How Europe should answer the inflation reduction act

Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 1992

Rome, IAI, September 2020, 5 p. (IAI Commentaries ; 20|60), 2020

Fighting climate change is an important policy objective but it should not be linked to protectionist mechanisms or become a tool for an artificial (energy/resource) dependency avoidance. Furthermore, decision makers in Brussels should consider potentially adverse effects of the proposed international measures on stability and growth in emerging countries. New measures could undermine state budgets in already fragile contexts, potentially creating new internal and external tensions that will also come at a cost for EU interests.

The Monitor, 2022

The Monitor Progressive news, views and ideas As world leaders depart from the COP27 conference in Cairo, another key policy battle over international climate policy is taking place. Far from the boardrooms of the Egyptian capital, one of the largest global common markets is deciding on how to incorporate climate into its import regulations. Though a nal decision is still pending (https:/ /www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)698889) , the European Union (EU) could very well kick off the New Year with a new policy-the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the name given to what is essentially a tariff on high-carbon imports. To the EU, CBAM re ects its commitment to decarbonization, supporting its climate change policy by avoiding "carbon leakage (https:/ /www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/2awc3khbmvds4klpya8lc/sponsored/the-european-commissions-cbamthreat-or-opportunity) ." Europe's key trading partners view it as unfair and unilateral (https:/ /www.thehindu.com/scitech/energy-and-environment/cop27-india-china-brazil-south-africa-oppose-carbon-border-tax/article66144968.ece). The results of this trade dispute could affect Canada's rollout of a CBAM-type measure at home. The European policy launch is also happening while the EU and other countries consider World Trade Organization challenges to U.S. subsidies for green energy and electric vehicles, which they claim distort trade. It would be a shame to let these trade tensions and messy climate politics get in the way of decent ideas for decarbonizing heavy industry.

1996

Discussion Papers of Diw Berlin, 2004

Intereconomics, 2007

Georgia Journal of International Comparative Law, 2014

The European Union (EU) currently imports 54% of its energy. The EU therefore faces serious energy challenges concerning pollution from greenhouse gas emissions, energy security and the competitiveness and effective implementation of the internal energy market. Since the 1990s, EU has worked progressively towards tackling these issues starting with setting policies and a legislative and regulatory framework for attaining these goals. The EU intends to lead a new industrial revolution and create a high efficiency energy economy with low CO2 emissions.

2017

Highlights • The current EU climate end energy package includes several policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2020. The main instrument is the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The complexity of this policy package flags up synergies and interactions among different climate policy instruments, in particular, between the EU ETS and energy policies such as those to support Renewable Energy (REN) or energy efficiency.

2021

With the creation of the Green Deal, the European Union aims to achieve the goal of climate-neutrality by 2050. Multi-speed European integration is very likely to take place during the procedure of transition, if the proper precautions are not taken. Although this would not necessarily be a reason to be concerned about in other cases, in the case of climate-neutrality would be most distressful. That is because of the lack of justness multi-speed transition carries and the nature of the goal itself. Although the EU has created a whole mechanism to reassure that the transition will take place in a fair and just way, it concentrates on regions with specific features (such as fossil and carbon dependency), leaving behind other, less concerning regions. This Policy Brief aims to create a link between the Just Transition Mechanism and the possibility of multi-speed integration and to propose an additional pillar that –even though might seem gentlermay be enough to prevent this issue. That...

Sustainable Growth and Applications in Renewable Energy Sources, 2011

Lessons learned: reform, not revolution. The good news first: the current architecture of EU climate and energy policies is adequate – in principle. It has helped deliver substantial reductions in GHG emissions and it has promoted a significant increase in renewable energies. And according to the 2014 Report on Energy Prices and Costs, “there is no empirical evidence that the current framework has caused carbon leakage or has impacted negatively on the competitiveness of the EU economy. The EU has retained the lead in exports of energy intensive goods” (European Commission 2014d, 13). These are remarkable achievements. Despite these achievements, important elements of current policy framework require reform, some of them urgently. First, the targets. The level of ambition – as reflected in the 2020 targets or the energy roadmap – is insufficient to meet the 2050 GHG reduction targets. Even with the implementation of measures currently in the planning, 2030 emissions are believed to decrease to only 28% below 1990 levels (compared to – 24% in 2020) (European Commission 2014c). Such reductions fall short of cost effective decarbonisation pathway towards 2050. Second, the instruments. Marred by large surpluses of allowances, the ETS has failed to set prices that incentivise the required investments and – more problematically – is not expected to do so in the future. Attempts to improve energy efficiency have suffered from a fragmented and insufficiently rigid EU policy framework. They have not and are unlikely to deliver energy savings at the level required. In times of economic crisis, EU climate and energy policies have been criticized as expensive, inefficient and incoherent. Political pressure to weaken the framework has been high, almost questioning the decarbonisation objectives of the EU as such. This has led to significant uncertainties for investors, who no longer see credible political signals that the EU is truly committed to decarbonising its economy. This has undermined one of the key objectives of the 2020 framework: providing business with investment security. In response to the consultation of the 2030 framework, many stakeholders expressed their expectation that the 2030 framework would reduce uncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.

ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 2014

Science

Economy-wide emissions drop 43 to 48% below 2005 levels by 2035 with accelerated clean energy deployment

2007

Imposing emission ceilings with freely tradable permits is an efficient way of meeting climate change objectives in an undistorted world. However, the efficiency of such a system is reduced because of the many distortions that are pre-existing. Of these we focus on existing energy taxes within EU-member states. These taxes differ widely, by energy carrier, by user and by member state. Making use of the global general equilibrium model WorldScan, we assess the efficiency gains associated with tax reforms that bring energy taxes more in line with the objective of abating global warming. Moreover, the overall efficiency of the EU system aiming at emissions reduction is also assessed vis-à-vis a cap-and-trade system that covers the complete economy. Finally, we show the additional benefits of specific forms of revenue recycling when permits are auctioned over and above recycling in a lump-sum fashion.