Case Study 4: Russia-Ukraine War

Cuestiones Políticas

The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is an unusual geopolitical event that puts the security of Western Europe at risk and, at the same time, erodes the norms of international law that regulate, at least in theory, relations between civilized countries. Indeed, it is a tragic event that has cost the lives of thousands of civilians who have been victims of war crimes and serious violations of their fundamental rights. In this sense, the objective of this editorial is twofold, on the one hand, to present volume 40, number 73 of Political Questions and, on the other, to briefly explain the causes and geopolitical consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is concluded that the invasion of Putin’s Russia in Ukraine can trigger a prolonged and extensive conflict that can even confront NATO directly with Russia. Ideologically, it is a conflict that means a clash between different political models such as the liberal democracies of the West (ensuring human...

Journal of European Studies (JES)

The security-insecurity paradox in a geopolitical struggle between Russia and its ex-territory; Ukraine along with the politics of the influences between great powers has made the Russian invasion a reality. Russian intervention in its periphery in February 2022 has sent shockwaves to the European Union and NATO members, and posed various challenges to the Eurasian states. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a protracted one, but this new phase is more complex and multi-layered. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, and support to the militant separatists in Donbas, undermined Ukrainian sovereignty. A series of border skirmishes occurred during 2014-2021, which led to thousands of people dead and injured.[1] The tension converted into a humanitarian crisis with millions of refugees and collateral damages after the 2022 war. This recent situation can be termed as a geopolitical warfare, which is based on the politics of security to assert political advantages i...

Munich Repository Paper Archive Nr. 112394, 2022

This paper presents an interpretation of the underlying dynamics of the global political economy, which has led to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022. It thus is an alternative to interpretations that view the individual psychological traits of Vladimir Putin as the driving force behind this event. To enable a more sensible account, it turns out to be necessary to go back in the history of the conflict between Russia and NATO to the times of the Cold War. Briefly, two important fields of methodology, the theory of power and game theory have to be touched upon. Finally, the justified emotional disgust concerning Putin's aggressive war and the somewhat more detached scientific analysis are tried to be reconciled in the concluding paragraphs.

Fedorenko V., Fedorenko M. Russia’s Military Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Aim, Reasons, and Implications. Krytyka Prawa, Niezależne studia nad prawem. tom 14, nr 1/2022. S. 7-42, 2022

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia's military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to postwar international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature. Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since the 17th century the theoretical foundations of the law of war have been laid, which enshrined in international laws and customs of warfare (Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention, etc.) since the 19th century, thus forming the international humanitarian law.

Krytyka Prawa

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia’s military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to post-war international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature. Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since...

IR FUUAST, 2023

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine has caused immense implications for the Europeans Security landscape, which was based on the post cold war negotiations and treaties between Russia and the West. The origins of the Ukraine invasion were laid down after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian pivot to the West during the protests in the winter of 2013-14 against the pro-Russia government. Due to its geographical location, Ukraine was caught between Russia and the West because Russia’s sphere of influence was threatened by the enlargement of the EU and NATO. The Invasion changed the security dynamics and European countries aimed fear of outspreading war making tectonic shifts in their policies to redefine their defense capabilities. Russia does not want NATO on its border and the reaffirmed buffer state must remain neutral otherwise both Russia and US-led West will follow a regime change policy in Ukraine and will continue to fight for their respective hegemonies. The fate of European security will be decided by the nature of the relationship with Russia and Russia's Invasion of Ukraine possibly will lead to a war of attrition and end up in a frozen conflict.

Geopolitics of the War in Ukraine, 2022

In this 25,000-word monograph we present an analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as part of Russian revisionism and its implications for regional and global international order. We examine Russian interests and strategic objectives; the geopolitical impact of the invasion and we analyze in detail the military and strategic lessons of the war in Ukraine. Finally, we provide three possible military scenarios about the continuation of the war addressing also the issue of the possible use of nuclear weapons and conclude with some policy recommendations.

New Eastern Europe, 2020

In the clash of narratives between Russia and NATO states, Moscow has clearly gained an upper hand. Russian success stems not only from the fact that the Kremlin has been able to send a much clearer and more coherent message than the Alliance, but also because NATO states do not have one narrative, or counter-narrative. One of the central concerns when analysing international security and its history is how to explain certain events and their impact on international politics. For policy-makers and societies it is crucial to define "who we are" and "what kind of world order we want". The passing decade has been marked by a return to a crisis between the West and Russia (sometimes referred to as the New Cold War), with conflict over Russian aggression in Ukraine being the most striking example. Yet the indirect confrontation between NATO and Russia should be measured not only in political disputes, economic calculations and military build-up, but also in terms of the competing narratives that have shaped the understanding or misunderstanding of partners and adversaries alike. One of the ways that the Kremlin gains political and diplomatic ground in international affairs is by putting a wedge between NATO allies, namely, between the United States and its European partners. This was quite evident in the recent intra-NATO rift over Turkey's decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from Russia and deploy military troops, hand in hand with Russian forces, in Syria last October. Simultaneously, even a glance at Europe reveals challenges to its security and stability: Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran, Turkey-to name just a few states that lay in the so-called arc of instability, and which are influenced, to a certain extent, by the direct policies of the Russian Federation.

2017

The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imagin-able: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications • The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security). • Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable. • American and European interests sometimes overlap, but not always, also within NATO. One can observe a pattern whereby the US pushes the Europeans to accept the American view. For instance on NATO extension (certainly in 2008), as well as on missile defence. This article implicitly argues that the European member states within NATO should be more careful to agree with the US view if it does not fit their own interests.

Strategic Panorama 2022(2):5-11, 2022

This paper examines three major theoretical frameworks to explain Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. It is argued that although the war caught many by surprise, it can still be explained by at least several International Relations theories. President Putin’s decision may be erroneous but it should be treated as rational. The purpose of this research is to suggest theoretical frameworks suitable for understanding and evaluating the key foreign policy and security decisions taken by the current Russian leadership. It is assumed that the moves and choices taken by the Kremlin, in particular on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, resulted from the way decision-makers had perceived the threats and options of the time. It is also assumed that International Relations as a scientific discipline has relevant explanations and frameworks for dealing even with such seemingly irrational decisions like the one taken before the invasion. Political leaders are not going mad; they rather act within specific environments framed by available information and some basic theoretical assumptions. This article focuses on examining Russia’s invasion of Ukraine through the lenses of security dilemma, rational decision-making and power transition process. The author argues that each of these approaches can provide a coherent explanation of a strategic logic behind the decision to wage war. Moreover, by using each of these instruments it may be possible to assess Russia’s foreign and security policy beyond its Ukrainian direction, and also in a retrospect. An interstate war in a modern world is assumed to bear extremely high costs and generate high risks. Because of that, wars are so rare. But this does not imply that wars are impossible. At different levels and under certain conditions, launching a war may still seem to be the best course of action, in particular for revisionist states, even if it a choice between the bad and the worst.