The role the Armed Forces likely to play in future conflicts

In the imaginable future plausible conflicts are unlikely to occur in prolonged ground campaigns, with major inconclusive battles and lengthy periods of immobility and slow destruction, on large, well-defined fronts. Although battles and periods of attrition have occurred in the war between Iran and Iraq (countries that have been able to sustain them for a long time - a model of war whose repetition is not impossible but unlikely), in the Gulf conflicts - 1991 was an intervention with limited objectives, without total defeat, the Balkans - 1999 and Afghanistan - 2001/2002, (which took place under a now more credible model, that of asymmetric intervention), action on land It was characterized by rapid penetration and / or flanking or even manoeuvring in limited zones rather than battle fronts, after the enemy ground force's operational capacity was reduced by air strikes, missiles and special operations. There is at all any similarly with the large units of heavy (armoured), heavy artillery and conventional infantry very influential in the most relevant conventional land theatres in the 20th century (Europe, North Africa, First and Second World Wars). The collapse of the Iraqi Army in 1991, the effective survival of these large units, with their supportive all-round paraphernalia, is compromised by the lethal accuracy and efficiency of modern weapons - aviation (airplanes and helicopters) and cruise missiles. Although, still present in the great powers and in some countries with classic regional concerns and cares (Korea, Iraq itself, Israel and a few others), in general the large heavy units are no longer the "flagship" of the Modern armies. Countries, which are at least relevant in their geopolitical region, should have these tanks, although in smaller relative dimensions than in the past, as restricted or occasional situations may arise where their shock power is convenient. The trend is that the importance of short-term, ready-to-deploy ground forces (repeating, strategic and operational-tactical deployment), ready for the modern-style “blitzkrieg” with heavy use of helicopters and special operations is growing in importance (destruction / sabotage, seizure, recognition and attainment of "intelligence", hostage or non-combatant rescue and counterterrorism), well endowed with weapons, communications, sensors and other technologically advanced equipment.

Routledge Handbook of the Future of Warfare, 2023

This handbook provides a comprehensive, problem-driven and dynamic overview of the future of warfare. The volatilities and uncertainties of the global security environment raise timely and important questions about the future of humanity's oldest occupation: war. This volume addresses these questions through a collection of cutting-edge contributions by leading scholars in the field. Its overall focus is prognostic rather than futuristic, highlighting discernible trends, key developments and themes without downplaying the lessons from the past. By making the past meet the present in order to envision the future, the handbook offers a diversified outlook on the future of warfare, which will be indispensable for researchers, students and military practitioners alike. The volume is divided into six thematic sections. Section I draws out general trends in the phenomenon of war and sketches the most significant developments, from the past to the present and into the future. Section II looks at the areas and domains which actively shape the future of warfare. Section III engages with the main theories and conceptions of warfare, capturing those attributes of contemporary conflicts which will most likely persist and determine the dynamics and directions of their transformations. The fourth section addresses differentiation and complexity in the domain of warfare, pointing to those factors which will exert a strong impact on the structure and properties of that domain. Section V focuses on technology as the principal trigger of changes and alterations in the essence of warfare. The final section draws on the general trends identified in Section I and sheds light on how those trends have manifested in specific local contexts. This section zooms in on particular geographies which are seen and anticipated as hotbeds where future warfare will most likely assume its shape and reveal its true colours. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, defence studies, war and technology, and International Relations.

International Review of the Red Cross, 2015

To what extent do the ways in which we anticipate threats, analyze their possible consequences and determine ways to mitigate them explain the causes of warfare in the future? This article – though never attempting to predict – poses plausible causes of future wars that may stem from transformative change over the next two decades. In asking the question “Are we ready?” to deal with such wars, the answer is framed in terms of the interrelationship between the prospect of profound change, emerging tensions, unprecedented violence and organizational capacities to deal with complexity and uncertainty. To be prepared to deal with the prospect of future wars, relevant organizations have to be more anticipatory and adaptive, while at the same time looking for new ways to engage the wider international community. The article concludes with a set of recommendations intended to meet such organizational challenges – with the aspiration that the question “Are we ready?” can be answered more af...

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES, 2012

The current challenges of the contemporary operational environment determine not only the establishment of a force structure having the necessary high engagement and sustainment capacity (including logistics), but also the allocation of ISTAR capabilities to support the fulfilment of assigned missions and the achievement of desired effects by the armed forces. Their support will be permanently adapted to the specificity of the operations in which they will be engaged, focusing on commonali- ty, interchangeability, interoperability and integrated functioning within multinatio- nal structures, depending on the way they will be organised, the deployment site, the climate, their sustainment capability in conflict areas and the legal institutionalised framework set up by the international organisations that will conduct those missions.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directly challenged the Pentagon's strategists and military chiefs in an important speech at the National Defense University in September 2008. The speech was a critical assessment of the prevailing U.S. military culture and the prism through which our Armed Forces see themselves. This prism clarifies what is important about the future and how we posture our forces for the future. Secretary Gates questioned that mindset and its hold on the Services and the Department of Defense's capitalization practices. Secretary Gates also declared that "the defining principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance," 1 a principle that will also be key in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This principle will force the critical examination of assumptions about the future, our understanding of threats, and their relative priorities. Gates emphasizes achieving a balance between our current conflicts and the Pentagon's penchant to plan toward more canonical, conventional scenarios. The Secretary believes that the Pentagon is devoted to postulated longer term challenges that have little to do with current conflicts and more likely threats. He used the term Next-War-itis to describe a prism that distorts the Services' ability to see military affairs clearly and objectively. 2 The concept of balance is central to today's security debate, but it is a complex problem rather than a simple equation. To America's ongoing battles in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted limitations in our understanding of the complexity of modern warfare. Furthermore, our cultural prism has retarded the institutionalization of capabilities needed to prevail in stabilization and counterinsurgency missions. An ongoing debate about future threats is often framed as a dichotomous choice between counterinsurgency and conventional war. This oversimplifies defense planning and resource allocation decisions. Instead of fundamentally different approaches, we should expect competitors who will employ all forms of war, perhaps simultaneously. Such multimodal threats are often called hybrid threats. Hybrid adversaries employ combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric advantage. Thus, the choice is not simply one of preparing for long-term stability operations or high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do both simultaneously against enemies far more ruthless than today's. This essay widens the aperture of the current debate to account for this threat. It compares and contrasts four competing perspectives and evaluates them for readiness and risk implications. This risk assessment argues that the hybrid threat presents the most operational risk in the near-to midterm. Accordingly, it concludes that hybrid threats are a better focal point for considering alternative joint force postures.

Infinity Journal, 2012

Future Wars (futurewars.rspanwar.net), 2017

Part I of this write-up discussed the changing nature of warfare over the last several centuries, based on Lind’s categorisation of “Generations of Warfare” as well as the concept of “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). This part looks at the fast changing pace at which warfighting concepts are undergoing change in the present century, especially as a result of the ongoing rapid technological advancements. It gives an overview of some new conceptualisations of modern warfare such as “Asymmetric Warfare”, “Unrestricted Warfare” and “Hybrid Warfare”. It also dwells briefly on new Information Age warfighting concepts, such as “Network Centric Warfare”, “Information Warfare” and “Cyber Warfare”.

Future Wars (futurewars.rspanwar.net), 2017

Over the centuries, warfare has undergone significant transformation, due to new discoveries and innovative application of technologies, resulting in dramatic changes in military doctrine, organisational concepts, and conduct of military operations. The changing face of war was categorised as “generations of warfare” in 1989 by a team of US analysts, led by William S Lind. The changing nature of warfare is also reflected in the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This first of a two-part article takes a brief look at these two aspects, and their relevance to the current Indian security scenario.

2019

The popular maxim holds that generals (and, by extension, their armies) always plan for the previous war. 1 The wide-ranging chapters of this volume show the limits of this truism. There is much more to thinking about future war: it is a dynamic and on-going process, influenced by a myriad of political, military, social, economic and cultural shifts. The imagining of future war is an important factor and often a causal element in historical processes, whether or not it is immediately followed by war. The study of the thinking about and the planning for wars in the past not only opens a window on wider societal conceptions and preoccupations at the time, but is also a basis for thinking about (and hopefully implementing) military changes in peacetime.

Revista Cientifica General Jose Maria Cordova, 2019