Structural Realism, again
Simon Saunders2003, Synthese
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Abstract
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The paper critiques Cao's historical account of 20th-century field theories, arguing it insufficiently addresses pivotal developments in quantum physics and special relativity. It proposes an alternative view, advocating for a structural understanding of dynamics that transcends traditional ontologies, reflecting continuity across varying domains of physics. The discussion centers on the epistemological implications of structural knowledge in contrast to instrumental views, while also addressing criticisms of the author's earlier positions.
Related papers
Structural Realism
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2012
Must Structural Realism Cover the Special Sciences?
EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 2013
Structural Realism (SR) is typically rated as a moderate realist doctrine about the ultimate entities of nature described by fundamental physics. Whether it must be extended to the higher-level special sciences is not so clear. In this short paper I argue that there is no need to 'structuralize' the special sciences. By mounting concrete examples I show that structural descriptions and structural laws certainly play a role in the special sciences, but that they don't play any exclusive role nor that they give us any reason to believe that all that there is on the various levels is structure. I fortify my points by arguing that structures are global entities (in order for SR not to collapse into a bundle ontology) and that the assumption of higher-level structures as genuinely global or holistic entities is even more arcane. Many proponents and opponents of structural realism alike seem to agree on the point that SR, if sound, must provide more than just a metaphysics of the fundamental physical level, but that it should also provide an ontological framework that covers higher levels of complexity and thus pertains to the special sciences as well. As Frigg and Votsis (2011, p. 269) put it: the question remains whether OSR, and ESR for that matter, can give an adequate account of the ontology and epistemology of other sciences. The bulk of the literature on SR has thus far focussed on modern (and in particular fundamental) physics. This is no accident of history. A structuralist analysis of scientific theories usually departs from those theories' mathematical formalism, and formalisation is the hallmark of modern physics. Therefore SR seems to be at odds with less formal sciences such as biology or the social sciences. This has led some critics to claim that SR is a philosophy with little, if any, relevance outside the province of physics : : :
TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURALISM IN PHYSICS: An alternative to Structural Realism
In physics, structures are good candidates for the role of transparadigmatic invariants, which entities can no longer play. This is why structural realism looks more credible than standard entity realism. But why should structures be stable, rather than entities ? Here, structural realists have no answer ; they content themselves with the mere observation that this is how things stand. By contrast, transcendental structuralism (derived from Kant's transcendental idealism) can easily make sense of this fact. Indeed, it shows that when knowledge bears on phenomena, namely on the emergent byproduct of a relation between the explorer and what is to be explored, this knowledge necessarily bears on relations between such phenomena. After a development on the clarifying power of transcendental structuralism, I turn to an early transcendental structuralist interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Jean-Louis Destouches (1909-1980). Destouches, an early French philosopher of physics, was a student of Louis de Broglie. He recasted in the 1940 the very concept of physical theory in the light of quantum physics. According to him, whenever phenomena are inextricably relative to the experimental setup , a physical theory cannot provide anything beyond a list of interconnected predictions for future facts given a relevant class of past facts. In his general mathematical theory of predictions, the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics do not refer to some " real " waves; they are shown to be nothing but the formal expression of the phenomena's being relative to incompatible experimental contexts. Since the quantization of variables can itself be derived from a wave-mechanical formalism, it becomes clear that the most prominent features of quantum mechanics are a mere consequence of contextuality. Destouches thus proved that it is easy to make sense of quantum mechanics provided a reflective attitude is adopted. By contrast, too many difficulties arise when one tries at any cost to make quantum mechanics intelligible within a purely ontological framework.
Some Aspects of the Arcane Nature of Quantum Mechanical Theory and Distinctive Forms of Realism Arising Out of It
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2018
The paper, in Part 1, is devoted to discussing the underlying logic and algebra of the classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, their syntax and semantics, the reasons for their differences and the diagrammatic representations of the two. This part of the paper also demonstrates that there are several puzzling characters of microphysical phenomena by alluding to the relevant details of the double-slit experiment. These counterintuitive results of the experiment make it difficult to explain the empirical success and realist commitments of quantum mechanics. The second part, Part 2, of the paper is concerned with the question as to how conceptual schemes of scientists interact with the world such that the problem of new meaning and reference of the microphysical terms could be determined. The paper refrains from having a general discussion on Realism and do not venture into a comprehensive survey and critique of all known varieties of realistic interpretations. It selects only a few forms of realism (based on the reasons given) in investigating microphysical phenomena forming part of QM. These selected forms of realism explain how does conceptual scheme/terms in scientific theory hookup to the objects and their relations in the world based on the model-theoretic character of the scientific theory and causal rigidified descriptivism of scientific terms (vide Putnam) as well as scientist's interaction with the world, say, in the "instrumental context of laboratory" (vide Heelan) such that the problem of meaning and reference could be resolved. The paper claims that convergence of the two views may result in a particular form of realism, the Hermeneuticized Internal Realism, appropriate for the science of microphysical phenomena.
Structures as the objects of fundamental physics
The paper argues that there are structures rather than objects with an intrinsic identity in the domain of fundamental physics. We line out the standard metaphysics of objects with an intrinsic identity, recall the main objection against that position (section 1) and then retrace the development to epistemic structural realism (section 2) and to ontic structural realism (section 3). We elaborate on the arguments for ontic structural realism from quantum physics (section 4) and from space-time physics (section 5). Finally, we claim that the main objection against the standard metaphysics of objects with an intrinsic identity is countered by structural realism only if the fundamental physical structures are conceived as causal structures (section 6).
The reality of relations: the case from quantum physics
2013
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell's theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together-that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell.
How Ontic Structural Realism would Formalize
Scientific Progress
Athens Journal of Sciences, 2021
This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper, T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, first I connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before their progressive distancing. Finally, I outline a formulation of scientific progress inferred from the structural realism approach. In particular, my definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go. As I will emphasize, this definition also provides an answer to the aforementioned original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce.
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Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure
Synthese, 2003
We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structural realism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned the view of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualising objects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in the context of modern physics.
Fundamental Physics and (New-)Mechanistic Ontologies
2023
According to Kuhlmann & Glennan, fundamental physics and New Mechanicism do "not fit well together" (Kuhlmann and Glennan, Euro J Phil Sci 4:338, 2014). For two main reasons: (1) Quantum mechanics (QM) challenges the hypothesis that there are objects with definite properties that are related by local causal interactions; (2) since mechanisms are composed of lower-lever mechanisms, then if in fundamental physics the existence of mechanisms can be questioned, and if macroscopic mechanisms supervene on fundamental physics entities and processes, then fundamental physics can even undermine mechanistic ontology and its explanatory ambition. In their paper, Kuhlmann & Glennan tried to argue that the problem of the compatibilisation between fundamental physics and New Mechanicism can be partially addressed since, on the one hand, the quantum decoherence hypothesis allows to defend that the universal validity of quantum mechanics does not undermine New Mechanicism ontological and explanatory claims as they occur within in classical domains. And on the other hand, it is possible to offer a non-classical mechanistic explanation of certain kinds of quantum phenomena. This paper aims to argue that there has always been a problematic relationship between mechanical philosophy and fundamental physics throughout the history of physics. Therefore, in part, the challenges posed by QM to mechanicism are not new; nevertheless, mechanicism prevailed throughout the history of physics. On the other hand, I also aim to argue that although fundamental physics may not be compatible with New Mechanicism, that should not imply a rejection of mechanistic ontology for reasons other than the quantum decoherence hypothesis.
From metaphysical principles to dynamical laws
Cambridge History of Philosophy of the Scientific Revolution, 2022
Ontic Structural Realism an Fundamentality
2020
Ontic structuralism is a thesis about the fundamentalone whereby relations, not objects, are the basic building blocks of reality. However, there are in fact several dimensions to the structuralismfundamentality link, and many alternative ways of cashing out the idea that reality is fundamentally structural. Arguably, these require a more systematic and detailed assessment than acknowledged in the literature so far. I provide such an assessment based on considerations coming from both physics and analytic metaphysics, and conclude by pointing to an hitherto quite neglected theoretical option.
ORG_PHYSICS: REPLACING THE OBSOLETE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS
This essay attempts to analyze the impact of continuing to tolerate the Warrior Values in an era of Advanced Technology that has been promoted by two of the oldest intellectual subjects for over 2500 years: mathematics and philosophy. The thesis of this essay is that science will only renew its progress after its cuts off these historic roots and adopts more positive goals oriented to Helping Humanity, instead of pursuing its religiously inspired search for truth and certainty. Physics is the oldest science and the one that set the pattern for most of the others, it has been mostly related to mathematics and has become the one with the largest number of specialties. Therefore, physics has been separated off from the rest of the sciences in this essay and all the others have been given a parallel essay, called ORG-SCIENCE. This analysis is structured by exploring the history of the major advances in physics since 1600 in terms of innovators, concepts, underlying mathematics and the major problems exposed by these advances. This analysis is made from a Natural Philosophy perspective because the thesis here is that the problems arose from weak metaphysical assumptions that can be traced back to Aristotle, 2500 years ago. The problem seems to be related to the specialization of western intellectuals: few philosophers have been real, practicing scientists (doing it, not just reading about it), while most scientists have little knowledge of philosophy; so a dangerous chasm has developed in these two aspects of our mental world. Here we deliberately position most mathematicians with the philosophers as their work also rarely involves direct experience with reality. There are a few exceptions, like C.S. Pierce (professional chemist before turning to philosophy); Einstein was a theoretical physicist, who mainly worked as a mathematician but had an ongoing interest in philosophy. Even the great scientists like Newton and Maxwell, who sometimes performed hands-on physics research, really had personal obsessions with religion more than philosophy. Most philosophers simply desire to know and as talkers, they are prepared to write but few are ready to really do something useful with their hands; just as it was in Athens 2500 years ago. Rejecting the traditional form of discursive (or linear) thinking, the basis for ‘Rationality’ (or Reason), we attempt to ground this analysis in non-linear, complex networks – possibly reflecting how ideas are actually stored in our own minds. This viewpoint is used to create a new metaphysics based on recent knowledge gained from biological research to create new proposals to adequately explain the major pillars in the history of physics. The linear approximation is the underlying assumption behind the usage of calculus; in fact, mathematical Analysis is justified by the use of infinitesimal (the divisor going to zero) and its inverse technique of Integration. In fact, there has been a permanent alliance between Philosophers and Mathematicians ever since Plato insisted that the students at his Academy be familiar with Pythagoras’s ideas. Both groups desired the simplicity of examining timeless objects (definitions and rules); the spatial (static) emphasis rather than the dynamic features of living systems. Physics has adopted a similar viewpoint by accepting Lagrange’s mathematical trick of replacing dynamic interactions with the spatial derivative of a spatial, continuous function – the Potential. We illustrate this thesis by quickly summarizing all of the science of physics, in terms of its history in 4 phases (or Scientific Revolutions); pointing out their key personalities (mostly mathematicians) and achievements. We also point out their major conceptual problems to expose their common roots. We finally follow a modern path based on knowledge of biology and history. This exposes several of the deep flaws in physics that few physicists are aware of. We suggest new approaches based on novel ideas in psychology and neuroscience. This essay may be viewed as a brief critique of the undeserved reputation of physics in the modern world by a weary Natural Philosopher.
Between Physics and Metaphysics: Structure as a Boundary Concept
The notion of structure is found to be used in a great number of theories, scientific research programs and world views. However, its uses and definitions are as diverse as the objects of the scientific disciplines where it can be found. Without trying to recreate the structuralist aspiration from the mid XX century, which believed to have found in this notion a common transdisciplinary language, I discuss a specific aspect of this concept that could be considered a constant in different perspectives. This aspect refers to the location of the notions of structure as boundaries in the different scientific theories. With this, I try to argue that the definition or presentation of a structure configures in itself the frontier for scientific knowledge, defining at the same time implied ontological assumptions. In order to discuss this hypothesis, and taking into consideration the double origin of contemporary notions of structure –the mathematical and linguistic line–, I revise several theoretical perspectives which made explicit the relation between structures and knowledge, and their relation with the real: the arguments on physical knowledge by Eddington, structural anthropology, structural linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Piaget’s genetic psychology.
In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism
In this paper we clarify how ‘epistemic’ (ESR) and ‘ontic’ structural realism (OSR) should be understood and reply to some important criticisms of the latter. We shall begin with an outline of the historical origins of what might broadly be called the ‘structuralist tendency’ within philosophy of science. This has come to be identified with a form of ‘structural realism’ but it should be noted that it also includes those who adopt an anti-realist or empiricist stance. Because of the width of its embrace and its complex history, defining what is meant by ‘structure’ and characterising the tendency in general, is problematic. However, we begin by pointing out that the structuralist tendency always involves a shift in focus away from objects – however they are metaphysically conceived – to the structures in which they are (supposedly) embedded (where the reason for the qualifier ‘supposedly’ will become clear shortly). This is vague but the tendency, both historically and in its current incarnation, is not monolithic but rather includes various overlapping subgroups of structuralists.
Structural realism and the nature of structure
Ontic Structural Realism is a version of realism about science according to which by positing the existence of structures, understood as basic components of reality, one can resolve central difficulties faced by standard versions of scientific realism. Structures are invoked to respond to two important challenges: one posed by the pessimist meta-induction and the other by the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics, which arises in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We argue that difficulties in the proper understanding of what a structure is undermines the realist component of the view. Given the difficulties, either realism should be dropped or additional metaphysical components not fully endorsed by science should be incorporated.
Kinematics, Dynamics, and the Structure of Physical Theory
arXiv (Cornell University), 2016
Every physical theory has (at least) two different forms of mathematical equations to represent its target systems: the dynamical (equations of motion) and the kinematical (kinematical constraints). Kinematical constraints are differentiated from equations of motion by the fact that their particular form is fixed once and for all, irrespective of the interactions the system enters into. By contrast, the particular form of a system's equations of motion depends essentially on the particular interaction the system enters into. All contemporary accounts of the structure and semantics of physical theory treat dynamics, i.e., the equations of motion, as the most important feature of a theory for the purposes of its philosophical analysis. I argue to the contrary that it is the kinematical constraints that determine the structure and empirical content of a physical theory in the most important ways: they function as necessary preconditions for the appropriate application of the theory; they differentiate types of physical systems; they are necessary for the equations of motion to be well posed or even just cogent; and they guide the experimentalist in the design of tools for measurement and observation. It is thus satisfaction of the kinematical constraints that renders meaning to those terms representing a system's physical quantities in the first place, even before one can ask whether or not the system satisfies the theory's equations of motion. † This paper has been submitted to Philosophy of Science, Mar. 2016. I thank Chris Pincock for detailed comments, insightful suggestions and hard questions on an earlier draft of a manuscript of which this paper is a fragment, and for many enjoyable, illuminating conversations about these things in general. I thank Adam Caulton, Bill Demopoulos, and Sebastian Lutz for enjoyable and helpful conversations on the structure and semantics of theories in general. Finally, I thank Howard Stein for many fruitful and delightful conversations over many years touching on all sorts of matters related to the issues I address here in particular, and, in general, for more than I can well say. This paper owes a clear and debt to several of his papers, especially Stein (1992, 1994, 2004).
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