The Role of Affect in Naturalistic Decision Making

2006

Abstract The seven papers in this special issue represent the breadth and complexity of approaches to the study of affect in judgment and decision processes. Four papers examine the role of arousal or specific emotions in decision making. The three other papers investigate the impacts of uncertainty, time course, and thinking about mood.

2016

A good decision making process is expected, and often required, to be free from emotions. It is done in order to ensure that decision-making is objective. There is a strong belief among decision theorists that objective decision making is unbiased and is more likely to produce good results. This paper discusses some possible effects of emotions on decision making. It also discusses an experiment and its outcome, that was conducted to validate or otherwise, the claimed objectively of decision making being free from emotions. The main outcome of the experiment was the finding that decision-makers achieve better performance in decision making if they are able to control the possible biases produced by their feelings.

Emotion plays a major role in influencing our everyday cognitive and behavioral functions, including decision making. We introduce different ways in which emotions are characterized in terms of the way they influence or elicited by decision making. This chapter discusses different theories that have been proposed to explain the role of emotions in judgment and decision making. We also discuss incidental emotional influences, both long-duration influences like mood and short-duration influences by emotional context present prior to or during decision making. We present and discuss results from a study with emotional pictures presented prior to decision making and how that influences both decision processes and postdecision experience as a function of uncertainty. We conclude with a summary of the work on emotions and decision making in the context of decision-making theories and our work on incidental emotions.

2007

This paper examines the link between affective experience and decision-making performance. In a stock investment simulation, 101 stock investors rated their feelings on an Internet Web site while making investment decisions each day for 20 consecutive business days. Contrary to the popular belief that feelings are generally bad for decision making, we found that individuals who experienced more intense feelings achieved higher decision-making performance. Moreover, individuals who were better able to identify and distinguish among their current feelings achieved higher decisionmaking performance via their enhanced ability to control the possible biases induced by those feelings. Folk theories abound when it comes to the topic of how feelings affect decision making (Slovic, 2001). Traditionally, emotionality has been portrayed as the opposite of rationality and/or effectiveness in a managerial setting (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Putnam & Mumby, 1993). Organizations have frequently asked their employees and managers to keep their affective experiences at work within a relatively neutral range or to express their feelings only according to narrowly defined organizational rules (Hochschild, 1983; Morris & Feldman, 1996). A similar prescription is popular in the field of finance. Investors are frequently instructed to put their feelings under control, meaning that they need to avoid or suppress strong feelings (Babin & Donovan, 2000). Scientific debate over whether subjective experiences of emotion are functional or maladaptive has been ongoing (Gohm & Clore, 2002). Some argue that feelings are a source of unwanted bias (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) and thus need to be properly regulated (Gross & John, 2003). Others maintain that feelings play an adaptive role in decision making (Damasio, 1994) and benefit personal well-being (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Fredrickson, 2001). In the present study, we provide evidence that might help to resolve this debate by suggesting that whether affective feelings are functional or dysfunctional for decision making is largely dependent upon how people experience those feelings and what they do about them during decision making. On the basis of a broad perspective on individual differences in affective information processing (Gohm, 2003; Gohm & Clore, 2000), we propose that individuals can experience intense feelings during decision making while simultaneously regulating the possible biases induced by those feelings, both of which may positively contribute to their decision-making performance. We empirically examined the proposed relationships in a stock investment simulation combined with an experience-sampling procedure. This study extends previous research on affect and decision making in three ways. First, it provides direct empirical evidence regarding how feelings influence individuals' decisionmaking performance in a high-fidelity simulation that simultaneously captures the aspects of psychological realism (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982

2011

Table of contents Chapter 1 Interaction of emotional processes with decision-making in economic psychology 4 1.1. Theories of the effects of emotions and emotion regulation on decisional processes 5 1.1.1. The theory of the dual processes of thinking 8 1.1.2. The model of anticipated and incidental emotions in decision-making 1.1.2.1. Theories of anticipated emotions in risky decisions 1.1.2.2. Theories of anticipated emotions in intertemporal decisions 1.1.2.3. Theories of incidental emotions 1.1.3. The affect heuristic 1.1.4. The model of risk as feeling 1.1.5. The somatic marker hypothesis 1.2. Controlling emotions through emotion regulation 1.3. Cognitive and behavioural effects of emotion regulation 1.4. Emotion regulations and the emotion-decision interaction 40 1.5. The neurobiology of decision-making and emotion regulation 41 1.6. Concluding theoretical comments on the emotion-emotion regulation and economic decision making interaction 48 Chapter 2 Psychometric properties of the instruments used on Romanian samples 51 Study 1.1. Psychometric properties of ERQ Study 1.2. Psychometric properties of CERQ Study 1.3. Psychometric properties of DOSPERT Chapter 3 Emotion regulation and risk taking Study 2 Impact of emotion regulation strategies on negative emotions Study 3 Impact of emotion regulation strategies on natural positive and negative emotions Study 4 The role of emotion regulation strategies and declarative knowledge Chapter 4 Emotion regulation and the framing effect 111 Study 5 Emotion regulation strategies and susceptibility to framing Chapter 5 Emotion regulation and fairness Study 6 Emotion regulations and fairness in sharing financial resources Chapter 6 Emotion regulation and decisional processes: Final conclusions References

Anyone whose interests he in real-life decision processes is bound to note the oft times disturbing role that emotions play in such processes, particularly in the areas of assessment of information and long-range planning. Instead of simply dismissing emotions as noisome, irrational agents in the decision making process, one needs to obtain an understanding of their nature and how they influence the decision making process in order to acquire better control of them. This paper proposes a model of emotions based primarily on the following assumptions: (1) The whole set of emotions forms a system that is evolutionally developed and generically programmed -a system that serves the purpose of making decisions that are appropriate to the kinds of environments that can be characterized as primitive and wild. The non-emotional, more analytical decision system is a product of a much later period in evolution which, along with other higher cognitive-analytical functions, developed primarily to supplement, but not to replace, the emotion system by covering its shortcomings. Thus, even though these two systems are often in conflict, the cognitive decision system does not operate without the help of the emotion system; without desires, loves, and hates there hardly would be utilities. (3) The first assumption gives rise to the possibility of studying the emotion system as a purposeful, rational decision system in its own right.

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1993

Based on a two-dimensional model of affect that views Pleasantness and Arousal as affect's two primary dimensions, this study investigates the effects of emotions on choice processes and outcomes. In Study 1, subjects first described their naturally occurring emotional state and then performed two multi-attribute product choice tasks. Subjects in more pleasant mood deliberated longer, used more decision-related information, reexamined more previously examined information, and made more interdimensional moves. Subjects in more aroused mood spent less time deliberating, revealed less information, ignored more product-describing attributes, and reexamined less of previously examined information. Study 2 replicated many of these effects with experimentally manipulated emotions and using a managerial decision-making task. The results are interpreted in terms of (1) a congruency between one's hedonic state and selected decision strategy and (2) a restriction in attentional capacity induced by increased Arousal. KEY WORDS Affect and emotion Multi-attribute choice Decision processes During the last 20 years the central concern of behavioral decision research has been the effects of task characteristics and their perceptions on decision making (Abelson and Levi, 1985; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). This interest in task features had led to the neglect of examining the influence of the decision maker's emotional state on the decision process and its outcomes. In recent years, however, the growing recognition of affect's central role in cognitive and social psychology (e.g. Bower and Cohen, 1982; Isen, 1987; Zajonc, 1980) brought a better understanding of affect's significance on decision making. To date, considerable evidence suggests that the decision maker's emotional state can have a powerful influence on decision tasks (for a review, see Isen, 1987), including estimation of risk of undesirable events (Johnson and Tversky, 1983), strategy selection in multi-attribute choice (Isen and Means, 1983), risk taking (Isen and Geva, 1987; Mano, 1993), person-judgment formation (Mano, 1992), and interpersonal preferences (Forgas and Bower, 1988). Theoretical arguments offered for affect's influence on decision making have focused on a congruency between affective state and selected decision strategy (Isen et al., 1978; Isen, 1987). To date, a series of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence have been advanced to explain the links between affect and decision making. In particular, it has been suggested that subjects induced to experience positive uflect will tend to reduce decision complexity by engaging in speedy and simplified kinds of processing (Isen, 1987), that they use their cognitive strategies and information more efficiently

International journal of Indian psychology, 2023

Recent theories of Decision-Making have advocated the role of emotions in the cognitive processes of decisions. One such approach is the EIC model (Lerner et al., 2015) which positsmood to indirectly affect decision making by impacting current emotions, indicating individual's overall emotional states to indirectly influence cognitive decision processes. The study aimed to understand the role of emotions on decision making and the nuances that underlie it. The 6 main hypothesis of the paper focused on evaluating whether incidental emotions via current emotions affect decision making significantly or do decision styles have a stronger significant effect on decision making. The paper used a mixed method design where the qualitative data was collected via interviews and thematic analysis and labels were attuned via open coding that helped in triangulation and pattern generation. Tools used were the YDMC, Mood induction videos of OPENLAV Database, Decision Style questionnaire (DSQ), Ryff's well-being scale and an Interview schedule. A purposive sampling was done to obtain the sample (N=29) for the pre-test post-test design. Results for the quantitative data concluded that sad and angry incidental mood had significant effects on FR1 and FR2 (Resistance to Framing and Sunken costs) of YDMC and, that happy mood had no significant effect on risk perception. The decision styles that have been seen to dominate were Vigilant followed by Dependent and Spontaneous style. For qualitative data, based on the dominant responses for the entire sample an Interactive Hexagonal map was constructed. STB (Self -thoughts & Beliefs), FP (Futuristic perspective), CE (Current experiences), EE (Environmental effects), and PEx (Past experiences) were the dominant pattern connections found for the current sample. Thus, Incidental Mood had a significant effect on Resistance to Framing and Sunken costs whereas had no significant effect on Consistency with Risk Perception. Future work on the nuances of mood on decision-making can help determine the affective, cognitive, and neuropsychological models of decision-making where neural correlates could help delve deeper in these higher cognitive and emotional processes.

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems Scientific Journal, 2009

Decision making is traditionally viewed as a rational process where reason calculates the best way to achieve the goal. Investigations from different areas of cognitive science have shown that human decisions and actions are much more influenced by intuition and emotional responses then it was previously thought. In this paper I examine the role of emotion in decision making, particularly Damasio's hypothesis of somatic markers and Green's dual process theory of moral judgment. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the threat that deliberation and conscious rationality is an illusion.

How do people feel about the outcomes of risky options? Results from two experiments demonstrate that the emotional reaction to a monetary outcome is not a simple function of the utility of that outcome Emotional responses also depend on probabilities and unobtained outcomes Unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes Furthermore any given outcome is less pleasant if an unobtained outcome is better We propose an account of emotional experiences associated with outcomes of decisions called decision affect theory It incorporates utilities expectations and counterfactual comparisons into hedonic responses Finally we show that choices between risky options can be described as the maximization of expected emotional experiences as predicted by decision affect theory That is people choose the risky option for which they expect to feel better on average