An Argument for Consequentialism

I argue that we should reject all traditional forms of act-consequentialism if moral rationalism is true. (Moral rationalism, as I define it, holds that if S is morally required to perform x, then S has decisive reason, all things considered, to perform x.) I argue that moral rationalism in conjunction with a certain conception of practical reasons (viz., the teleological conception of reasons) compels us to accept act-consequentialism. I give a presumptive argument in favor of moral rationalism. And I argue that act-consequentialism is best construed as a theory that ranks outcomes, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason each agent has to desire that they obtain.

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act’s deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that the consequentialist should rank outcomes, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason each agent has to desire that they obtain and that, when we rank outcomes in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What’s more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally obligated to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain. Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular consequentialist theory (viz., commonsense consequentialism), Portmore defends commonsense consequentialism as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of practical reasons, practical rationality, and the objective/subjective obligation distinction. And beyond offering accounts of imperfect duties, agent-centered options, supererogatory acts, Portmore offers accounts of the relationships between reasons and value, reasons and desire, and reasons and morality. https://sites.google.com/site/commonsenseconsequentialism/

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007

Morality seems important, in the sense that there are practical reasons - at least for most of us, most of the time - to be moral. A central theoretical motivation for consequentialism is that it appears clear that there are practical reasons to promote good outcomes, but mysterious why we should care about non-consequentialist moral considerations or how they could be genuine reasons to act. In this paper we argue that this theoretical motivation is mistaken, and that because many arguments for consequentialism rely upon it, the mistake substantially weakens the overall case for consequentialism. We argue that there is indeed a theoretical connection between good states and reasons to act, because good states are those it is fitting to desire and there is a conceptual connection between the fittingness of a motive and reasons to perform the acts it motivates. But while some of our motives are directed at states, others are directed at acts themselves. We contend that just as the fittingness of desires for states generates reasons to promote the good, the fittingness of these act-directed motives generates reasons to do other things. Moreover, we argue that an act’s moral status consists in the fittingness of act-directed feelings of obligation to perform or avoid performing it, so the connection between fitting motives and reasons to act explains reasons to be moral whether or not morality directs us to promote the good. This, we contend, de-mystifies how there could be non-consequentialist reasons that are both moral and practical.

2014

This paper is a critical discussion of Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism. It focuses on the thesis of moral rationalism, which Portmore endorses relies heavily upon, and which holds that moral requirements are always also rational requirements. I suggest that a more plausible view of the relation between rationality and morality might be that moral requirements are always rationally permissible. I also seek to undermine Portmore's claim that the set of capacities that open the door to an agent's being blameworthy might also lead her to perform blameworthy acts.

2001

order to decide what to do. As a result of this ill-advised assumption, the moral agent is alienated from a whole wealth of methods of decision-making that I claim are, under certain conditions, morally pennissible or even, more controversially, morally compulsory. Contrary to that, I believe that the substantive moral rules that apply to decision-making processes are rather more complex. The fact that so much of contemporary practical philosophy assumes that reasoning is always the best way to make decisions is at least partly due to the lack of a clear distinction between reasoning as a way that leads to the morally correct action and reasoning as a means to know what is the morally correct action. The failure to understand the distinction between those two modalities of reasoning processes blurs the perception of the peculiar moral rules that apply to the use of reasoning as a tool of moral decision-making. My claim that there is a complex relation between the morality of actions and the morality of decision-making methods is not to be confused with the much more familiar claim that the rationality (in the sense of means-end calculation1) of decision-making is independent of the morality of the action to be performed. What is at stake is the morality of decision-making processes and their relation to the morality of the actions performed as a result of the decision-making processes. This complex relation is a recurring theme in many of the arguments presented below, notably in the first and the fourth chapters. However, the fact that there is a distinction between the morality of decision-making and the morality of actions does not imply that there is no relation between them. Indeed, I shall try to explain this connection in chapter four, in doing so, I expect to clarify the moral relevance ofthe distinction. The alienation between the moral agent and her decision-making might take yet another form. Namely, it might take the form of an argument that tries to justify the thesis that some sorts of rational decision-making, notably public decision-making, should be regarded as 'non-comprehensive' or 'non-plenary'. I use those expressions to refer to processes of decision-making in which the agent should not use all the reasons that could 1 Pursuing this sort of 'rationality', means to engage into what Habennas 'pragmatic discourse' which, as he pointed out, is only one sort of practical discourse (see his Between Facts and Norms Translated by William Rehg, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 151-168, see also his On the Pragmatic, the Ethical and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason in Habermas, Jurgen Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Transl. by Ciaran P. Cronin) Cambrige/Mass: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 1-17.

Philosophical Studies, 1986

This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative force in moral reasoning and hence do not count in ethical justification. In the second, I answer some possible objections to my case. I Appeals to Moral Intuitions and "No Credibility "Argument Philosophers today use the term "moral intuition" to refer to a certain kind of moral judgment which people hold about particular actions, situations, individuals, etc.; such judgments need not be self-evident or indubitable, but they must be maintained sincerely and not result from any inference or derivation from developed moral principles or theories.' Although many philosophers do refer to such judgments in the process of vindicating, refuting, or adjusting moral principles and theories, it is still open to question whether such a procedure can be justified. Since moral intuitions may result from selfinterest, self-deception, historical or cultural accident, hidden class bias, and so on, a method based on an appeal to such judgments may be "no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices".2 A number of authors have proposed recently a procedure which includes an appeal to moral intuitions but is intended to avoid the objection that they are simply prejudices. The proponents of this procedure claim, first, that these judgments are carefully selected, or filtered, and therefore considered; and second, that the full justification of any moral proposition results from coherence produced in a triple set of beliefs held by a person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories.3 Thus, the initially chosen moral intuitions are not assumed to be incorrigible but are treated rather as the provisional starting points, subjects to some further possible revisions. In this essay, I

The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, eds. Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, London: Bloomsbury), 2015

Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory—consequentialism—that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there is the question of what we do if we accept that there is a demandingness problem for consequentialism: How can consequentialists respond? The present chapter sets out to answer these questions (or at least point to how they could be answered).

Utilitas, 2001

If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that this argument fails to establish consequentialism as understood by ‘most philosophers’, because it fails to establish agent-neutrality. I respond by distinguishing consequentialism, which need not be agent-neutral, from utilitarianism, which claims agent-neutrality. Howard-Snyder also presents a schema for a non-consequentialist theory that is supposed to explain moral substitutability. I respond that her explanation cannot be completed without introducing incoherence into deontological moral theories.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011

Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory's commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.