Kant and the problem of self-identification

Studi Filosofici, 2021

The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant's philosophy that are connected to the representation 'I' and the question of self-identification in self-consciousness. The subjective capacity to represent itself through the representation 'I' will be articulated on the basis of the structure the so-called de se or I-thoughts developed by Perry and Recanati. In this regard, a contrast between Longuenesse's view and my approach on self-identification and the different uses of I as subject will be considered.

Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht; Ed. by Bacin, Stefano / Ferrarin, Alfredo / La Rocca, Claudio / Ruffing, Margit, 2013

In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences, avoiding any mechanical association between Kant and an elusive reading of the I think, e.g. as suggested mutatis mutandis by McDowell and Kitcher.

Paradigmi, 2019

The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns and focus on the same type of reference involved in the “I", obviously via different philosophical paths and antipodal metaphysical assumptions.

Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?

Studi Kantiani , 2023

Despite the recent flurry of books or essays on Kant's supposed theory of 'the self', one may wonder whether Kant even has a concept of 'the self'. If he does, what is that concept? Does it differ from 'the I', 'the soul' or 'the mind'? If it does differ, in what ways does it differ? The paper is an attempt at answering some of these questions. I focus on Kant's use of the substantivized reflexive 'the self' ('das Selbst') and its differences, if any, from Kant's use of the substantivized first-person pronoun 'the I' ('das Ich'). I argue that Kant's use of two different terms reflects two contrasting influences. On the one hand, Kant inherits the notion of 'the self' from Locke and the empiricist tradition in psychology (therefore, Kant's term 'das Selbst'). On the other hand, he is the heir of the discussion of Descartes' Cogito argument in the rationalist tradition (therefore, Kant's 'I think' and Kant's use of the substantivized 'das Ich'). The paper defends the claim that from these two contrasting influences, Kant elaborates an original and complex notion of 'the self' or 'being self to oneself'. That notion is expressed in using 'I' as the (logical) subject in the proposition 'I think'. This explains why, in Kant's use of the expressions, the two notions, 'the self' and 'the I' converge. Neither of them is the concept of an object. Both notions refer to the subject of thinking in virtue of the fact that the subject is, in thinking, self to itself. Section 1 of the paper offers and analysis of Locke's idea of 'the self' as an ancestor of Kant's notion. Section 2 offers an analysis of Kant's notion of the self in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Section 3 analyzes Kant's contrast between the 'standing and abiding self' of transcendental apperception and the forever changing consciousness of oneself in the empirical unity of apperception. Section 4 analyzes the relation between Kant's notion of 'the self' and Kant's analysis of the proposition 'I think'. To conclude, the paper takes stock of the original features of Kant's notions of 'the self' and 'the I'.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 2007

Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010

What I propose to emphasize here is that, beyond the criticism by Kant of Lockean thought and of psychology in general, the theses sug- gested by the English philosopher about consciousness and self-consciousness (as source and criterion of unity of consciousness) hold paramount im- portance for understanding the meaning of Kantian pure transcendental apperception, especially in light of the dispute against the Humean “Ego’s dissolution”.

Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 8 (2023): THE PRIMACY OF SENSIBILITY, 2023

Philo, 2011

One of the principle aims of the B version of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to show how it is possible that the same “I think” can accompany all of my representations, which is a transcendental condition of the possibility of judgment. Contra interpreters such as A. Brook, I show that this “I think” is an a priori (reflected) self-consciousness; contra P. Keller, I show that this a priori self-consciousness is first and foremost a consciousness of one’s personal identity from a first person point of view.

Why do we use it so often both in our most ordinary and in our most philosophical language games? I attempt to investigate this question in the lights of the -mainly, but not exclusively late -Wittgensteinian trail of thoughts, by citing some quotations I consider talking and relevant. Or, more precisely and in accordance with the Wittgensteinian therapy -I only sketch a landscape, whose different elements -that is: the different uses of identity -relate to each other on the model of the family resemblance. (1.) By way of introduction it should be noted that when it comes to Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is explicitly not empirical, explanatory, definitoric, essentialist or a priori. Rather it is likened to a certain conception of Freudian therapy that is guided by the endeavor for perspic(K)uous representation, especially when our language 'goes on a holiday' and we get entangled in the web of our grammar. In our present case, when we are to examine the various forms and applications of identity. This investigations aims to be a grammatical one as well. I am to focus on three uses of identity, about which, I believe, the Wittgensteinian thoughts can supply us with insights -by means of citing some explicit exegetic and philological arguments; and by taking adequately applicable objects of comparisons as an analogy.