On the a priori rejection of evidential arguments from evil

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2003

In recent times, a number of philosophers have championed ‘sceptical theist’ responses to evidential arguments from evil. [Alston 1991, 1996; Bergmann 2001; Fitzpatrick 1981; Howard-Snyder 1996a, 1996c; van Inwagen 1991; Plantinga 1979, 1988; Wykstra 1984, 1996] The core idea behind these responses to evidential arguments from evil is that considerations of human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine those arguments. This core idea is developed in different ways. Some ‘sceptical theists’—[Bergmann 2001; Howard-Snyder 1996a, 1996c]—claim that consideration of human cognitive limitations in the realm of value are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. Other ‘sceptical theists’—[Alston 1991, 1996; van Inwagen 1991; Plantinga 1979, 1988; Wykstra 1984, 1996]—claim that consideration of human cognitive limitations in various spheres including the realm of value are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. Our response to these ‘sceptical theists’ is in two parts. First, we argue—against [Bergmann 2001, et al.]—that it isn’t true that considerations of human cognitive limitations in the realm of value are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. Second, we argue against [Alston 1991, 1996, et al.]—that it isn’t true that considerations of human cognitive limitations in various spheres including the realm of values are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2000

Sophia, 1994

Recent work on the evidential argument from evil offers us sundry considerations which are intended to weigh against this form of atheological arguments. By far the most provocative is that on a priori grounds alone, evil can be shown to be evidentially impotent. This astonishing thesis has been given a vigorous defense by Keith Yandell. In this paper, we shall measure the prospects for an a priori dismissal of evidential arguments from evil.

Philo, 2005

and Oppy (2003), we set out to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil. In particular, we argued that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine noseeum inferences in evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine noseeum inferences that play a crucial role in the justification of ordinary moral reasoning. Bergmann and Rea (2005) defend sceptical theism against our argument. They claim, first, that our argument fails to show that 'sceptical theism as such undermines ordinary moral practice', and, second, that our argument fails even to show that 'in the absence of various background beliefs that theists are very likely to possess, [sceptical theism] undermines ordinary moral practice'. Following Bergmann (2001), we shall suppose that the sceptical theist critique of evidential arguments relies upon the following three claims: ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. ST2: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are representative of the possible evils there are.

The evidential argument from evil is one argument philosophers have proposed to conclude that, in light of the existence of evil, the existence of a good, all-powerful, and benevolent God cannot exist, and theistic belief is irrational, or in light of pointless evil, the existence of such a being is unlikely. In offering an answer to the question of evil, a Christian defense argues that it is reasonable to believe in God and that he is justified in allowing evil, even if we do not know his reasons.

Australasian Philosophical Review, 2022

This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. It will be published in its final form in an upcoming issue of Australasian Philosophical Review). This paper focuses on three aspects of Dormandy's discussion: Evidentialism about Faith, stubborn counterevidence and horrendous evils (HE). 1 On Dormandy's account, 'Evidentialism about Faith' says: Respect for evidence about the object of faith is an excellent-making feature of faith, even though this may, in a world like ours, mean forming negative beliefs about that object. [Dormandy forthcoming: 14]. On Dormandy's account, there exists much apparently stubborn counterevidence in our world, on the basis of which, any competent person who respects her evidence would likely form negative beliefs about God [ibid.: 2, 4, 5, 8, 14, 15 20]. This paper focuses on (HE) as a form of stubborn counterevidence [ibid.: 4, 8]. On my reading, there are two ways to understand how likely it would be, on Dormandy's account, for the evidentialist to form negative beliefs about God due to (HE). On the weaker view, it is logically possible for an evidentialist to form negative beliefs about God. Dormandy explains that respect for evidence 'may' mean forming negative beliefs [ibid.: 14]. On the stronger view, due to our world being filled with stubborn counterevidence, it is highly probable that an evidentialist would form negative beliefs about God [ibid.: 2, 5]. Against the stronger view, I consider the case of the Theistic Evidentialist. A Committed Theistic Evidentialist is an evidentialist who possesses a defeater belief against (HE). An Uncommitted Theistic Evidentialist is an evidentialist who allows that some defeater belief against (HE) might be true. Both these positions are important as I suspect that most theists who are evidentialists would subscribe to some defeater belief against apparently stubborn evidence, and even if one is not a theist, I suspect that the number of evidentialists who are willing to countenance the possibility that some defeater belief might be true would be rather significant. This paper focuses primarily on the Committed

Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons for action. Since the existence of genuine pragmatic reasons for action is common ground between the Evidentialist and the Pragmatist, this problem for the New Evidentialist arguments is fatal. The upshot is that the deadlock between these two positions is restored: neither side can claim to be in possession of an argument that could convince the other. As it happens, I myself favor Pragmatism about reasons for belief, and although I don’t claim to be able to convince a committed Evidentialist, I do make a prima facie case for Pragmatism by describing particular scenarios in which it seems to be true. I then go on to develop my own preferred version of the view: Robust Pragmatism, according to which a consideration never constitutes a reason for believing a proposition purely in virtue of being evidence for it.

2015

Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skeptical theists”. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory version that is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”. I argue that he has done no such thing.

2016

In this research, we discussed the types of evil: moral and natural, which are cited by atheistic philosophers as evidence against the existence of God. The so-called evidence from evil has been used by the atheistic and other non-theistic scholars to raise hypothesis on evaluating the possibility or likelihood that an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God exists in a world that is littered with evil. Moral evil is evil that arise from the misuse of free will by moral agents, while natural evils are natural disasters such as: earthquakes, famine, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes etc. We discussed moral evil and Plantinga's free will defense. We also discussed the natural evil and how it poses threat to theism. The logical and the evidential arguments from evil are the forms of arguments developed from moral and natural evils. While many scholars have agreed that Plantinga's free will defense adequately responds to the problem of logical evil, the same

Religious Studies, 2020

Michael Tooley has developed a sophisticated evidential version of the argument from evil that aims to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil depend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley's defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence of unknown wrongmaking properties. I argue that Tooley's argument begs the question against the theist, and, in doing so, commits an analogue of the base rate fallacy. I conclude with some reflections on what a successful argument from evil would have to establish.