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This article explores the uses of Greek literature, philosophy, and politics in contemporary political theory. It explains that, since the second half of the 20th century, the study and deployment of Greek texts in political theory has served four interrelated projects: (1) to underscore political theory’s roots as an embedded and politically relevant practice; (2) to show that the history of political thought may function as contemporary critique; (3) to recover the spontaneity, plurality, and equality of classical politics for modernity; (4) and to offer new resources for thinking about democratic equality and activity. The article suggests that the question of how to recuperate the new political theoretical possibilities posed by a polyvocal or deconstructed Plato remains an underappreciated but critical question for political and democratic theory today.
Other readings and texts listed in the syllabus will be given to the students during classes and posted on the course Trunk site (https://trunk.tufts.edu).
Other readings and texts listed in the syllabus will be given to the students during classes and posted on the course Trunk site (https://trunk.tufts.edu).
Polis, 2016
Greek historians of the fifth and fourth centuries bce also intended their works to be political commentaries. This paper concentrates on the work of Thucydides, and his interest in fifth-century ideas of constitutionalism. Honing in on the political ‘opposites’, democracy and oligarchy, this paper argues that Thucydides collapses these categories, to show not only that they are unstable, but that, built upon the same political vocabulary, they naturally lead towards his new idea of the measured blending of the few and the many in a mixed constitution, which creates political stability and a positive political experience for the community. In this sense, Thucydides’ text, which uses historical narrative as a vehicle for political commentary, needs to be understood within the framework of historical contextualism, but also as a ‘possession for all time’.
Abstract Discourses since the time of Socrates (470 B.C.) the Greek Philosopher to the political speech of US President Barrack Hussein Obama’s inaugural address in 2009 have certain qualities in common. But the most important of it all; it changed the course of history with respect to creating an huge impact to not only the minds of an individual but to the common mass in general. It changed the perception of how people looked at things differently edging beyond as to what appears to be a normal occurrence in men and women’s daily lives. Often, political speeches provide a ray of hope by connecting to the many who are in constant need of a direction towards which one can either travel or alter its course depending on the circumstances, which warrant in the first place. Political stalwarts accompanied by their strategists often carefully construct their speeches over a period of time. The choice of words to be used in speeches often evokes the emotional consciousness of the common mass. Which in turn creates ripples cutting across boundaries from wherein the original speech was originally to be delivered. Access to political speeches has become an easy access for both political aficionados and the common mass with the dawn of Information and Space Age. This paper attempts to trace the evolution of political oration, parleys on the lives and the influence of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, intends to study on the principles of local analogy discovered in them and fundamentally tries to resolve as to how they are influential in either ensuring the wellbeing of an individual or be ravaged by it. Keywords: Greek, Political Philosophy, Socrates, Plato, Aristotl
Forthcoming, 2023
Plato is not the author of the first political writings that have come down to us. Even in classical Greece he was preceded by such authors as Herodotus and Isocrates. Nevertheless, he can be considered the “father” of political philosophy, in that he tries to apply a higher standard—justice—to the experience and the political theory of statesmen and citizens, previously presented by rhetoricians and sophists as morally indifferent. Today it seems evident to us that justice should be the principle used in organizing a political society and that, if a society is too unjust, then it should be reformed through political means: either peacefully through legislation, or even through a violent revolution which turns everything upside down. From Plato we have inherited the idea that justice is something we should aspire to. The central theme of classical philosophy is the development of a doctrine of “the best regime,” which in essence means the most just regime. There is, however, a chasm between ancient and modern political doctrines. The “best regime”, for the ancients, doesn’t seem to be an ideal to be achieved, but rather a sort of “mental experience” which reveals the limits of what can be expected in political life. The goal of this experience is, according to Cicero, to make apparent the principles of political life, and not to give birth to an actual, real city. According to this interpretation, the most beautiful city, Calpollis—which Socrates proposes in the Republic and which raises countless objections from his interlocutors—isn’t a likely scenario, and perhaps not even a possible one. Socrates’ companions, among them Plato’s elder brothers, even ask themselves whether such a city would be desirable. The most famous of Plato’s dialogues should, therefore, be interpreted more like a comedy, rather than a sort of intellectual debate which seeks to find principles for an actual society. Pascal stated that the work wasn’t to be seen as a serious one, but rather a sort of demonstration through a reduction to the absurd. For the ancients, the best regime might not be contrary to nature, but it is extremely unlikely to be achieved. Justice is a virtue of the soul, but the systematic implementation of this standard in the city will always reveal itself to be paradoxical, in light of the ridiculous consequences that would result, such as the abolition of the family and of private property, the purging of the main Hellenic cultural works, the abolition of poetry, and a government by “philosophers”, who can’t even find their way around the public square (meaning that they lack practical experience). Even if their projects were implemented, they would meet so much resistance that it would be necessary to ban all persons older than ten years from the city. The conclusion seems to be that it is not possible to formulate a theory of justice which stipulates the best political institutions and the best laws, without relying to a great extent on the virtue of the citizenry. This perspective strikes us as alien, and it is almost incomprehensible that Plato wouldn’t at least try to put the conjectures of his characters into practice. The traditional view of the Republic in the twentieth century, on the contrary, is that Plato seriously proposes a reign by philosophers, equality between men and women in the military and in public life, shared property, and a communist totalitarian state, or at least a kind of kibbutz avant la lettre, which takes children from the family to ensure social equality. It is said, moreover, that in Plato’s opinion, philosophers should be the counselors of princes, prepared to manipulate the crowds with noble lies. To understand Plato’s political teachings, we are required to read his works as dialogues, in their dramatic context, detecting irony, and without assuming that Plato agrees with what Socrates says to his interlocutors. Whichever way we interpret him, it is undeniable that no political theory since Plato has been able to dispense with the notions of justice and of an “ideal” political regime, one “in accordance with our prayers”—and it was Plato who placed these notions at the heart of political philosophy.
American Political Science Review, 2001
Sara Monoson challenges the common view of Plato as a strong opponent of democracy. Although she acknowledges his severe criticisms of democracy, she argues that his re- sponse to Athenian democracy shows ambivalence rather than complete hostility. Not only does Plato offer some qualified endorsements of democratic politics, she contends, but also he presents the practice of the philosophic life as rooted in Athenian democratic culture. Karl Popper's cri- tique of Plato as a proto-totalitarian enemy of the "open society" is not as influential as it once was, but the assump- tion that Plato and Platonic philosophy are incompatible with democracy persists. Monoson wants to overturn that view and thus convince modern democratic readers that they may have something to learn from Plato.
The conditions of life that nowadays, in the era of globalization, are shaped intensively raise the question of re-approaching the platonic thought. The long course covered by the mechanistic account of the nature, the world and the human being, has driven to the separation of science (ἐπιστήμη) from philosophy and to the splintering off of knowledge (γνώση).
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