle and are universals to a great extent. However, the sufficient use of reason and encouragement of logical thought are cultural subject matters. Moreover, giving examples from your own tradition is a personal decision of an author. Unfortunately, logical examples taken from the Holy Qur’an have not seen enough in the classical Logic books widely read in the historical madrasahs or contemporary faculties of Islamic theology. Whereas, this would make Logic more interesting and more useful for the students of theology and the other Muslims. For this reason, this article deals firstly with the Quranic encouragements on the use of reason logically; and then gives severel examples for various logical argument types taken from the Qur’an.

Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God. Because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are a kind of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. For me in this subject, there are some similarities between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides. In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge. Summary: Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel’s and Stroumsa’s arguments, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge. In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are kinds of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. Based on God’s immutability, some thinkers argued that God does not knows particulars. Particulars occurs due to the matter. Matter and its functions are continually changing. Therefore, to know the particulars requires changing in God’s essence. If God is the most perfect being, it is impossible that He is subject to affection. Thus, God does not know the particulars. Other thinkers, like Avicenna, argued that God knows the particulars as a universal way. For example, God knows only humanity and He cannot know Zayd as a particular person. al-Ghazālī criticizes Avicenna’s idea in Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and argues that God is a perfect being and He should know particulars as a particulars. For al-Ghazālī, God should know everything, and His knowledge is different from our knowledge. In order to explain this matter, he says in Ninety-Nine Names of God; “But this can be understood only through an example. Perhaps you have seen the clock which informs one of the hour of worship. If you have not seen it, then, generally speaking, (it is constructed in this manner). There must be a mechanism in the form of a cylinder which contains a known amount of water. There must also be another hollow mechanism which is placed within the cylinder (but) above the water, and a string which has one of its ends tied to this hollow mechanism. The other end is tied to the part of a small container which is placed above the hollow cylinder. In (this container) there is a ball. Under the ball there is another bowl (placed) in such a manner that if the ball drops will fall into the bowl, and its jingle will be heard. Then the bottom of the cylindrical mechanism must be pierced to a determined extent so that the water can escape through it little by little…. All of this can be determined by a determination of the extent of cause which neither increases nor decreases. It is possible to make the falling of the ball into the bowl a cause of another action and this other action a cause of a third action, and to continue this process indefinitely so that from it are generated remarkable and predetermined movements (actions) of circumscribed extent. The first cause was the falling of the water in a determined quantity…. All of that happens in a determined quantity and to a determined extent which causes the determination of all of it by (adding at this point) the determination of the first movement which is the movement of the water. When you understand that these mechanisms are the principles from which movements must result, and that the movement must be determined if the result is to be regulated, then certainly that which has been determined must proceed from them….Even as the movement of the mechanism, the string, and the ball are not external to the will of the inventor of the mechanism -on the contrary, that is what He willed when He invented the mechanism- so also all the events which occur in the world, both the evil and the good and the beneficial and harmful, are not external to the will of God Most High. Rather (all of) that is the intention of God Most High for the sake of which He has planned its causes.” For Maimonides, as in al-Ghazālī, God is a perfect being and He must have the perfect attributes. Because of knowing is a perfect attribute, He should know everything, and His knowledge is different from human knowledge. In order to explain the difference between God’s knowledge and human knowledge Maimonides gives a parable in The Guide of the Perplexed. “Suppose a thing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. An artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every little ball that descends -all this is fully perceived by him who makes the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully understands the machinery…Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge…” As can be seen from above, when Maimonides is explaining the difference of God’s and human knowledge, he uses the same example what al-Ghazālī used. Even though Maimonides does not mention al-Ghazālī’s name in his works, it could be seen that there are a lot of similarities between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, in this paper, I tried to show that there is a similarity between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas on God’s knowledge. In my opinion, therefore, in the formation of Maimonides’s thought, as he thanks to Muslim philosophers like al-Farābī, Avicenna and Averroes, he also thanks to al-Ghazālī.

İslam Tetkikleri Dergisi/Journal of Islamic Review, 2021

Endülüs’te başlayan hayatını Mağrib topraklarında sürdüren Ebû Ali es-Sekûnî (ö. 717/1317) müteahhir dönemde yaşamış olmasına rağmen çoğunlukla müteahhir kelâmcıları ve mantıkçıları eleştirmiş, kelâmî görüşlerinde büyük ölçüde Ebubekir b. Tayyib el-Bâkıllânî (ö. 403/1013) çizgisini takip etmiş ve kelâm ilminde mütekaddim kelâmcıların referans alınması gerektiğini savunmuştur. Ancak onun bu eleştirel tavrı genel olarak bilgi taksiminde mantıkçılardan, tasdikî bilginin tahlilinde ise Faheddîn er-Râzî’den (ö. 606/1210) istifade etmesine engel olmamıştır. Tasdikî bilginin unsurlarından biri olduğu söylenen ya da tasdiki bilgi anlamında kullanılan hüküm, Sekûnî’nin düşünce sisteminde merkezî kavramlardan biridir. Ona göre bilimlere temel teşkil eden hükümlerin içerisinden özellikle aklî hükümler değişime konu olmadığından dolayı büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bu yönüyle onlar kelâm ilminde inceleme konusu yapılır. Ayrıca bu hükümler, Sekûnî’nin düşünce sisteminde filozoflarla en belirgin kesişimin yaşandığı noktalarından biridir. Mesela onun aklen zorunlu taksimi Ebu’l-Hasen el-Âmirî (ö. 381/992) ve İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) gibi filozofların zorunluluk anlayışıyla ciddi benzerlik gösterir. Bu makalede Temyîz isimli eserinden hareketle Sekûnî’nin bilgi ve aklî hüküm anlayışı ele alınmaktadır. Abū Ali al-Sakūnī (d. 717/1317), who was born in Andalusia and grew up in Maghrib territory, mostly adopted a critical attitude to the later Muslim theologians and logicians, following the footsteps of Abū Baqr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) in the formation of his own theological views. However, he made use of logicians in terms of the classification of knowledge in general and of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) in terms of his views on knowledge derived from granting assent on the other. Logical judgment, which is said to be one of the principal elements of the knowledge achieved by granting assent or alternatively regarded as a substitute for knowledge of that kind occupies a central place in the systematical thought of Sakūnī as a whole. For him, among the judgments, which provide a certain basis for all sciences, particularly the rational judgments are of great importance. Because rational judgments are not liable to any changes or modifications, they are subject to examination in the science of Kalām in this respect. Additionally, in Sakūnī’s system, we find that rational judgments are located at the very junction point where his own views on the topic and those of philosophers have collided. For instance, his classification of rational judgment, particularly one that is logically necessary, shows a striking similarity to the understanding of necessity by philosophers such as Abu’l-Hasan al-‘Āmirī (d. 381/992) and Avicenna (d. 428/1037). This article will examine Sakūnī’s work Tamyīz to ascertain his understanding of knowledge and rational judgment.

Eskiyeni Dergisi, 2021

Knowledge is one of the most important subjects of the science of Kalām. The issue of “knowledge” plays a key role in the knowledge and determination of the principles of Islamic faith and in the efforts to prove what is required to be believed. The systems and methodologies of each Kalām School are shaped within the framework of the knowledge understanding of that Kalām School. The approach of the Kalām schools to theological issues and their provision of judgments are determined by reaching the truth (haqīqah) knowledge, what they accept as knowledge and what they do not accept. For this reason, the subject of knowledge takes its primary place in the works written on the Kalām. This situation put forth the importance of knowledge in the Kalām. Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), one of the predecessors (muta’akhkhirūn) Ash’arī theolo-gians, is one of the Kalām scholar dealing with and clarifying the subject of knowledge. Al-Ījī is considered one of the leading figures of the post- Gazzālī Philosophical Kalām. Al-Ījī, who devoted his work Kitāb al-Mawāqif to creating his own Kalām methodology and striv-ing to determine a method in theological (Kalām) issues, allocated the introduction of this work to the subject of knowledge. Al-Ījī, who tries to produce a ultimate theory of knowledge by taking advantage of the classical Ash’arī tradition on knowledge, tried to form his own theory by revealing past mistakes and deficiencies in knowledge. It can be said that the Kalām started with knowledge. However, it is known that there is no consensus among theologians about the definition of knowledge. While Mu’tazilî schol-ars argue that knowledge is a belief, Ash’arī scholars argue that knowledge is an adjective (sifat), whereas Islamic philosophers claim that knowledge is a intellectual entity. Al-Ījī accepts that knowledge is an adjective. According to Al-Ījī, knowledge is the rela-tion/relative of the knowing to the known in a situation. In other words, knowledge is an adjective that exists and attaches itself to something. This adjective distinguishes itself from other information where it exists. In doing so, carried out in a manner based on tradition, not depending on a cause – effect relationship. Al-Ījī maintains that it is possible to obtain absolute knowledge. The classification of knowledge made by kalāmists in order to obtain absolute knowledge will help to under-stand what knowledge is. The kalāmists divided knowledge into eternal and hādith knowledge and stated that the eternal knowledge is the knowledge of Allah and the hādith knowledge is the knowledge of the created ones. On the other hand, al-Ījī consti-tutes his theory of knowledge based on hādith knowledge. Because the eternal knowledge is the knowledge of Allah, there is no necessity and acquirement. According to al-Ījī, “hādith knowledge” is divided into two parts as “darūrī/necessary knowledge” and “kasbī/acquired knowledge”. Al-Ījī, who makes extensive statements about necessary knowledge, does not enter detailed explanations about the acquired knowledge and ex-presses that the knowledge is only possible with the observing, and provides naẓarī (theo-retical) knowledge in the majority of his work as a equivalent to “darūrī knowledge”. Adhering to this classification on knowledge made by the theologians before him, al-Ījī has applied the definition of knowledge -he put forward in the final analysis- to darūrī knowledge and naẓarī knowledge. According to him, due to the existential/ontological structure of human beings, darūrī knowledge is the knowledge brought from birth, that is, adjectives of human. Acquiring darūrī knowledge is not within the power of man. On the other hand, naẓarī knowledge depends entirely on the power of man. It is the knowledge that a person obtains through evidence by using some means. Naẓarī knowledge is an adjective of people having intellectual ability and using their intellectual faculties. In this paper, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s description of knowledge and his approach to types of knowledge within the framework of this description will be discussed and his knowledge theory will be examined in detail.

The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies, 2008

Humanbeing is honered by being appointed as chalif of the world and was created together with the required instruments to be able to render the the duty he assumed. Allah, the Almighty, have informed the the humanbeing his/her duties to be fulfilled during the lifetime from the mother's womb to the tomb and guided him/her through the devine books and the applications of the prophets. From the birth to his/her age to handle itself, He has given his/her custody to his/her parents for a healthy development and maintanence. After puberty, He has made him/herself responsible for maintaining physical and mental health of his/her own and of those under his/her responsibility according to the certain principles.

Bilimname, 2018

Bilgi; eksiksiz bir tanıma sahip olmasa da felsefe, kelâm ve tasavvufun temel tartışma konularından biridir. Bilginin, duyu organlarınca iletilen verilerin insan aklı tarafından işlenmesiyle ortaya çıktığını iddia edenler olduğu gibi bunlardan tamamen bağımsız bir şekilde kalbe bırakılan bir nur ile oluştuğunu iddia edenler de bulunmaktadır. Kalbe bırakılan nurun insanların çoğunda görülmemesi nedeniyle bilgi edinmede tüm insanların sahip olduğu ortak alet olan aklın konumunu tartışmaya açmak daha önemli görünmektedir. Bu bağlamda İslam düşüncesinde derin etkiye sahip olan Gazzâlî’nin önemli eserlerinden biri olan İḥyâ’da akıl ve aklîlik meselesinin nasıl ele alındığını bu makalede ortaya koymaya çalışıyoruz. Akıl kavramıyla ilişkili olarak ele alınan kalp ve ilim kavramlarının kullanımlarına da değinmek suretiyle Gazzâlî’nin akla yönelik tarafsız, olumlu ve olumsuz tutumunu sırasıyla işlediğimiz bu makalenin amacı genel bir Gazzâlî profili çizmek değil; müstakil olarak mezkûr eserd...

KUR’ÂN’DAKİ HİKMET KAVRAMI ÇERÇEVESİNDE KUR’ÂN-SÜNNET BÜTÜNLÜĞÜ THE INTEGRITY OF THE QUR’ANSUNNAH WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONCEPT OF ALHİKMA(WISDOM) IN THE QUR’AN, 2021

Bu makalede Kur’ân-Sünnet bütünlüğünün Kur’ân’daki temelleri ele alınmakta ve özellikle “hikmet” kavramı üzerinde durulmaktadır. Hikmet kelimesi, Kur’ân’da geçtiği yere göre farklı anlamlara gelmektedir. Hikmet kelimesinin anlamlarından birisi ve en önemlisi nübüvvet ve vahyin uygulanması olan sünnettir. Sünnet ve Kur’ân’ı birbirinden bağımsız olarak ele almak ve anlamaya çalışmak her şeyden önce Kur’ân açısından doğru değildir. Zira gerek hikmet kavramı gerekse Kur’ân’daki diğer âyetler Kur’ân-Sünnet bütünlüğüne özellikle delalet etmektedir. Sünnetin ikinci kaynak oluşunun tespitinin ardından bir o kadar da onun mahiyetinin bilinmesi gerekmektedir. Sünnetin bütünüyle vahiy ürünü, tamamen Hz. Peygamber’in ictihadları veya kısmen vahiy kısmen de ictihad şeklinde olduğuna dair görüşler bulunmaktadır. Deliller çerçevesinde sünnetin hem vahiy hem de ictihadlardan oluştuğu anlaşılmaktadır. Kur’ân ile Sünnet ayrılmaz ikilidir. İslâmî olduğunu ileri süren her türlü düşünce ve eylem bu iki temel kaynaktan beslenmek zorundadır

2017

Kur’an-i Kerim, insanoglunun anlam dunyasini sekillendirerek duygu ve davranislarina istikamet kazandirma maksadiyla indirilmis bir kitaptir. O’nun, kendini bir hidayet kaynagi olarak nitelendirmesinin anlami da esasen budur. ‘Hidayet kaynagi’ nitelemesi, Kur’an ayetlerinin egitsel acidan tasidigi degere isaret etmektedir. Bununla birlikte Kur’an’in bir hidayet kaynagi olarak islev gorebilmesi icin bireylere dusen bazi sorumluluklar bulunmaktadir. Ayetlerin manasi uzerinde arastirmalar yapilmasi ve zihinsel aktiviteler gerceklestirilmesi bu sorumluluklarin basinda gelmektedir. Ayetlerden alinmasi gereken ibretlerin ve cikarilmasi gereken derslerin kesfedilmesi baska turlu mumkun olmaz. Ayetleri anlama surecinde yararlanilmasi gereken basta gelen kaynaklar kuskusuz tefsirlerdir. Ancak mevcut tefsirlerde, ayet-i kerimelerin insan davranislarina bakan yonu ile ne olcude ele alinip yorumlandigi arastirilmaya muhtac bir meseledir. Soz konusu ihtiyactan hareketle yapilan bu arastirmada, “...

Eskiyeni, 2014

One of the important schools of Islamic thought is illumination. However, throughout the history in the tradition of Islamic thought, Aristotle and “New Plutonian Peripatetist” movement have been prioritised, and this school has been mostly ignored. It should be known that illumination, which has been built by Suhrawardi as a “light metaphysics” that depends on “intuitional method”, has enriched the Islamic philosophy tradition. The opposition Suhrawardi faced in his age has prevented the spread of his ideas. Because of this reason, illumination has been ignored to some extent in the thought environments. However, it has continued it’s existence within several educative movements until today. It should be known that the comprehensive research of illumination, which is one of the truly original schools of Islamic thought, would contribute to understanding Islamic thought fully and sturdily.

2010

Bütün bir insanlığa doğru yolu bulmaları için gönderilen en son ilahi kelam olan Kur’an, ayetlerinin tefekkür edilmesini, anlaşılmasını ve sunduğu ilkelere göre ahlaklı toplumların oluşturulmasını muhataplarından isteyen bir kitaptır. Kur’an’ın temel hedefi insanoğluna bu dünyada Allah’ın hoşnut olacağı bir hayat yaşatmak, ahirette de korkunç azaba mahkûm olmamasını sağlamaktır. İnsanın en temel görevi kendisine sayısız nimetler bahşeden Allah’a şükrederek kulluğunu her daim göstermesidir. Kur’an’ın en temel evrensel mesajı budur. Kur’an’ın dili olan Arapçayı bilmeyenler için ayetlerin ne demek istediğini anlamanın en başta gelen yolu, Kur’an meallerine başvurmaktır. Ülkemizde Kur’an mealleri hiç hız kaybetmeden yazılmaya devam etmektedir. Ancak, yapılan meallerin ekseriyetinin, özellikle hedef dil Türkçe açısından yeterli düzeyde olmadığı da bir gerçektir. Bu durum evrensel mesajları adeta gölgelemektedir. Bu makalede, meallerin evrensel mesajları yansıtamama sorunu olarak harfî çe...

The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies, 2013

A basic requirement of the religious obligation is the reason and it is the greatest blessing of Allah. The senses are man's information-gathering tools from his external-internal world. Allah has supported human with the divine knowledge to generate thoughts. The thoughts obtained by humans through processing this information may not be enough to make favorable decisions. Therefore, he must protect his mind from subsequently transmitted weaknesses and he must use his will-power on the right side. Mental development of youth and planned use of the reason should be provided until the age of maturity. After having reached mental maturity, opportunities should be given to edit his/her internal-external world.

Eskiyeni, 2013

Kur’an’ı anlamanın vahyin ilk dönemlerinden günümüze değin bir şekilde sorun teşkil ettiği pek bilinen bir husustur. Ancak bu sorunun ilk dönemden itibaren sürekli anlam değişikliğine uğradığı ve ilerleyen zamanlarda doğrudan sorunun kendisini anlamanın en temel soru haline geldiği bazen gözlerden kaçan bir husus olmaktadır. Hz. Peygamber hayatta olduğu sürece Kur’an’ı anlamak, daha ziyade insanların içinde yaşadığı “ortam”ı anlamak iken, daha sonra dikkatlerin ortamın kendisinden metnin kendisine yöneldiği fark edilmektedir. Böylece ilk başta insanların Kur’an’ı anlaması, olup biten olayları anlaması ve sorunlara nasıl yaklaşılacağının belirlenmesi iken, daha sonra Kur’an metninin dilsel düzeyde ele alınması anlama sorununun mahiyetinde değişikliğe yol açmıştır.

Tasavvur / Tekirdağ İlahiyat Dergisi, 2022

İslam düşüncesi, hangi gelenek içerisinde yer alırsa alsın on ikinci yüz-yıldan sonraki düşünürlerin önemli bir kısmının İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) şârihi olduğu bir sürecin içerisinden geçti. Bu olgu Fahreddîn er-Râzî’nin (ö. 606/1210) sorunsallaştırma kabiliyetiyle birleşince, onun eleştirel okumaları, kendisinden sonraki kuşakları meşgul edecek aporiaları su yüzüne çıkarıp çözülmeyi bekleyen birer probleme dönüştürdü. Gerek ontoloji, epistemoloji ve aksiyolojinin kesiştiği birçok hususla yakından ilintili olması gerekse İslam düşünce geleneklerinin varlık anlayışlarının doğrudan yansıdığı bir problem alanı olması açısından bilginin mahiyeti, bunlar arasında önemli bir yere sahiptir. Râzî başta olmak üzere birçok düşünürün çözümlemelerinde görüldüğü üzere, Meşşâî felsefede bilginin ontolojisi, mahiyeti ve kategorisi, sistemin bütünü dikkate alındığında önemli meydan okumalarla karşılaşmaya elverişli unsurlar içermektedir. Buna bağlı olarak Şemseddin İsfahânî (ö. 749/1349), Teftâzânî (ö. 792/1390), Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî (ö. 816/1413), Ali Kuşçu (ö. 879/1474), Devvânî (ö. 908/1502), Sadreddîn Deştekî (ö. 903/1498) gibi düşünürler gerek sorunun tespiti ve imalarının açığa çıkarılması gerekse çözüm teklifleri açısından tartışmayı daha ileri bir noktaya taşımışlardır. Elinizdeki çalışma işte bu birikimi tevarüs eden on altıncı yüzyıl düşünürü Kutbüddin el-Îcî’nin (ö. 955/1548) soruna yaklaşım biçimini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Değerlendirmelerini özellikle Ali Kuşçu’nun, Devvânî’nin ve Deştekî’nin konuyla ilgili yorumları üzerinden yapan Îcî, bu düşünürlerin kategori sorununun çözümüne dair tekliflerini analiz etmek ve kendi yaklaşımını ortaya koymak suretiyle önemli katkılar sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Îcî, Ali Kuşçu’nun husûl-kıyâm ayırımını, Deştekî’nin dönüşüm teorisini çeşitli açılardan sorunlu bulmaktadır. Filozofların sisteminde bilginin gerçek anlamda nitelik kategorisinde yer alamayacağına dair Devvânî’nin iddiasının da tatmin edici olmadığını düşünen Îcî, hariçte var olan türsel hakikat ile fert arasındaki ilişkiyi yorumlayarak kategori sorununun çözümü için araçsallaştırmakta ve nesnenin mahiyetine özdeş olan cevherî anlamın, nefste araz olarak bulunan bilginin zihnî varlığa sahip bir parçası olabileceğini öne sürmektedir.