Meditation and Knowledge in Indian Buddhist Epistemology (2023)

Buddhist Studies Review, 2006

The three texts were likely composed in Tibet between 792 and 794 CE, although see Taniguchi (1992) for an argument that the fi rst Bhāvanākramaḥ was composed somewhat earlier in India.

Wading into the Stream of Wisdom. Essays in Honor of Leslie Kawamura. Ed. Sarah F. Haynes and Michelle J. Sorensen. Contemporary Issues in Buddhist Studies. Berkeley: BDK America., 2013

T he term bhāvanā/sgom is usually translated as "meditation," but from a philological standpoint it is more rigorously rendered as "cultivation" or "familiarization." It may indeed be that rendering the term bhāvanā as "meditation" is only an approximation and may even be in some ways misleading. That said, we'll stay with this rendering as it is more or less conventionally adopted in Buddhist circles. We'll discuss some of the translational issues below in more detail. The principal question taken up in this paper is what modern non-Asian Buddhists understand meditation to be. Two types of answers interest us here: (1) Many non-Asian Buddhists will maintain that "meditation" refers to a practical activity of sitting calmly, with concentrated nonconceptual, non-analytic awareness. They will also hold that this activity is what most Tibetan monks and other Buddhists do as their fundamental spiritual practice. Being a readily identifiable practical skill, its nature is not considered to be an important subject of philosophical speculation. (2) Others at some point will treat "meditation" as a normative term. Thus for them not everything called "meditation" is equal, as some practices are more effective, faster, more beneficial, deeper, etc., and some are potentially quite antithetical to what meditation should be. What meditation should be and what it achieves thus become a philosophical issue of some urgency. The resolution of these issues may even be seen as necessary precondition for the success of the practice. In the first half of this paper, Andreas Doctor examines some aspects of the first type of response. Based on his experience with Westerners and Tibetans in Ka-Nying Shedrub Ling (bka' rnying shes grub gling) monastery in Nepal, he contrasts how the term "meditation" is in fact used very differently by these two groups, and how in Tibetan usage

Oxford Scholarship Online

One of the fundamental distinctions in the modern academy is the difference between studying human life as people experience it and studying it in terms of impersonal causal processes—the so-called first- and third-person approaches. This dichotomy is reflected in the study of meditation, in which neuroscientists attempt to correlate their “objective” findings with the “subjective” reports of meditators. This very distinction, though, invites two extremes: either these discourses are ultimately incommensurable or one discourse—the subjective—should be reduced to the “true,” objective discourse. This chapter criticizes putatively pure subjectivity or objectivity from Buddhist philosophical perspectives, especially the non-duality of subject and object, and seeks to articulate a middle ground between reductionism and incommensurability.

This article offers a synoptic overview of the Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po’s (1527‒92) efforts to clarify the sense and significance of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud doctrine of mental nonengagement (amanasikāra) and to defend it as a valid system of exegesis (bshad lugs) and practice (sgrub lugs). It starts with Padma dkar po’s critical rejoinder to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s (1182–1251) contention that Dwags po Bka’ brgyud traditions advocated the type of blank-minded “mental nonengagement” (amanasikāra) that had been promoted by Heshang at the Samyé debate prior to his ignominious defeat at the hands of Kamalaśīla. In defending Bka’ brgyud amanasikāra teachings in light of Maitrīpa’s Amanasikāra Doctrinal Cycle (yid la mi byed pa’i chos skor), the Fourth ’Brug chen sets out to show how these are fully in accord with authoritative Indian Madhyamaka and tantric amanasikāra teachings, to the extent that all agree that thoughts are left behind in the context of ascertaining the ultimate, but are diametrically opposed to the type of perpetual blank-mindedness amanasikāra attributed to Heshang. A key to Padma dkar po’s defence is his insistence upon the compatibility between Kamalaśīla’s conceptualist interpretation of amanasikāra as a “well-founded mental engagement” (yoniśo manasikāra) having emptiness as its object and Maitrīpa’s strongly nondual interpretation of amanasikāra as “mental engagement having emptiness (a = emptiness + manasikāra) as its nature”. Both agree that the goal of Buddhist meditation is a nonconceptual ascertainment of the ultimate and the path consists in dispelling reifications which conceal it. The key difference, then, is whether this goal of nonconceptual wisdom is “arrived at” via conceptual representations and a lengthy process of analytical investigation (Kamalaśīla) or “disclosed” in its originary condition through direct perceptions in which conceptual representations are left behind (Maitrīpa, Rāmapāla, Sahajavajra, Padma dkar po). Though it may be argued that Padma dkar po’s compatibilism makes a significant concession to a representationalist strain of Cittamātra epistemology that had been rejected by Maitrīpa’s Apratiṣṭhāna (nonfoundationalist) Madhyamaka tradition, and in this way elides important differences between their respective epistemologies, Higgins argues for seeing it as a type of soteriological contextualism which aims to accommodate both perspectives by coordinating their respective soteriological roles and spheres of application. Such is the conciliatory thrust of his middle way: to combine the virtues of each approach while avoiding the vices of pursuing either as an end in itself.

Asiatische Studien, 2023

The “middle wayˮ (madhyamā pratipad) is a concept of great significance in Buddhism. For Mahāyāna philosophers, the concept of the middle way free from the two extremes of superimposition (samāropa) and denial (apavāda) has ontological import. In the history of the development of Mahāyāna thought, we also see a tendency to work out a dimension of the middle way related to yogis’ spiritual cultivation and to combine it with the middle way’s ontological aspect. The eighth-century Mādhyamika thinker Kamalaśīla is one whose theory of the middle way has a close connection with his theory of spiritual cultivation. The purpose of this paper is to explore Kamalaśīla’s view on the relationship between (1) the middle way that lies between the two extremes of superimposition and denial, and (2) his theory of spiritual cultivation. I first clarify Kamalaśīla’s definition of the two extremes of superimposition and denial by examining his Madhyamakāloka and Madhyama-kālaṃkārapañjikā. Based on the knowledge thus gained, I then delve into the four-teenth chapter of the Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā, a text where Kamalaśīla clearly reveals his take on the relationship between yogi’s meditative examination and the middle way of the two extremes of superimposition and denial. My conclusion is that for Kamalaśīla, meditative examination from the perspective of Madhyamaka ontology is the means to abandon the two extremes of superimposition and denial. Moreover, the middle way itself consists in the attainment of non-conceptual gnosis (nirvikalpajñāna) and the awareness obtained subsequently to that (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), both of which result from such meditative examination.

Our Heritage (Journal of Sanskrit College and University, Kolkata), 2018

Abstract The Foundations of Buddhist Meditation - P. P. Gokhale Central University of Tibetan Studies, Sarnath The paper is an attempt to grasp the essence of Buddhist meditation from a philosophical point of view. Here the author approaches Buddhist meditation, not from a sectarian Buddhist point of view, but from the point of view of a lay seeker. The paper explores three foundations of Buddhist meditation: ontological, epistemological and moral-psychological. By investigating into different forms of Buddhist meditation, the author observes that the Buddhist meditation is not of unitary nature, but is multifaceted. Different limbs in the Noble 8-limbed path are involved in the different kinds of meditation. Sammāsamādhi, Sammāsati, Sammāditthi and also Sammāsaṅkappo. The paper also deals with the difference between Śamatha and Vipaśyanā and the way Vipaśyanā is understood differently in Yogācāra and Mādhyamika tradition.

Routledge Handbook of Yoga and Meditation Studies, 2020

The study attempts an overview of the Indian Buddhist meditation from a philologicohistorical perspective. I avoid as much as possible metatextual statements focusing instead on a number of canonical sources representative of the main Buddhist traditions. I first look into the semantics of such key terms as bhāvanā 'meditative cultivation' , samādhi 'meditative concentration' , dhyāna 'absorption' , yoga 'spiritual praxis' , etc. This is followed by a brief introduction to the forty subjects of meditation in Theravāda Buddhism and the set of five meditative objects found in the Northern Buddhist traditions, i.e. impurity, friendliness, dependent origination, analysis of the elements, and mindfulness of breathing. The bulk of the study examines the descriptions and doctrinal background of the central meditative techniques and systems throughout Buddhist history: (1) samatha (usually identified as absorption meditation) and vipassanā (= the four applications of mindfulness) in Early Buddhism and the five-step path of spiritual cultivation in the Northern Mainstream school of Sarvāstivāda; (2) the three contemplations (trayaḥ samādhayaḥ) and compassion meditation in Mahāyāna Buddhism and the five-stage model of spiritual progression in the idealistic school of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda; (3) visualisations, control of inner energy, mantra meditation in Tantric Buddhism and the six-step spiritual path in the Noble Lineage of the Guhyasamājatantra. * My sincerest gratitude goes to Drs Karen O'Brien-Kop and Suzanne Newcombe for accepting this modest contribution as well as to the anonymous reviewer for his/her pertinent comments. ** Lack of space in the published volume led to the deletion of many original citations and technical terms which remain included in this version. I am sincerely grateful to Prof. em. Dr Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg) who has kindly made suggestions to correct some errors in the Sanskrit citations. This draft has been revised accordingly. Unfortunately, the corrections as well as my acknowledgement of debt to Prof. Schmithausen could not be included in the published version.

This paper examines the advent of meditation practice in the Buddhist soteriological tradition. The Buddhist tradition's theoretical and practical creations are adaptations, responses, and replications of other traditions it is historically conversant with. These other traditions include Brahminic and Jain as well as developmental stages within the Buddhist tradition itself. From the perspective of meditation practice, a chronological, developmental progression is suggested between pre-Canonical to Mahāyāna Buddhism, which questions such divergent labels. This progression is expressed by the internal functions and culminating states of the meditations discussed.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2016

In this paper I attempt to explain the contribution of meditation (bhāvanā) to knowledge as it is presented in the Bhāvanākramas. Kamalaśīla’s presentation in these texts makes use of the schema of three wisdoms or prajñās (śrutamayī-, cintāmayī, and bhāvanāmayī-prajñā) and a very specific understanding of the notion of bhūtapratyavekṣā as 'the discernment of reality'. My analysis is framed in the context of a recent controversy concerning the epistemological role of meditation in relation to the views of the opposing sides of the historical debate at Bsam yas. I argue that the Bhāvanākramas assign a necessary and very specific function to conceptual meditation in the process of acquiring a direct, non-conceptual knowledge of reality (nirvikalpajñāna).