Japan’s New Security Policy: Toward Regional Involvement at Sea?

Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 2020

Japan is heavily dependent on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) of the South China Sea for its external trade including the critical energy imports from the Persian Gulf region. Any kind of instability or disruption over the contested waters will have an adverse effect on Japan's trade and economy. The increasingly assertive actions of Beijing, especially the military buildup have raised concerns in Tokyo as it might eventually lead to the strategic control of the SLOCs. Thus, developments in the South China Sea are a major reason why Japan has brought about several changes to its defence and security policies. This paper will explore how Chinese assertions in the South China Sea have encouraged Japan to steadily revise its security policies in a more fundamental way since the end of World War II.

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2017

Japan has a national interest in the South China Sea issue. Although its direct commitment is ultimately limited in a material sense due to a lack of military capabilities, as well as political and constitutional constraints on the Self-Defense Force, Japan has maintained its firm stance to uphold international maritime rules and norms, and nurtured strong diplomatic relations and conducted maritime capacity-building programs with the South-East Asian states, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. These actions contribute to consolidating the rule of law at sea and provide those claimant states an opportunity to withstand pressures from China. Given the Trump administration’s unclear South China Sea policy and South-East Asia’s strategic uncertainty, Japan is becoming a key player in maintaining regional maritime stability in East Asia through diplomacy.

Seoul National University Journal of International Affairs, 2018

"In the face of the volatility in the East China Sea, marked with the rise of assertive China, Japan's decision to militarize the region in 2014 and 2015 under the Abe administration represented a significant shift in its foreign policy orientation. This paper will analyze Japan's militarization of the East China Sea, with particular focus on its consequences and implications. The paper is conducted as a qualitative phenomenological study, which draws upon existing relevant literature and a wide range of primary sources such as statements and speeches of Japanese key political figures as well as officials of other countries concerned. As opposed to the objective illustration of particular events, the primary sources illustrate the growing first-hand threat perceptions among the Japanese policy-makers who found themselves trapped in the destabilizing regional environment, which compelled them to embrace the hardline approach. This paper demonstrates that Japan's militarization not only failed to achieve the Abe administrations desired outcomes, but also culminated in worsening Japan's diplomatic ties with its neighboring states and generating a regional security dilemma. This examination is useful for understanding how Japan's militarization contributed to forming the current volatile security situation in East Asia, especially in its relation with China. Additionally, Japan's militarization is representative of its changing foreign policy orientation toward China, which is becoming more confrontational and uncompromising. The originality of this work lies in the use of unfiltered perspectives and voices in Japanese political sphere, documented in primary sources."

This article examines and analyses Japan’s current interest in the South China Sea, by first alluding to the historical context of that country’s involvement from the mid-1930s to the end of the Pacific War, 1945. It then outlines Japan’s energy security and needs and that country’s national policy relating to securing safety for its flagged ships and those vessels assisting in promoting Japan’s export and import and the diplomatic role that Japan plays towards regional stability. Japan in their Diplomatic Bluebook stated that the priority for Japan is to guarantee the security and prosperity of the country and its people. Here, it is clear that the Japanese Government will try to do everything to give the best to ensure their survival. Japan interests in South China Sea is because it is deemed critical for the Japanese security.

National Institute of Defense Studies, 2018

Japan has sought to improve Southeast Asian maritime safety and security as an element of its foreign policy for the last fifty years. Predominantly comprised of capacity building activities (CBAs), the Japanese initiatives have focused on helping Southeast Asian states maintain good order in their nearby waters. In recent years, these policies have received increased public attention given the more direct involvement of Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in efforts that were previously the exclusive domain of Japanese civilian agencies, non-governmental foundations and private interests. This paper analyzes the evolution of Japan’s maritime security initiatives by documenting major events and offering new insights into the most important milestones and inflection points associated with that history. Unlike previous accounts that portray this history as a matter of gradual change, it demonstrates that Japan’s initiatives have passed through three distinct phases (1969-1998, 1999-2009, and 2010-present) with the shifts between each being marked by very quick expansions of the Japanese agencies, partner organizations and missions involved. The paper continues by discussing the most prevalent explanations for the way these initiatives have developed by grouping the arguments into four narrative clusters based on the key variables considered. The first narrative cluster focuses on security threats and national power, the second on the domestic competition that creates Japan’s foreign policy, the third on U.S.-Japan alliance dynamics, and the fourth on concepts of national reputation and responsibility. The analysis shows that none of the common explanations are satisfactory. Instead eclectic, multi-dimensional and comprehensive studies are required to properly understand the Japanese security policymaking process. The paper concludes by examining what this historical and process analysis suggests may be on the horizon for Japan’s future involvement in Southeast Asian maritime security.

Asian Security , 2020

Japan has included improvement of Southeast Asian maritime security as an aim of its foreign policy for the last fifty years. This article analyzes the evolution of Japan’s maritime security initiatives in Southeast Asia by documenting major events and offering new insights into the most important inflection points associated with that history. Unlike previous accounts that portray this history as a matter of gradual change, it demonstrates that Japan’s initiatives passed through three distinct phases (1969–1998, 1999–2009, and 2010- present) with the shifts between each being marked by quick expansions of the Japanese agencies and partner organizations involved. This history pro- vides critical context for understanding Japan’s apparent transition into a fourth phase in which Japanese cooperative activities will begin working to strengthen Southeast Asian military capacities.

Jurnal hubungan internasional, 2021

This research aims to investigate Japan's motivation to be involved in the South China Sea dispute despite Japan's far distance from the conflicted area. Utilizing the qualitative research method, this research analyzes Japanese Government official documents and relevant literature to achieve the research objective. The research discovers that Japan's main interest in the South China Sea is to articulate a safer maritime lane for the sake of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda by balancing China's assertiveness in the region. Employing a regional security complex framework, this research sees that Japan, by its presence in the South China Sea, tries to intensify the security interaction with Southeast Asian counterparts to expand the Northeast Asian regional subcomplex, aiming to strengthen the perception of China as a threat to Southeast Asian countries. The South China Sea involvement will fortify Japan's security interlink with Southeast Asian counterparts, balancing China's expansive trait in the maritime zone, accelerating Tokyo-initiated Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

Asian Perspective, 2009

Japan has pursued a grand strategy of creating an East Asian maritime order with a special emphasis on situating a U.S.-Japan-China trilateral arrangement, based on cooperative security, at the core of an East Asian maritime regime. The United States and China have slowly adopted some of this Japanese strategy. This article examines the lessons East Asia has learned from several maritime security initiatives-America's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), Japan's ReCAAP, and Southeast Asia's MALSINDO-that were applied to the anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. Despite the influence of Japan's strategy for maritime security, paradoxically it has responded more slowly in its deployment to the Gulf of Aden, contributing to the traditional image of Japan as a reactive state. The institutional design of maritime regimes in the Gulf of Aden and in East Asia is thus incrementally unfolding; maritime cooperation is taking place in an ad hoc, bottom-up manner with very uncertain outcomes.

Japan's principal security interest in Southeast Asia is the safety and security of regional sea lanes. Over the past several years, Japan has expressed growing concern at rising tensions in the South China Sea and the lack of progress by the claimants to negotiate effective conflict management mechanisms. Japan is not a claimant in the dispute, but as a major maritime trading nation, it is a significant stakeholder. Japan has two major concerns over the South China Sea. First, that instability has the potential to disrupt the free flow of maritime trade on which the country's economic prosperity depends, and, second, that if China is able to persuade or coerce other Asian nations into accepting its claimed 'historic rights' in the South China Sea, existing international legal norms would be undermined. Moreover, Tokyo is alarmed at China's increasingly assertive posture in the maritime domain, and views the disputes in the South and East China Seas as linked. To mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea, Japan is pursuing a number of strategies: it raises the problem at regional security forums; it seeks to enhance cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on issues of maritime security and encourage unity within the organization on the South China Sea; it discusses the problem bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries and has started to provide capacity-building support to selected claimants (principally, the Philippines); and it seeks closer ties with other external stakeholders that share its concerns.

Abstract: The Philippines and Japan have evolved a security partnership in the face of China’s maritime expansion in the South and East China Seas. The two countries pursue this security partnership through regular bilateral consultations among Philippine and Japanese heads of states, political leaders, defense ministry officials, and high-ranking military officers; joint naval exercises; and exploratory discussions for arms transfers and negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the Philippines. Initially, Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 Constitution hindered this security partnership. However, a recent reinterpretation of the pacifist constitution now allows Japan a collective self-defense “particularly to export arms to its allies and security partners and to deploy the JSDF overseas when necessary. Now, the challenge for Japan and the Philippines is to ensure the viability of their security partnership in the light of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s efforts to improve his country’s relations with China.