A Moral Argument for Veganism

Journal of Animal Behaviour and Biometeorology

The justification for this review article is to understand the position of vegans and those individuals who consume food of animal origin from an unbiased perspective but with a grounding in scientific evidence. This will provide people who eat meat with scientific and ethical arguments to defend their alimentary autonomy in the context of the moral conflict that has emerged in societies regarding the consumption of meat and animal products, which is criticized –sometimes even attacked– by activists, ovolactovegetarians, or vegetarians with alimentary habits that stress ethical and moral respect for animals. These individuals refuse to eat meat and animal products but sometimes show disrespect for those who do. In recent decades, veganism and vegetarianism have reached an apogee in some western societies where they are often considered a healthy option for humans that simultaneously fosters animal and environmental welfare. While those diets may provide numerous benefits, they can a...

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2015

In his article 'In Defense of Eating Meat', Timothy Hsiao argued that sentience is not sufficient for moral status, that the pain experienced by an animal is bad but not morally bad, that the nutritional interests of humans trump the interests of animals and that eating meat is permissible. In this article I explore the strengths and weaknesses of Hsiao's argument, clarify some issues and argue that eating meat is likely in conflict with some of our strongest moral intuitions.

2015

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This paper discusses Peter Singer's strict ethical vegetarianism. I argue that utilitarianism does not provide sufficient grounds for vegetarianism to be presented as an ethical obligation. I argue that the boycott style of vegetarianism advocated by Singer is not an effective means of reducing the suffering experienced by animals and, finally, demonstrate that the proper application of the principle of utility to our dietary choices requires the consumption of both ethically sourced meats and roadkill.

2013

Are animals not ours to use? According to proponents of veganism such as Gary Francione, any and all use of animals by humans is exploitative and wrong. It is wrong because animals have intrinsic worth and humans' use of animals fails to respect that worth. Contra Francione, I argue that that there are conditions under which it may be morally appropriate to collect, consume, sell, or otherwise use animal products. Francione is mistaken in his belief that assigning intrinsic worth to a being is impossible if said being is also conceived as a resource. Using and (non-instrumental) valuing are not mutually exclusive; if they were, many if not most human relationships would be deemed morally unacceptable. Through a series of thought experiments involving intra-human relationships, I suggest that moral condemnation of relationships within which a less dependent party regularly takes from a more dependent party is indefensible. In fact, relationships of use between asymmetrically dependent parties are essential to the functioning of cooperative society, and are therefore desirable. My aims with this article are to convince readers of the need to reject principled veganism, and to garner support for new philosophical accounts of morally appropriate human-nonhuman animal relationships.

A Critique of the Moral Defense of Vegetarianism, 2016

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WIREs Climate Change, 2020

In this article, we review an array of positions in the contemporary literature that concern the moral reasons for vegan consumerism. We situate veganism within the broader field of ethical consumerism, present a variety of motivations and justifications for veganism and discuss criticisms of vegan consumerism. The arguments presented in the article ultimately pertain to the question of whether concerns for animals, human rights or climate justice entail strong moral reasons to adopt a vegan lifestyle. Additionally, we address issues of particular relevance for political philosophy, such as whether organized vegan consumer campaigns are a politically legitimate means to strive for structural change. We hope to show that there are anthropocentric as well as animal-centred reasons that speak in favour of radically reformed human-animal relations, including diets that are at least predominantly plant-based.

Critical Perspectives on Veganism, eds. Jodey Castricano & Rasmus R. Simonsen, 2016

The paper proposes an anthropocentric argument for veganism based on a speciesistic premise that most carnists likely affirm: human flourishing should be promoted. I highlight four areas of human suffering promoted by a carnistic diet: (1) health dangers to workers (both physical and psychological), (2) economic dangers to workers, (3) physical dangers to communities around slaughterhouses, and (4) environmental dangers to communities-at-large. Consequently, one could ignore the well-being of non-human animals and nevertheless recognize significant moral failings in the current standard system of meat production.

In Konstantinos Boudouris (Ed.) Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society, 2018

There is a teeth-biting debate between vegetarianism and non-vegetarianism on human obligations towards animals. Vegetarianism appeals for equal and ethical treatment for animals whereas non-vegetarianism simply denies any such treatments considering that animals do not have a sense of morality. Non-vegetarianism seems to be ignoring some obligatory duties towards animals and undermines ethical arguments for animal rights. It does not provide sound reason for why humans should deliberately kill animals, painlessly or with least harm, for their own sake. It also overlooks the world economic situation of global hunger in which the use of the total food resources and distribution in terms of nutrition would be much more equitable if everyone was a vegetarian. This paper argues against non-vegetarianism and defends vegetarianism by making a claim that we do have moral obligations of certain kinds towards animals same as we have moral obligations towards us in terms of natural right to survival.