Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2001, Journal of Urban Economics
Restrictions on the density at which development can occur are a central tool of land use regulation. Yet, they are understudied in the empirical literature. In this paper, we present a methodology to identify how much restrictions on the ratio of building space to lot area constrain developers. Our approach generates a measure of the distortion from the private optimum caused by restrictions as a function of land prices and the maximum allowed ratio of floor space to lot area. We use this methodology to examine how the set of incentives facing different levels of local government in Shanghai, China, affects density constraints on redevelopment sites in the city's emerging real estate market. ᮊ 2000 Academic Press I. INTRODUCTION Virtually every zoning law includes a limitation on the structural density, the ratio of building space to lot area, to which a parcel of land can be developed. Yet, the determinants and impacts of these density restrictions are poorly
Journal of Urban Economics, 2009
We investigate conceptually and empirically the role of economic incentives in the primary land allocation in China in recent years. A theoretical analysis demonstrates how recent fiscal and governance reforms give rise to land conversion decisions and long run urban spatial sizes much like those generated by competitive land markets with private land ownership. An econometric investigation of Shanghai and the provinces surrounding it demonstrates the presence of rent gradients, often used as an indication of the presence of land markets. It thus appears that economic forces have continued to exercise dominant influence over primary land allocations in spite of recent administrative restrictions on land conversion. These rent gradients are strongest in the most economically developed portions of the study region and weakest in the least economically developed. Urban land values exceed agricultural land values by a
Social Science Research Network, 2006
1999
This paper reviews the urban redevelopment activities in Shanghai as the land market reforms were introduced. We focus on the impact of land use institutions on the spatial pattern of these activities. Sites for private real estate redevelopment were supplied by individual districts in the city. But the need for districts to pay for the resettlement of displaced residents contributed
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 2006
Introduction In Japanese city planning, urban areas are classified into`land-use zones' so that buildings used for very different purposes do not coexist in the same area. At the same time, there are restrictions on the form of buildings so that a balance between development and urban infrastructure is maintained, buildings are appropriately arranged, and buildings and roads receive enough light and ventilation. Because the planning administration lacks an effective procedure for monitoring the change of use of existing buildings, in practice different uses compete for the same land. Therefore, restrictions on the forms of buildings which determine the development capacity of land are emphasized in the current land-use control system (Asami 1994). Under restrictions known as the`zoning floor area ratio', (1) in each land-use zone the maximum floor area ratio of lots must not exceed the floor area ratio (FAR) designated for that land-use zone. In addition, buildings are restricted by a variety of rules which apply to individual lots: these rules are called`shape controls'. Specifically, the maximum FAR of each lot is proportional to the width of the road in front of the lot (hereinafter, thè front road'). The heights and shapes of buildings are also controlled by absolute height limits, shadow restrictions, and slant-plane restrictions. According to the shadow restrictions, the shadow of a building cannot fall outside of its plots for more than a certain period during the winter solstice. Under slant-plane restrictions, the height of buildings is restricted according to the distance from the front-road boundary or
Land Use Policy, 2018
The paper addresses the links between planning uncertainty and land values, from theoretical and empirical perspective. We investigated land prices in a western part of Krakow (Poland) using a sample of 419 property sales from 2012 and 2014. We used spatial hedonic models to explore the relations between planning and building decisions, development density and land values. We found that administrative decisions (development and building permits) are capitalized in sales prices. Land with valid Decision on Development Conditions sold for 27-29% more than comparable properties. The implicit value of Building Permit was even higher as it increased the sale price by 47-50%. Additionally, we observed that potential density of development has a positive impact on land prices, but the effect is stronger for institutional investors.
The Wagner Review, 2021
Cities continually remake themselves through addition and subtraction. As buildings are torn down and new ones constructed, landlords, real estate developers, and public institutions are constantly changing the cityscape to achieve public and private land use goals. Economic, physical, and policy forces dictate what gets built and what varies block to block, and understanding these forces is fundamental to both the policymakers that regulate land use and the private parties impacted by those regulations. In an attempt to understand these forces, this paper employs a linear probability model to predict the likelihood that a parcel, or lot of land in New York City, will develop based on various characteristics.
2005
Effective governance of residential development and housing markets poses difficult challenges for land regulators. In theory, excessive land restrictions limit the buildable supply, tilting construction toward lower densities and larger, more expensive homes. Often, local prerogative and regional need conflict, and policymakers must make tradeoffs carefully. When higher income incumbents control the political processes by which local planning and zoning decisions are made, regions can become less affordable as prices increase. Housing assistance programs meant to benefit lower income households could be frustrated by limits on density and other restrictions on the number and size of new units.
Journal of Urban Economics, 2006
Many communities on the urban fringe are implementing a range of policies to preserve farmland and open space, cluster residential development, and guide development to areas with existing infrastructure. These efforts are an attempt to control overall growth and the concomitant loss in open space and also to counter a trend toward the so-called large lot development that often takes place in these areas. Planners have argued that policies to manage density are the most important local policy focus for urban areas in the coming years. It is possible that large lot development and sprawl are themselves the result of government policy. Most local governments use zoning to establish minimum acreage requirements for each residential dwelling unit; in ex-urban localities, these limits are often quite high. Developers might build a subdivision with average lot sizes greater than the minimum but they cannot by law go below it. Some researchers have argued, however, that the spatial patterns of development are simply the natural result of household preferences and market forces. In this paper, we address the question of whether zoning limits are the primary cause of lowdensity, sprawling development or whether market forces tend to dictate this outcome. If zoning limits account for low-density development in at least some cases, how would development patterns be different if there had been no such rules? We begin by constructing a simple model of the developer decision about the density of new development. The subdivision is the unit of observation, and developers must weigh both demand and cost considerations in choosing density, in addition to complying with zoning restrictions that vary across parcels. We apply the model using parcel-level data from a region where zoning rules vary but are exogenous to the period under study. Calvert County, Maryland, near Washington, DC, is an historically rural county that has experienced rapid growth in recent years. The county has a transferable development rights (TDRs) program that has led to a great deal of variability in the intensity of development across properties. We are able to not only examine the extent to which zoning has contributed to large lot development but also to determine the economic forces that underlie density decisions. Finally, we are able to forecast how density would have been different in the absence of zoning rules by estimating a Tobit equation that is censored for the observations constrained by zoning.
2008
Land-use regulation is undertaken by units of local government and is notoriously hard to measure. This paper assembles and reports the results of five complementary and overlapping surveys of local regulation in the San Francisco Bay Area. We compile measures derived from surveys of public officials conducted in 1992 and 1998 and another completed in 2007. In addition, we survey the perceptions of regulation among developers and land-use intermediaries. A rich description and comparison of regulatory patterns is provided. The paper also investigates relationships among various measures of regulation and housing outcomes. We find, for example, that the entitlement process increases the cost of a new single family dwelling by almost $23,000 in the Bay Area. Moreover, the requirement of an additional review by governmental agents to gain approval of new developments is associated with a four-percent increase in the prices of existing owner-occupied housing.
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2012
Municipal governments in China established direct control of the supply of urban land in August 2004. This paper examines whether this government action mitigates the efficiency of the residential land market. Using a unique data set of detailed land and residential community transactions with manually collected location information for residential land lots in seven Chinese cities, we analyze the relationship between the land lease prices and residential property prices from the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2005. We find that residential property prices determine residential land prices prior to 2004:3, but have no influence after 2004:3. This supports the hypothesis that the market for residential land became less efficient after local Chinese governments initiated direct control of the land supply, in the sense that land transaction prices no longer reflect the demand for land.
Land Use Policy, 2013
Beijing has a unique spatial pattern that is characterized by an inverted U-shape building height curve and geometrically developed transportation network (rings of highways and axial roads). The inverted U-shape curve of building heights is mainly the outcome of building height restrictions in inner city for historical preservation. This paper estimates the economic costs of the building height restrictions by using land development data. Through comparing land development without building height restrictions and simulations, we show that the economic costs are substantial. The impacts of the building height restrictions include land price decrease by up to 60%, housing output decrease by up to 70%, and land investment decrease by 85%. To accommodate the loss of housing output, the city edge has to expand, causing urban sprawl (given all other things equal). In order to offset building space reduction, housing prices rise by 20% and the city edge expands by 12%. Finally, induced travel costs resulting from urban sprawl and low density caused by building height restrictions may not be trivial.
Cities
Real estate development is a complex speculative endeavor and developer firms take a variety of forms throughout the world. State run development companies are relatively common and China is no exception. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have played a major role in China's transition to a market-based real estate sector, yet we know relatively little about the housing they build relative to private companies currently. To assess how their performance differs from private companies, we use a comprehensive set of georeferenced housing transactions, joined with remote sensing data and data on neighborhood amenities and transportation infrastructure, to analyze the dynamics of the Chengdu housing market from 2004 to 2011. We observe a drop in the variation in housing price and size, as well as a growing premium for larger units that we connect to changes in government regulations. Importantly, we find that units developed by SOE sell at a discount of roughly 7%. To explain this discount, we draw on literature and examine pricing strategy, difficult to measure quality elements, preferred treatment by local governments, and efforts to fulfill social goals related to housing provision. The study outlines directions for future research and we recommend the Chinese government formalize the relationship between SOEs in national housing policy to facilitate the production of lower-cost housing in a more consistent and equitable manner.
Chinese Geographical Science, 2001
China began to introduce market principles and establish price mechanism to better manage land and improve land use efficiency in the late 1980s. Since then, land m.arkets begin to emerge. A benchmark land price system, providing guidelines for land use rights selling and transferring, was established in order to overcome lack of market data and experiences in land transaction. The benchmark prices of land use rights are determined by land use, land use density (floor-land ratio), land gravies, land improvement, and tenant resettlement costs. This paper first conducts a formal analysis based on modem urban economic theory. The formal model provides a theoretical foundation in which the benchmark land price system is assessed and evaluated in terms of land use and urban development. The paper then concludes that the benchmark price system has two theoretical problems. One is associated with the fact that floor-land ratio plays an important role in land price determination whereas the theory suggests the other way around. That is, floor-land ratio depends on land prices. The other problem is that the benchmark land price system does not provide adequate room for the substitution between land and capital inputs. The substitution is a key in achieving land use efficiency in land markets and urban development process. It is concluded that the practice of the benchmark land price system is at odd with reforms that aim to introduce market principles and mechanism to guide resource uses. Therefore, it is recommended that further land policy reform should be taken. KEY WORDS: urban economics; land development; land prices; urban land use; floor-land ratio CLC number: F293.2 Document code: A Biography: DING Cheng-ri(1963 -), male, a native of Jilin Province, Ph. D., associate professor. His research interests include urban economies, housing, real estate and land development, quantitative research, neighborhood and local economic development, and spatial analysis and GIS.
Social Science Research Network, 2008
A key asset that is important in international markets is real estate-raw land and developed properties. Also, real estate can clearly have difference local rules for investment and transactions based upon bankruptcy protection, appraisal standards, lending standards, taxation and planning processes across countries. This can be particularly true when assessing a developing country. In this research, we assess the relative pricing behavior for land in Beijing China. We see this as important for three core reasons. First, China has a strong growth economy but is still in many ways an undeveloped country and thus we do not have significant data about asset pricing behavior there. Second, China has not traditionally had a market based land and property transfer system. Thus, it is interesting to assess how prices are determined relative to typical market expectations. Third, we have extensive evidence on pricing behavior in the USA and Europe but little such evidence on China. Are the same variables important in Land pricing in China and are there other unique local variables. For example, there have been twenty-two articles published in core journals on Chinese land and only two provide empirical estimates of value attributes and none of there are as extensive as our study. Thus, we consider a large data set of land prices in Beijing China and assess the relative pricing behavior. Our key results are that pricing behavior in general follows the traditional expected variables as determined by size, planning use, location and other neighborhood characteristics. However, we also find that land prices are associated with buyer characteristics; for example, foreign investors pay less than local investors.
International Real Estate Review, 2006
Cities, 2016
This paper analyzes how the newly introduced land pricing system affects urban land productivity in China, taking post-land-reform Beijing as an example. China has been developing its urban land market by building an effective pricing system. This study indicates that the effects of such pricing system on urban land productivity have evolved with the progress of land reform. It is only since 2004, when land granting by negotiation was at last totally prohibited for profit-oriented developments, that the land pricing system has started to positively and significantly improve urban land productivity; the land pricing system also promotes more productive urban land usage by stimulating more intensive investment and better business management.
using-co sts-land-use-regulatio ns/ Cre d it: wo o d le ywo nd e rwo rks (Cre ative Co mmo ns BY) In desirable cities, property owners and developers influence tighter land use regulations, which can lead to substantially higher urban and housing costs. In the US and elsewhere, zoning policies and other land use regulations are now widespread. Christian Hilber and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud look at the reasons behind these policies, finding that, driven by lobbying from developers and property owners, places that are more developed tend to adopt tighter land use regulations. With land regulations operating as a form of 'shadow tax', of over 50 per cent of housing value in some cities, land regulations may now have become too much of a barrier to development in urban areas. Land use regulations vary tremendously in shape and scope across space and have become more widespread and stringent over time. Although land use regulations have a long history dating back to the 17 th century at least, they were initially pro-growth. Only one century ago, hardly any country regulated land use systematically in a restrictive manner. T he f irst comprehensive zoning law in the United States, f or example, dates back to 1916 (in New York). In contrast, nowadays all modern states regulate land use intensively in an overwhelmingly restrictive way. Land use planning policies can, in principle, raise welf are by correcting market f ailures. Recent evidence, however, casts doubt on this proposition and suggests that such regulations have strong adverse net ef f ects: Turner, Haughwout, and van der Klaauw (2012) estimate the net cost of land use regulations as a proportion of land value to reach a hef ty 38% in their sample of residential plot transactions across the United States. An earlier study by Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) estimates the net costs of land use planning policies in the UK to amount to as much as 3.9% of annual household incomes. So we are talking about big numbers.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
A special feature of China's housing market is land use rights in the form of land leasehold contracts granted by the government. We consider an equilibrium model in which a representative developer may choose to redevelop existing centrally located housing or to develop new housing at the periphery of the city. We show that as the city grows, the land leasehold system results in the city center being developed less intensely and more land being used on the outskirts of the city when compared to a fee simple environment. Thus, cities in China are likely to be relatively more spread out, with city centers relatively older than would be the case with "fee simple" ownership. Our model suggests that excess residential land use is about 6 percent. In addition, compared with the ownership case, housing supply will grow more quickly in the near future, but more slowly later on during the transition of the Chinese economy. Parallel to the supply growth pattern, equilibrium price grows relative slowly in the near future, but more quickly later on. While we focus on residential uses, we believe our model can be applied to other land uses.
Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.