The Ulster Defence Association: Paramilitaries and Politics

Electoral Studies, 2004

Since the start of the Northern Ireland conflict in 1969, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been committed to a military campaign to achieve a British withdrawal from the province. The adoption of a parallel electoral strategy in the 1980s and 1990s represents a fundamental change of tactics. This article outlines the background to this change, and analyses the electoral success of the IRA's political wing, Sinn Fein. Using survey data collected over four decades, the results show that Sinn Fein's electoral support has come mainly from previous non-voters and new voters, at a time when the Catholic proportion of younger voters has been increasing. The net effect has been to increase the overall nationalist and republican vote, with no decrease in the Social Democratic Labour Party vote. The personal influence of Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein president, together with public support for the IRA's military campaign, helps to account for Sinn Fein's mobilization of these voters. The strategy of pursuing parallel military and electoral campaigns has paid major political dividends for Irish republicans. #

Parliamentary Affairs, 2018

2005

Simply surviving to reach a second regularly scheduled election was something of a triumph for the Northern Ireland Assembly and the peace process. Not one of the earlier Assemblies, Conventions, or Forums elected since the end of the Stormont regime in 1972 have had a second term. However, given the results of the 2001 Westminster elections, the once dominant parties in their respective blocs-the UUP and SDLP-were bound to view the crucial 2003 elections with some trepidation.

Parliamentary History, 2010

Amsterdam University Press eBooks, 2017

A section of the population here tried to overthrow the state by force of arms, and the British government, after the fall of Stormont, failed in their fundamental right, or the fundamental thing for them was to protect life and to me they failed in that. I could have easily got involved with the RUC, because, I mean, I wasn't involved in any criminal activity before I joined the Ulster Volunteer Force, but I felt that we had been let down by our government, who had handcuffed the security forces with their policy of appeasement and restraint rather than the same sort of policy they used in the conflict in the Falklands. If they had had the same attitude towards republicans, I don't think it would have been a war. I think it would have been a conflict that could have been put down in a couple of years.

This paper looks at the legal constitutional, and electoral framework of Northern Ireland, and provides a chronology of events in the political and constitutional arena since 1972. It also gives statistics on casualties connected with civil disturbances, strength of the security services, and votes cast at Northern Ireland elections since 1972. Finally it gives a brief description of the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998. See Research Paper 98/11 Public Processions in Northern Ireland for an outline of the current public order legislation in Northern

Parliamentary Affairs, 2015

Electoral Studies, 2007

The period since the signing of Northern Ireland's 'peace deal', the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), has seen a shift in the votes of many Protestants to the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), hitherto seen as a hardline, anti-GFA organisation fusing religion and politics. This article uses a case study of the Orange Order, the largest religious-cultural organisation in Northern Ireland containing almost one-in-four Protestant voters, to examine the basis of the appeal of more militant Protestant Unionism in the DUP. The article suggests that a radical ethnic militancy is apparent amongst younger 'Orange' Protestants in particular. This shift in Protestant-Unionist opinion has been exacerbated in a post-conflict party system, in which electoral competition is based upon intra-ethnic bloc rivalry around the defence of the interests of a particular bloc.