Involvement of The Communist Era in 13 Mei 1969 Racial Riot

At the heart of it, this research paper asks the question: Why did genocide not occur in the aftermath of race riots in Malaysia in 1969? I propose that two interlinked factors played their parts in deescalating conflict. Firstly, British divide and rule policy during the colonial era segregated ethnic groups such that violence tended to be concentrated in urban areas where the population were mixed. Even in these areas, ethnic groups still tended to gravitate towards each other, such that government responses were targeted and could cordon off key areas. Secondly, the government tightly controlled media, freedom of movement, and freedom of information such that rumormongering was curbed and the spread of negative sentiment was directed towards a certain segment of opposition politicians. The thread connecting all the two is in government response: The authorities acted swiftly to consolidate power and opportunistically targeted opponents; violence was a means to power, provided it was carefully and selectively applied, and always under control. Thus, the May 13 riots did not escalate into genocide as the government retained control over the ebb and flow of violence, and applied extreme discrimination in its use of force.

In Malaysia perspective, political violence is distinguished from other phenomena such as aggression, force or authority by its instrumental character. Whereas aggression refers to an unprovoked action, violence has a reason (however obscure this might be). As a rational action, violence continues to be so to the extent that is effective in reaching the end that must justify it [Arendt 1970: 46]. Theories of violence were generally fashioned by the psychologist to fit the individual or were applied by the political scientist to conflicts between nations. Violence was taken for granted and neglected. However, this article reviews theories of violence according to a two major namely, (i) violence as a reaction and (ii) violence as a action.

Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik, 2015

In the discussions of anti-Chinese phenomena in Indonesian regime transition in 1997-2004, religion appears to be less dominating in the study of ethnicity, economical and political factors. In scientific works, the perception of anti-Chinese violence also dominated by the views of politics and economy. In fact, religion also plays crucial role in many cases, ranging from the issue of Chinese infidelity, anti-Islamism and atheism. This paper was not aimed to stress that politics, economy and social are not important. Otherwise, this paper argues that religion are equally important as politic, economic and social analysis, especially to explain anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia.

Randwick International of Social Science Journal

This article discusses the impact of Malaysia's formation on September 16, 1963. The establishment of Malaysia involves Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. Planning at the early stage includes Brunei but the State withdrew at the end of Malaysia's formation. Singapore also dropped out from the Malaysia Formation two years later in 1965. The formation of Malaysia has affected Malaysia to this day. The objective of the study is to discuss the benefits of politics, socialization and racial relations in Malaysia. Among the things discussed in this article are the benefits of the platform of socialisation and racial relations in Malaysia as well as the political aspects. Both of these were examined using historical approaches and library research. The findings show that Malaysia's establishment has made Malaysia a unique nation with racial diversity. This includes the establishment of many political parties based on their respective race or tribe, especially in Sabah and Sa...

2008

In this thesis, I examine the experiences of people in West Sumatra during the 1965-1966 events and their aftermaths, by focusing on the experiences of both women and men. I argue that it was not only the propaganda or the political sitxiation of 1965 which played important roles in violence actions on the members of Partai Komunis Indonesia, (PKJ, the Indonesian Communist Party), and the members of its related mass organizations, but it was caused more by the complexity of political and social situations which had occurred before 1965, especially in West Sumatra. This thesis develops the approach designed by Robert Cribb which emphasizes four factors; the military complexities in investigating the events, extreme political tension at national events, local political and social tensions, and a more general culture of violence permeating Indonesian society. I argue that the combination of military agency and political tension at national and local political levels as well as social tensions before the killings of 1965-1966 were instrumental in what happened in West Sumatra and a culture of violence involving preman (tukang pukul, or thugs) had also had considerable impact on violence against women and men in this province. ' Interview with ZB, conducted in Pariaman on 13 January 2003.1 use initials for all informants who were victims or who have some relation to the PKI or PKI-related organization, as well as for some informant who had no connection with the PKI but who asked me not to include their names in this sub-thesis. 1 kidnapped from their homes and killed at Lubang Buaya on the southern outskirts of the city. The military newspaper Sento Yudha reported on 5 October 1965 that, sukarelawati-sukarelawati Gerwani dan PR [Pemuda rakyat] beraksi. Mereka yang sudah kehilangan sifatsifat kemanusiaannya itu menusuk-nusukan pisau ke tubuh para korban. Bahkan para korban yang sudah tak berpakaian itu dipotong kemaluanrtya dengan silet dan dimasukkan ke mulut Women volunteers from Gerwani and PR [Pemuda Rakyat] took action. Those who had lost their humanity stabbed the victims with knives. The victims' clothes were even taken off and their penises were cut off with razor blades and placed in their mouths.^ Such stories as this were accompanied by statements from religious leaders that members of the PKI did not believe in God, thus spreading suspicion and hatred of communists. Violence towards PKI members as the consequence of their political allegiance spread rapidly throughout Indonesia.^ Cribb estimates that there were between 150,000-1.000.000 victims throughout Indonesia.'* Robinson, who carried out his research in Bali, estimated that about 5 percent of the population of under 2 million Balinese (100,000 people) were killed by the army and civilians^. As for West Sumatra, there are no official reports or academic estimations of the number of casualties. However, a number of records from an NGO carrying out research on the 1965/1966 violence and interviews I have conducted show that the number of victims who survived and experienced the violence outnumbered those who were murdered. The survivors of the violence were often detained with different classifications based on their involvement with the PKI (as were other victims

2022

From 1948 to 1960, the British colonial administration in Malaya eradicated most of the Malayan Communist Party in a civil war called the Emergency. While indigenous elites were not yet in control of the polity by the time the war was initiated, they did not hide their unconditional support to the colonial administration and the war became a convenient opportunity to seek popular support for anti-communism ahead of first federal elections and Malaysia’s partial independence. Communism was framed as anti-Malayan in three ways: they were considered anti-Islam, anti-democracy, and pro-Chinese Communist Party. Conditions for being part of the Malayan nation included citizens' need to oppose communism ideologically, not mobilize collectively since strikes were deemed “revolutionary”, and assist the state in fighting the MCP. The war on communism continued following decolonization and the post-colonial administration reiterated its expectations that citizens assist the government in the conflict. Religious authorities were central allies of the state in ensuring believers would be anti-communist.

This paper aims to compare popular revolutions and riot movements in Malaysia and Indonesia as well as their impact on democracy in each of these countries. Whilere volutions in these countries have been the subject of the research in the social and political sciences, no study has measured how the intensity of resistance affects the prospects for democracy. With all other factors being constant, this article argues that social movements and resistance efforts have their own social impacts. A variety of popular resistance movements occurred in Malaysia, which was colonized by Great Britain, and in Indonesia, which was colonized by the Dutch.These states created different models of control that influenced society directly and indirectly. As what was seen, a lot of radical movements in the Indonesian society existed during the colonial and post-revolution eras, continuing to the current day. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, as examined by Scott, everyday forms of resistance have tended to act individually and symbolically. In addition, this article will discuss why certain countries experience democratization quickly while others do not, and why certain countries experience better economic development rather than political development and vice versa. For example, Indonesia is considered politically developed but economically, not as developed. Meanwhile, Malaysia, a post-British colony, is argued to experience the opposite; it has developed its economy rapidly but, at the same time, political freedom and democracies are less developed. Freedom of the press, human rights enforcement,a multi-party system, and group opposition are indicators of democracy that are easy to find in Indonesia but not in Malaysia.