Dignity, Autonomy and Integrity of Self

Journal of Global Studies, Vol. 9 (March 2019), pp. 1-24. Kyoto: Doshisha University., 2019

Recently, vigorous debate has emerged in the field of the philosophy of human rights. Currently, opponents argue against so-called naturalistic theories that view human rights as possessed by all persons in virtue of humanity. In particular, the notion of human dignity, often appealed to by naturalistic theorists, is widely challenged. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of human dignity as a grounding value of human rights as well as naturalistic theories against criticisms. To accomplish this, the paper is structured as follows. First, it shows that in influential theories of human rights such as the one offered by James Griffin, the notion of human dignity in contemporary human rights documents is treated as providing important guidance for grounding human rights. Second, the paper defends dignity from Andrea Sangiovanni’s series of recent counter-arguments. To begin with, although Sangiovanni criticises three traditions of dignity, namely Aristocratic, Christian, and Kantian ones, it is pointed out that the best mixed theories of these traditions can avoid many of his criticisms. This paper, however, considers his two concerns regarding the Aristocratic tradition and one pertaining to all three traditions as worthy of examination, and thus responds to him. The paper shows that his three criticisms are ungrounded and the notion of dignity can work in a theory of human rights. Third, this paper defends naturalistic theories, by analysing and replying to Sangiovanni’s criticisms of Griffin’s view. Sangiovanni insists that naturalistic theories, inter alia Griffin’s, cannot distinguish human rights from other moral rights. The paper points out that the core of this criticism is a replication of an already suggested dilemma of the ‘austere’ and ‘rich’ interpretations of normative agency. It then argues that even Griffin’s theory can demonstrate an appropriate threshold of distinguishing human from other rights by considering ‘practicalities’ while proposing provisos for them. Finally, the paper analyses Sangiovanni’s alternatives to dignity and naturalistic theories: an idea of ‘integral sense of self’ and a context-sensitive human rights theory. The paper doubts that his idea of an integral sense of self can succeed as a genuine alternative to dignity. This is because, first, support for this idea requires engaging in the very controversy among naturalistic theories: which interests should ground human rights. Second, the idea uses the exact same theoretical resources of practicalities as those in typical naturalistic views. The paper also claims that naturalistic theories are needed to deal with the shortcomings of Sangiovanni’s context-based view of human rights, such as the inseparability of contexts, and (even if separable) too much of the calculative burden of human rights for individuals in each context. Based on the present investigation, the paper concludes that to guide our language community of human rights, we still need naturalistic theories and dignity-based views are promising candidates among these; i.e. we still need an idea of humanity with dignity.

This paper challenges the claim that human dignity is not the foundation of human rights, but is rather a special kind of human right itself. The claim recognizes that human persons have a vulnerable and psychologically constructed identity called the Self which is continuously developed throughout their lifetime. Such a claim relies on moral Contractualism as the basis for human rights and the Self is said to be an integral part of the human person such that she both demands that it remain free from serious insult while agreeing to refrain from insulting any other person’s Self. The argument for human dignity as a right will be critiqued for too quickly dismissing alternative accounts of dignity which place it as the foundation, rather than a result of human rights. Dignity is, by definition, that which makes one worthy rather than the result of being worthy. Therefore, dignity is not the kind of thing which can be the result of human rights. Dignity is best understood as the foundation of human rights as articulated by the theory of “attribution-dignity” which argues that people have dignity based on their status as human beings. Human beings possess a self, and dignity is constituted by the possession of the Self by humans, rather than their demand that the Self which they possess be protected.

In contemporary world there are a lot of idea of dignity and we can observe many differences in the perception and interpretation of it. One can find many reasons for this discrepancy. While focusing on the most important human rights, the authors want to demonstrate that, despite the many changes that have occurred in recent decades, the idea of human rights is essential to human dignity. For these reasons, we believe that the nature of human rights require its re-examination in the prism of human dignity. Analysis of philosophical, cultural and legal contexts in which a concept of dignity occurs, may contribute to a better understanding of what dignity is and what is not. Above all, may allow reflection on the crisis of dignity of the XXI century human. Dignity is a type of value that co-creates the sense of human life, directs to a specific goal, and also regulates interpersonal connections. Here, the authors analyze dignity in the context of specific concepts of man to show the relations between dignity and the eternal question: " who am I in the light of my rights? " Secondarily, we show how crucial contextual and hermeneutical thinking is, while studying fundamental concepts of human experiences such as dignity. The analysis of the subject carried out by experts in fields of legal and philosophical sciences, based on the common foundation, which is an individual and his life, points to many critical issues that need to be thoroughly evaluated, as long as the subject is approached holistically.

Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law

Human dignity is the most abstract principle that regulates the relationship between rulers and ruled. Its subject matter is the basic duty that a public authority owes to all who are governed by it. This duty is basic because it is not the product of a contingent fact about a particular legal system, whether a historical episode, a provision in a constitutional text, a commitment of a public culture, or a tradition of governance. Rather, human dignity is the subject of a public duty that attends the governance of human beings as such. Human dignity is a revolutionary constitutional idea because it rejects earlier ways of conceptualizing the relationship between rulers and ruled, in which the rulers either owed no duty to the ruled or owed only those duties that were voluntarily undertaken through some affirmative act. This article explores the concept of human dignity from two standpoints. On the one hand, it expounds the functions that the concept of human dignity plays in constitutional practice in jurisdictions around the world. On the other, it formulates difficulties that the leading theories of human dignity encounter in articulating the meaning of human dignity as a constitutional concept. These difficulties are instructive because they indicate the parameters in which a more adequate constitutional theory of human dignity would operate.

My primary and highly ambitious aim in this long-ish essay is to provide a clear, distinct, consistent, complete, and true—or at least philosophically intelligible, defensible and plausible—theory of human dignity. My secondary aim, which is also pretty ambitious, is to do for radically enlightened dignitarian social and political theory what John Rawls’s "Theory of Justice" did for liberal contractarian social and political theory.

Faith and Philosophy, 2000

The traditional doctrine of human dignity has fallen on hard times. It is said that that doctrine is "speciesist to the core" and "the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics." Those of us who would defend the view that humans enjoy greater moral standing than nonhuman living things must answer the question, "What's so special about humans?" In this paper, I argue that moral agency is a great-making property that confers special worth on its bearer. I Renaissance humanism never had a more enthusiastic spokesperson than the young intellectual, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494). According to Pico, "Man is the most fortunate creature and thus worthy of all admiration." He is "to be envied not only by the beasts, but also by the stars, and the Intelligences beyond this world." "To him it was granted to have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills. "I Pico was seldom known for restraint in his intellectual endeavors, and he may have allowed himself to get a little carried away. Indeed, Pope Innocent VIII-a human himself-suggested that Pico tone things down a bit. What this precocious young Florentine professed on paper, a younger Florentine contemporary would say just a few years later in marble. Michelangelo'S David also

Human Affairs, 2019

There is little need to argue for the importance of human rights (HRs) in our world. If one looks at the role they play today, it is hard to deny that their impact has increased beyond anything the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration could have hoped or imagined. However, even though human rights today have a far greater impact on politics than in the past, the philosophical reflection that surrounds them has had a less fortunate history. It is doubtful whether we are today in a better position than we were in 1948 to answer any of the philosophical questions surrounding them, including, and perhaps most crucially, the question about their foundation. Why are human rights standards—of whatever sort—that we should adopt, or even just take seriously? The first two parts of this paper summarize my recent work on the above question (Caranti, 2017) and the third takes it a step further. I will 1) show why the main orientations in the contemporary philosophy of human rights all fai...

Policy Sciences, 2011

Dignity seems to be something that virtually all people want. It is a seminal expression of the human experience that gains authority through the convergent demands of people worldwide. Even so, the human dignity concept is in unhelpful disarray. Dignity is variously viewed as an antecedent, a consequence, a value, a principle, and an experience, from philosophical, legal, pragmatic, psychological, behavioral, and cultural perspectives. We ask which if any of these human dignity concepts will likely serve our global common interests best, as both common ground and policy diagnostic? We examine four broad themes: dignity as (1) a metaphysical justification for human rights and duties, (2) virtuous comportment or behavior, (3) a perspective of “other,” and (4) a subjective experience of the individual, contingent on a broad and equitable sharing of values. We recommend viewing dignity as a commonwealth of individually assessed well-being, shaped by relationships with others, affected by the physical world, and framed in terms of values. Viewed this way, the idea of dignity accommodates the priorities of both individualistic and communitarian cultures. Conceiving of human dignity as a commonwealth of subjectively experienced value production and enjoyment has many practical policy implications.