Derandomization of auctions

2003

De Economist, 2006

This paper provides a swift tour of auction theory and its applications. Among the questions it considers are: How much do bidders bid in commonly studied single-object auctions? How e¢ cient are these auctions? How much revenue do they generate? Which single-object auction maximizes the seller's expected revenue? What is the best way to auction incentive contracts? And, how e¢ cient and complex are multi-object auctions?

TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa), 2006

Economic Inquiry, 2005

We analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions. We focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding. We then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions. As a controlled environment, this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field. The laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction. (JEL D44, H41) *We thank representatives of a church and a school in Tucson, Arizona, for making their records available. Tim Salmon provided much feedback on earlier drafts, as did seminar participants at the

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the previous Handbook chapter on this topic.

2002

In a pure private values setting, Vickrey's (1961) celebrated multi-unit auction achieves an (ex-post) efficient outcome. However, in the interdependent values case, when each bidder's private information affects the (ex-post) values of the others, the efficiency of Vickrey's auction can fail.

Auction is a form of organization of competition that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on the information obtained from the competing agents. From the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource allocation algorithm applied in the environment with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and interacting subsystems have different information about the system as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the historical development of mathematical theory underlying modern approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of the theory are also discussed

International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 2000

In many policy contexts, efficiency is the primary consideration in structuring auctions. In this paper, we survey several sources of inef-Þciency arising in auctions. We Þrst highlight the effects of demand reducing incentives, both in theory and in practice, in multi-unit auctions. Next, we study inefficiencies arising from interdependence in bidder valuations. Again, we highlight both theoretical insights as well as how these translate in practice. Finally, we present an impossibility theorem for attaining efficiency in sufficiently rich auction contexts. An auction form suggested by Klemperer is discussed as a means of ameliorating inefficiencies arising in practice. JEL ClassiÞcation Nos. D44, D82 Keywords: Auctions, Efficiency * Updated copies of this paper can be found at www.wws.princeton.edu/~rjmorgan. † This paper was prepared for the conference, Central Bank Operations: Theory and Evidence. This conference was organized by the Center for European Integration Studies with the support of Bank of Spain, Deutsche Bundesbank, and European Central Bank. The Þnancial assistance of the above entities is gratefully acknowledged. I also thank Michael Baye, Vijay Krishna, and Benny Moldovanu for useful comments. The editorial assistance of Heather Morgan was invaluable in enhancing the readability of this paper.

ACM Crossroads, 2006

This article describes our experiences with designing online auction software and presents a client-server software model for conducting online English auctions. The model is based on an existing auction server developed at James Cook University called the "Research Auction Server" (RAS). We use RAS to perform both simulated and real auctions and to gather data on the performance of key areas of auction research. RAS has been used to conduct research in auction security, fraudulent bidding behavior, bidding agent design, and market clearing algorithms. RAS is open source and available online at http://auction.maths.jcu.edu.au.

Australian Economic Review, 2011

2023

Fuentes, thanks for your encouragement and support. And finally, a special thanks to my family, specially my parents Ricardo Giaretta Sguerra and Christina Maria Massoni Sguerra: thank you for infusing me with a passion for knowledge and science and for always pushing me to reach my potential.

1997

In this initial report, we evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to complete the auction. This report focuses on enhancements that help to achieve these two goals. Some of the suggested changes also streamline the auction process so large auctions can be conducted more quickly without sacrificing efficiency. Although some of our suggestions-particularly those about closing rules-work both to restrict collusion and to speed the auction along, we have grouped the recommendations into two categories according to our assessment of the main reasons for the suggested change. Avoiding Collusion The first three suggestions, truncating the bids to three digits, limiting the use of bid withdrawals, and modifying the closing rule are intended primarily to reduce the opportunities to collude. We agree among ourselves that the first two kinds of changes are clearly desirable. We have some disagreement among ourselves about the third type of change and how it is best implemented. TRUNCATE BIDS TO THREE DIGITS One way in which bidders have attempted to coordinate their bidding is by signaling information in the last few digits of their bids. For example, a bidder can point to a market or bidder by putting a market or bidder number in the trailing digits of its bid. This practice has been observed in each auction. Bid signaling was especially common in the DEF auction and, indeed, one bidder filed a formal complaint about this practice. The importance of this mechanism is uncertain, as bidders and their advisers appear to have had difficulty making sense of the coded bids, and even when the codes were understood, competition was not necessarily reduced.

2013

Abstract. Auctions allocate trillions of dollars in goods and services every year. Auction design can have significant consequences, but its practice outstrips theory. We aim at advancing auction theory with help from mechanised reasoning. To that end we are developing a toolbox of formalised representations of key facts of auction theory, which will allow auction designers to have relevant properties of their auctions machine-checked.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

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Theoretical Economics

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