An Essay for Moral Objectivism

2020

Logical positivists have tried to distinguish meaningful questions from meaningless ones for decades. Their criterion of verifiability (and later of falsifiability) has left a strong mark in modern philosophy. However, logical positivism has been declared dead and many of the topics considered meaningless by them, such as ethics and aesthetics, are still lively debated by philosophers. It could even be argued that the conclusion that ethics and aesthetics should be dismissed as meaningless is a reductio ad absurdum of any theory of meaning. However, it is an equally absurd position to dismiss the broader idea that we must respect certain criteria in order to be entitled to claim that our statements are meaningful. In this thesis, therefore, I will try to reconcile the principles of logical positivism with ethics, proposing an alternative set of criteria for meaning and a pragmatic approach to ethics that should respect this criteria. I will do this by using Parfit's (2011) arguments in defense of objectivism as a case study. In chapter one I introduce the concepts that will serve as a foundation for my thesis. In chapter two, I begin my argumentation by laying out a fuzzy theory of meaning that allows for different degrees of meaningfulness based on Wittgenstein’s later work and concepts from cognitive science such as prototype theory and conceptual metaphors. In chapter three I argue that Parfit’s objectivism has a low degree of meaningfulness because it relies on the assumption that there is a “fundamental metaphysical relation that holds between facts, on the one hand, and beliefs, desires, aims, and actions, on the other”, a view that Smith (2017) calls “reasons fundamentalism”. Smith rejects reasons fundamentalism but accepts Parfit’s metaphysical framing of the debate. I will argue that the metaphysical nature of the argument renders it largely meaningless. Finally, in chapter four, I argue that although most metaethics is indeed meaningless, especially questions concerning the ontology of moral claims, the dismissal of moral utterances as mere expressions of emotions is also unjustified, and therefore I promote a pragmatic universalist metaethics that is compatible with the criteria of meaning described in chapter one. Essentially, I defend the thesis that the purpose of ethics is to resolve moral conflict, and that this should be done by appeal to logic, consistency, and universal moral intuitions, not contentious metaphysical commitments and category mistakes.

Quaestiones Infinitae, 2019

What implications do recent empirical findings from the fields of biology, primatology, anthropology, psychology and history have for metaethical theories about moral objectivity? I defend the thesis that these findings detract from the plausibility of a realist account of moral objectivity but leave room for a more moderate, antirealist account of objectivity, framed in terms of stance-invariance. The dissertation consists of six articles written for publication in academic journals. In these articles I present two novel, empirically informed challenges to moral realism, and point out some shortcomings of existing challenges. One of the novel challenges builds on the second horn of Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’, according to which moral realists are committed to an implausible evolutionary hypothesis, and extends this criticism to the historical realm. The other novel challenge is fuelled by theoretical and experimental work in moral psychology, and takes issue with the presumed advantages of moral realism in explaining the qualities of our moral experience. Apart from criticizing moral realism, I also develop and defend an alternative account of moral objectivity in antirealist terms and argue that it is as least as successful as a realist account in capturing the objectivist commitments of ordinary moral discourse. In this introductory chapter I outline the aims and methods of the dissertation and demonstrate the coherence of the treatise.

2017

Synthese, 2009

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativ-ism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. 1

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 1996

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2012

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call "perspectivalism." These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self-standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as 'wrong' and 'right', require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.

2013

In this paper, I contend that that although moral relativism with respect to social and cultural customs and mores is apparently consistent with the ideals of democracy and the principles of science, moral absolutism should be embraced because it is logically sound in relation to objective standards, appears consistent with ideas of an internal drive or force that influences human behavior, seems consonant with notions of divine involvement in human affairs and contributes to social harmony and continuity despite the necessary subordination of some human rights and freedoms for the common good.

This paper defines moral relativism, refutes it, explores its motivations, and examines its social consequences.

2011

This dissertation defends realist views in ethics against arguments advanced by ethical constructivists. Realists think that ethical truth obtains independently of any preferred perspective. That is, it is at bottom independent of whatever beliefs, desires, or other forms of commitment we have. Constructivists, in contrast, deny this. But this could mean different things, and there is currently no consensus on what constructivism involves exactly or how we ought to understand this dispute. Consequently, it has been difficult to evaluate the merits of constructivist arguments. This work attempts to remedy these deficiencies by developing a framework for both interpreting and evaluating the nature and scope of the constructivist's challenge. In the first two chapters, I address some of the larger interpretative disputes. In Chapter 1, I argue that there are two main ways of understanding constructivism. Each of these corresponds to the rejection of a particular commitment of realism. In Chapter 2, however, I argue that neither of these should be understood as representing a freestanding view in metaethics. Rather, each takes aim at a narrower target: viz., the realist's conception of ethical objectivity. The first type of constructivist challenge rejects realist claims about the nature of ethical objectivity; the second type accepts these but rejects claims about it scope. In the final three chapters, I evaluate these two versions of the challenge. In Chapter 3, I argue that if the constructivist rejects all stance-independent ethical truth, she commits herself to absurd results within ethical theory. This prompts me to consider more modest constructivist theses, ones that allow for some stanceindependent ethical truths but that also significantly restrict the scope that such truths play within an ethical theory. In Chapters 4 and 5, however, I argue that the best arguments for this more modest constructivism also fail because the ethical considerations they appeal to-i.e., moral rationalism and autonomy-can be equally accommodated by a robust moral realism.