Why Did Feyerabend Defend Astrology? Lessons for Integrated HPS

Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2011

The Fifth Joint Workshop on Integrated History and Philosophy of Science asked participants, “What is HPS for?” This clearly instrumental question generated a welcome spectrum of practical responses. Examples of “HPS-in-action” included the concept of complementary science, suggestions for new pedagogical strategies and investigations into the socio-political dimensions of science. On the other hand, a more theoretical underpinning did emerge in a discussion of the pros and cons of pluralism. This emphasis on pluralism not only underlies complementary science, but may also provide a pragmatic working basis for developing a more active role for HPS in both science and society.

Social Epistemology 30.4 (2016): 464-482.

This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was a robust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporary reflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third ‘pluralist’ reading is judged more persuasive, but found to be incomplete, owing to a failure to accommodate Feyerabend’s focus upon the integrity of scientists and the authority of science. I therefore suggest that the defences are more fully understood as defences of the epistemic integrity of scientists that take the form of critical exposures of failures by scientists to act with integrity. An appeal is made to contemporary virtue epistemology that clarifies Feyerabend’s implicit association of epistemic integrity and epistemic virtue. If so, what critics have taken to be radically ‘anarchistic’ defences of pseudoscience are, in fact, principled defences of the epistemic integrity – and hence authority – of science

Annals of Science, 2009

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2021

It is difficult not to notice the enthusiasm that has surrounded pluralism in recent years. Beginning with the fields of anthropology and sociology (Despres 1968; Newman 1973; Young 1976), the word “pluralism” has taken hold as an early twenty-first century watch- word in domains like political theory (Gatson 2002; Flathman 2005) and legal theory (Krisch 2010). The concept has also entered the philosophical arena, which now acknowl- edges ontological (Turner 2010), epistemic (Coliva and Pedersen 2017), ethical (Stocker 1991; Kekes 1993), and even logical (Beall and Restall 2006) forms of pluralism. Moreo- ver, the “pluralist turn” in philosophy of science now characterizes the current paradigm of post-positivist philosophy of science, following the earlier “historical turn” (Bird 2008) and “practice turn” (Soler et al. 2014). As a variety of this larger pluralist turn in contem- porary theory, this growing interest in scientific pluralism has both nourished and been influenced by other forms of pluralism originating in the philosophical and non-philosoph- ical domains (Kellert et al. 2006). The proliferation of pluralisms in science studies can be seen as a reaction against the prevalently monist approach of mainstream philosophy of science during the first half of the twentieth century.

Science & Education, 2013

My intention is to cast light on the characteristics of epistemic or fundamental research (in contrast to application-oriented research). I contrast a Baconian notion of objectivity, expressing a correspondence of the views of scientists to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend to values as well. I claim that a plurality of epistemic values serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. For instance, pluralism is the only way to cope with the challenge of preference bias. Furthermore, the plurality of epistemic values cannot be substantially reduced by exploring the empirical success of scientific theories distinguished in light of particular such values. However, in addition to pluralism at the level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific research is also characterized by a joint striving for consensus which I trace back to a shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the willingness of scientists to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This shared epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning general principles of dealing with knowledge claims. My contention is that pluralism and consensus formation can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community. This article was completed while I was visiting the Max-Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. Many thanks go to my host Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. I am grateful to audiences in Bielefeld, Greifswald, London Ontario, Berlin, and Wuppertal for many helpful responses that did much to improving the argument.

THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 2008

A WORTHWHILE REVIEW 648 PAGES TO BE ENJOYED ON A QUIET NIGHT OR TWO The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an outstanding guide to the major themes, movements, debates and topics in philosophy of science. Fifty-five entries by a team of renowned international contributors are organized into four parts: • Historical and Philosophical Context • Debates • Concepts • Individual Sciences The Companion begins with a critical examination of how philosophy of science has been involved in a mutually fruitful interaction with philosophical theories in areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, and reassesses the major schools of philosophy of science in the twentieth century. The second part explores the development of current debates among philosophers and scientists on issues such as confirmation, explanation, realism, scientific method, and the ethics of science. Part three discusses controversial concepts such as causation, prediction, unification, observation, and probability that lie at the heart of many disputes about science and scientific theories. The final part addresses some of the main philosophical problems that arise within eight branches of science: biology, chemistry, cognitive science, economics, mathematics, physics, psychology, and the social sciences. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is essential reading for anyone interested in philosophy of science and the connections between philosophy and the natural and social sciences. Stathis Psillos is an Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Athens, Greece. He is the author of Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (Routledge), Causation and Explanation and Philosophy of Science A–Z. Martin Curd is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA. He is co-editor (with Jan Cover) of Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. PART I Historical and philosophical context 1 1 The epistemology of science after Quine 3 PAUL A. ROTH 2 The history of philosophy and the philosophy of science 15 JOANNE WAUGH AND ROGER ARIEW 3 Metaphysics 26 Stephen Mumford 4 Philosophy of language 36 Rod Bertolet 5 The role of logic in philosophy of science 47 Diderik Batens 6 Critical rationalism 58 Gürol Irzik 7 The historical turn in the philosophy of science 67 ALEXANDER BIRD 8 Logical empiricism 78 Thomas Uebel 9 Pragmatism and science 91 Robert Almeder Part II Debates 101 10 Bayesianism 103 Colin Howson 11 Confirmation 115 ALAN HÁJEK AND JAMES M. JOYCE 12 Empiricism 129 Elliott Sober vi 13 Essentialism and natural kinds 139 BRIAN ELLIS 14 Ethics of science 149 David B. Resnik 15 Experiment 159 Theodore Arabatzis 16 Explanation 171 JAMES Woodward 17 The feminist approach to the philosophy of science 182 CASSANDRA L. PINNICK 18 Inference to the best explanation 193 Peter Lipton 19 Laws of nature 203 Marc Lange 20 Naturalism 213 RONALD N. GIERE 21 Realism/anti-realism 224 Michael Devitt 22 Relativism about science 236 Maria Baghramian 23 Scientific method 248 Howard Sankey 24 Social studies of science 259 ROBERT NOLA 25 The structure of theories 269 Steven French 26 Theory-change in science 281 John Worrall 27 Underdetermination 292 Igor Douven 28 Values in science 302 GERALD DOPPELT vii Part III Concepts 315 29 Causation 317 Christopher Hitchcock 30 Determinism 327 Barry Loewer 31 Evidence 337 Peter Achinstein 32 Function 349 D. M. WALSH 33 Idealization 358 James Ladyman 34 Measurement 367 HASOK CHANG AND NANCY CARTWRIGHT 35 Mechanisms 376 Stuart Glennan 36 Models 385 DEMETRIS PORTIDES 37 Observation 396 ANDRé KUKLA 38 Prediction 405 MALCOLM FORSTER 39 Probability 414 Maria Carla Galavotti 40 Reduction 425 Sahotra Sarkar 41 Representation in science 435 PAUL TELLER 42 Scientific discovery 442 Thomas Nickles 43 Space and time 452 OLIVER POOLEY 44 Symmetry 468 Margaret Morrison viii 45 Truthlikeness 478 Graham Oddie 46 Unification 489 TODD JONES 47 The virtues of a good theory 498 Ernan McMullin Part IV Individual sciences 509 48 Biology 511 Alexander Rosenberg 49 Chemistry 520 Robin FINDLAY Hendry 50 Cognitive science 531 Paul Thagard 51 Economics 543 USKALI MÄKI 52 Mathematics 555 PETER CLARK 53 Physics 567 SIMON SAUNDERS 54 Psychology 581 RICHARD SAMUELS 55 Social sciences 594 HAROLD KINCAID Index 605 THEN AS A COMPLEMENTARY READING https://www.academia.edu/2807083/In_defence_of_scientism

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2015