II: Our World Isn’t Logic

Philosophical Quarterly, 2017

Philosophy, 2013

Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2017

Logica Universalis, 2010

Tarski's conceptual analysis of the notion of logical consequence is one of the pinnacles of the process of defining the metamathematical foundations of mathematics in the tradition of his predecessors Euclid, Frege, Russell and Hilbert, and his contemporaries Carnap, Gödel, Gentzen and Turing. However, he also notes that in defining the concept of consequence "efforts were made to adhere to the common usage of the language of every day life." This paper addresses the issue of what relationship Tarski's analysis, and Béziau's further generalization of it in universal logic, have to reasoning in the everyday lives of ordinary people from the cognitive processes of children through to those of specialists in the empirical and deductive sciences. It surveys a selection of relevant research in a range of disciplines providing theoretical and empirical studies of human reasoning, discusses the value of adopting a universal logic perspective, answers the questions posed in the call for this special issue, and suggests some specific research challenges.

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021

Let a genuine moral dilemma be any situation answering to this description: (1) an agent, M, is categorically (absolutely, all things considered) obliged to do A, and can do A; (2) M is categorically (etc.) obliged to do B, and can do B; (3) M cannot do both A and B. Can there be genuine moral dilemmas? Some argue any such situation is strictly contradictory (Brink's versions of these arguments are canvased.) The correct answer is: yes. The key to eliminating any appearance of contradiction is to analyze obligation statements as conditionals: if you do not fulfill your obligations, you are bad. (Very informal gloss.) If you are obliged to do A and obliged not to do A, this isn't a contradiction. It is the basis of proof that you are/will be a bad person. The paper's conclusion discusses how standard deontic logic can encourage confusion on this score: "one slides, unawares, from talk about the actual world into talk about a deontically perfect world in which all obligations are satisfied. One may – after taking a quick look around – conclude there can be no genuine moral dilemmas here, which is true enough. What does not follow is anything whatsoever about the actual world. Once clarity concerning domains of discourse is restored, defenders of dilemmas can grant that, to be sure, deontically perfect worlds contain no moral dilemmas. (It is illogical to suppose an angel – incapable of wrong-doing – could confront a moral dilemma.) All the same, it does not appear to be a truth of logic that there must always be deontically perfect possible worlds counterpart to the actual one. So it is not a truth of logic that moral dilemmas are impossible."

Informal Logic, 1995

This paper explores some aspects of the concept 'logic' and its relation to moral voice, and argues that Menssen uses it too narrowly in her respone to Orr's "Just the Facts. Ma'am" and the work of Carol Gilligan. Grounded in the work of the later Wittgenstein, it is argued that formalized logic misses much of natural logic: the concept of 'moral talk' is developed to theorize Gilligan's ethic of care; it is argued that this form of moral deliberation is not argumentation in the formal sense; and the relationship between logic and epistemology is explored through the consideration of moral talk as a language-game which is woven into gendered forms of life. Finally, it is argued that the notion of a universal logic is the product of an oppressivc patriarchal culture and should not be defended by feminists.

Prolegomena, 2024

This paper examines the structure of moral paradoxes, arguing that moral dilemmas are grounded in moral agents and necessitate the same explanation as the logical behavior of these agents. Consequently, logical and moral laws derive from a different source than nomological and metaphysical laws. Furthermore, it is asserted that logical and moral laws are pluralistic in nature, permitting numerous logical deviations without leading to absurdity.

One of the most prominent strands in contemporary work on the virtues consists in the attempt to develop a distinctive-and compelling-account of practical reason on the basis of Aristotle's ethics. In response to this project, several eminent critics have argued that the Aristotelian account encourages a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement. Given the importance of developing a mature response to disagreement, the criticism is devastating if true. I examine this line of criticism closely, first elucidating the features of the Aristotelian account that motivate it, and then identifying two further features of the account that the criticism overlooks. These further features show the criticism to be entirely unwarranted. Once these features are acknowledged, a more promising line of criticism suggests itself-namely, that the Aristotelian account does too little to help us to resolve disputes-but that line of objection will have to be carried out on quite different grounds.