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2019, Focaal
This article is based on the transcript of a roundtable on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism held at the AAA Annual Meeting in 2017. The contributors explore this rise in the context of the role of affect in politics, rising socio-economic inequalities, racism and neoliberalism, and with reference to their own ethnographic research on these phenomena in Germany, Poland, Italy, France, the UK and Hungary.
This article is based on the transcript of a roundtable on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism held at the AAA Annual Meeting in 2017. The contributors explore this rise in the context of the role of affect in politics, rising socioeconomic inequalities, racism and neoliberalism, and with reference to their own ethnographic research on these phenomena in Germany, Poland, Italy, France, the UK and Hungary.
Social Science Information, 2017
The rise of the new radical populist right has been linked to fundamental socioeconomic changes fueled by globalization and economic deregulation. Yet, socioeconomic factors can hardly fully explain the rise of new right. We suggest that emotional processes that affect people’s identities provide an additional explanation for the current popularity of the radical right, not only among low- and medium-skilled workers, but also among the middle classes whose insecurities manifest as fears of not being able to live up to salient social identities and their constitutive values, and as shame about this anticipated or actual inability. This link between fear and shame becomes particularly salient in competitive market societies where responsibility for success and failure is increasingly individualized. Failure implies stigmatization through unemployment, being on welfare benefits, or forced migration to find work. Under these conditions, many tend to emotionally distance themselves from social identities that inflict shame and other negative emotions, instead seeking meaning and self-esteem from those aspects of identity that are perceived to be stable and to some extent exclusive, such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, and traditional gender roles. At the same time, repressed shame can manifest as anger and resentment against immigrants, refugees, gays, and other minorities as well as liberal cultural elites who appear as enemies of these more stable social identities.
Welcome to this second of two roundtables at this year's Annual Meeting of the AAA that we have organized in order to shed light on what anthropology and ethnography may contribute to our understanding of the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism in Europe and the USA. We first start planning this at last year's Annual Meeting of the AAA in Minneapolis, having been struck by the inevitable corridor and panel talk in the wake of Donald Trump's presidential election victory merely a week prior to this. One year on, there has of course been a virtual torrent of analysis, but it is still very much the case that public and academic debates on this have featured political scientists and sociologists in the most prominent roles, rather than anthropologists. Yet we are as anthropologists of course predisposed to think that anthropology and anthropologists do have something unique to contribute to these debates, not the least in the form of the detailed knowledge and insight into ordinary people's lives, ideas and behaviors that other disciplines may not always provide us with. Whatever the reasons for this may be -and anthropology's generally liberal left-of-center orientation and predisposition to study people we 'like' (Bangstad 2017) comes to mind as possible vectors here -we did find a paucity of relevant anthropological research on these matters. Hochschild (2016) may be right to speak of this as a proverbial 'empathy wall' which prevents us from engaging in
Festl, Michael (ed.). Pragmatism and Social Philosophy. Routledge, 2020
In this article we would like to critically discuss two different ways of re-evaluating the role that emotions – or affects1 – play in political life. First of all, in section 1 we will introduce Ernesto Laclau´s assessment of the role played by what he calls affects (following Sigmund Freud). According to Laclau, popular identities are produced through the condensation of heterogeneous social demands under one empty signifier. While this process is conceived as affectively charged, the exact role of these affects is not clear. Despite Laclau´s claim about the entanglement between the semiotic-linguistic and affective dimensions, the former dimension seems to trump the latter in his analysis of the genesis of political identities, banishing affects to a marginal role. This marginalization is in tension not only with Laclau´s original intentions, but also with his comments about the role that vague feelings of solidarity play in the constitution of new popular identities. In order to overcome this shortcoming, in section 2 we explore the possibility of providing a pragmatist alternative to Laclau's view of the role of emotions in political processes. Our alternative view draws on Dewey's approach to emotions. Specifically, we wish to emphasize two aspects: (1) emotions have a conceptual content (they say something about our experience of the world and about our values), (2) they have an epistemic function (they make possible and influence our political inquiries). These two elements form the point of view of an expressive theory, according to which emotional experiences as well as collective inquiries should be described as articulative processes. The notion of articulation describes the processes by which we move from “vague” feelings, suggestions and situations to determinate emotions, ideas, and problems. Articulation processes involve both a moment of “discovering” something which is only vaguely given, as well as a constructive moment of determination of vagueness. Finally, in section 3 we explore the prospective application of our Deweyan alternative to the role of emotions in the emergence of popular movements. Drawing on Pierre Rosanvallon's analysis, we show that the political emotions that are usually attached to populism can be analyzed from the perspective of their role in advancing or blocking collective inquiries. To his analysis we add the idea that, parting from an expressive notion of inquiry, the analysis of the epistemic role of emotions can be more fine-grained, accounting not only for their role in enabling or blocking argumentation but also describing other epistemically relevant aspects such as creativity and articulation. Finally, we draw on Emmanuel Renault's notion that a feeling of injustice can serve as a promising starting point for a more positive account of emotions in populism, able to step beyond Laclau's views.
Emotions are prevalent in the rhetoric of populist politicians and among their electorate. We argue that partially dissimilar emotional processes may be driving right-and left-wing populism. Existing research has associated populism with fear and insecurities experienced in contemporary societies on the one hand, and with anger, resentment, and hatred on the other. Yet, there are significant differences in the targets of right-and left-wing resentment: a political and economic establishment deemed responsible for austerity politics (left), and political and cultural elites accused of favoring ethnic, religious, and sexual outgroups at the expense of the neglected ingroup (right). Referring to partially different emotional opportunity structures and distinct political strategies at exploiting these structures, we suggest that right-wing populism is characterized by repressed shame that transforms fear and insecurity into anger, resentment, and hatred against perceived " enemies " of the precarious self. Left-wing populism, in turn, associates more with acknowledged shame that allows individuals to self-identify as aggrieved and humiliated by neoliberal policies and their advocates. The latter type of shame holds emancipatory potential as it allows individuals to establish bonds with others who feel the same, whereas repressors remain in their shame or seek bonds from repression-mediated defensive anger and hatred.
Partecipazione e Conflitto, Issue 13(1) 2020: 83-106, 2020
There is a tendency both in academia and in popular understandings to posit emotions against rationality and to judge them as an expression of intellectual inferiority. This could not be more evident than in current accounts of populism, which often describe populist supporters as overtaken by passions rather than relying on rational deliberation. However these arguments hardly stand up to scientific scrutiny. As I will show by reviewing the state-of-the-art, advancements in disciplines such as political psychology have now provided systematic evidence of how, contrary to what is traditionally rooted in the public imaginary, emotions and cognition work in concert. If emotionality is an integral part of decision-making and is vital to any type of political engagement, the question we should rather ask is what is peculiar about the relationship between emotions and populism. In the second part of the article, I will explore how the emotional 'supply and demand' intersect in our contemporary societies, where capitalism, individualism and globalisation have created particular affective states that provide fertile ground for the populist appeal to resonate. By examining the emotions-populism relationship based on three broad dimensions -structural, subjective and communicative -, this article provides a multilevel analysis that unpacks the significance of emotions for the emergence, diffusion and success of populism.
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 2019
This paper argues that it is important for educators in democratic education to understand how the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, the United States and around the world can never be viewed apart from the affective investments of populist leaders and their supporters to essentialist ideological visions of nationalism, racism, sexism and xenophobia. Democratic education can provide the space for educators and students to think critically and productively about people's affects, in order to identify the implications of different affective modes through which right-wing populism is articulated. Furthermore, this paper points out that 'negative' critique of the affective ideology of right-wing populism is not sufficient for developing a productive counter politics. An affirmative critique is also needed to set alternative frames and agendas which endorse and disseminate alternative concepts and affective practices such as equality, love and solidarity. These ideas provide critical resources to democratic education for developing a culture and process of democracy that transcends the negativity of mere critique of either right-wing populisms or inadequate forms of democracy.
Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, 2018
This interview began in Hamburg and Berlin and continued virtually, as an active email exchange, between November 2017 and April 2018. Our conversation was sparked by the recent and ongoing turn to the right in global politics. It departs from exploring ‘affective modes of inquiry’, which our interview partners have applied in recent articles. We then move on to discuss the events of Brexit in the UK and the return of the far right to German Parliament in 2017, as well as recent terms such as ‘techlash’ and ‘fake news’. Against this background, we tackle the core concern of this special issue by asking for the locations of affect in the concepts of ‘affective resonance’ and ‘(atmo)spheres‘. Finally, we ponder the potential of ‘affective counterpolitics’ and the challenges this brings for an academic engagement with realpolitik.
Emotion, Politics and Society, 2006
The disciplinary context: Towards a political sociology of emotions Oddly enough, a political sociology of emotions is considerably immature when compared with the enormous growth of the sociology of emotion during the last twenty-five years or so (
2017
Why, at the present historical moment, are divisive nationalist narratives more powerful than inclusive ones seeking to advance transnational integration? This essay examines four case studies of “nationalist storytelling”: the rhetoric of Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) during the Leave campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum of June 2016 in the United Kingdom, the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump in the United States, the 2017 campaign of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Netherlands, and the 2017 campaign of Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France. In each of these countries, populist leaders have deployed rhetoric that traces a three-stage emotional arc, emphasizing love for the homeland, fear of the foreigner, and righteous anger against corrupt elites who have endangered the nation’s well-being. The powerful emotional response aroused by this rhetoric has been a key factor in these movements’ recent electoral success.
Politics and Governance, 2024
The growth of radical right politics raises concerns about authoritarian and exclusionary scenarios, while populism is understood as a logic that articulates democratic demands and strengthens political engagement. There is a lack of research on the democratic views of radical right populism. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on these phenomena generally examines either the supply or demand side of politics, neglecting the narrative dimension that emerges from the two intertwining. This article aims to fill these gaps by using the heuristic of the "emotion narrative" that circulates between the supply and demand sides of radical right populist parties to examine their political culture. Assuming that populism creates social identities through the affective articulation of popular demands, focusing on the "narrative of emotions" (and not only on the narrative dimension of particular emotions) allows us to analyse how social and political objects, facts, ideas, and scenarios generate political culture. Through a mixed-methods comparative study of Portugal and Italy, this article assesses the emotion narratives of the parties Chega and Fratelli d'Italia. The dataset includes 14 semi-structured interviews with MPs and an original survey with 1,900 responses regarding political realities (on the democratic system, power structures, ethnic diversity, political history, and role of the media) and hypothetical scenarios (on authoritarianism, the rise of migration and diversity, anti-corruption, securitisation of the state, and expanded use of referendums). The emotion narratives of radical right populist political cultures engender democratic visions rooted in exclusionary identities with positive affection for centralism, authoritarianism, and securitisation of the state, as opposed to innovation and participation.
Discourse & Communication, 2017
Emotions and Society, 2020
This article seeks to explore and emphasise the role of emotions as a key variable in terms of understanding both the rise of anti-political sentiment and its manifestation in forms of ethno-populism. It argues that the changing emotional landscape has generally been overlooked in analyses that seek to comprehend contemporary social and political change. This argument matters, not only due to the manner in which it challenges dominant interpretations of the populist signal but also because it poses more basic questions about the limits of knowledge and evidential claims in an increasingly polarised, fractious and emotive contemporary context. The core argument concerning the existence of an emotional disconnection and why ‘feelings trump facts’ is therefore as significant for social and political scientists as it is for politicians and policy makers.
Subjectivity, 2012
Until very recently Political Studies has largely ignored the role of the human passions. Understanding the difference between emotion and affect seems vital to this task, as without the latter emotion becomes cognitivised and over-civilised. In this article, we examine some of the contributions of psychoanalysis and continental philosophy to our understanding of affect. We examine the corporeal and ambivalent nature of affect, which provides the basis for what we call the vicissitudes of human feeling, that is, the way in which different feelings connect or disconnect from one another in complex, indeterminate and surprising ways. We use a detailed examination of the vicissitudes of grief and grievance as they contribute to ressentiment, a sentiment that is a particular characteristic of reactionary forms of populism. Passion can only ever be partly tamed and civilised and this is what provides politics with its excitements and terrors.
Palgrave Book on Populism, 2022
Distinktion: Journal Of Social Theory, 2019
Populism of the twenty-first century, the paper argues, emerges from the aloofness of liberal democracy's sober regimes of rationality. This results in political movements that are explicitly affective in their strategies, both on the right and the left of the political spectrum. However, while policy research claims that leftand right-wing populism 'look alike' (isomorphia), the paper shows that there is only one populist logic that exceeds demarcations of 'left' or 'right'. Therefore, it introduces the concept of the populist moment to describe the structure of the populist logic that is shared by a variety of protest movements. As a feminist intervention in the field of populism studies, the paper, finally, discusses how Mouffe's political theory conflates 'left populism' and radical democracy. In reference to Ranciére's and Lorey's conceptualizations of radical democracy the paper portrays how to democratize democracy beyond Mouffe's hegemony theory.
World complexity science Academy journal, 2020
The essay critically engages a political newsletter which problematically invokes rhetoric in a populist project by making the argument that emotions are a legitimate and sufficient guide to settling political questions, and by implication that facts often are unnecessary in political decision making. Arguing at the meta level-less about political issues and more about the way to reach and justify political positions-the text is a rhetorically adept defense of a populist approach to politics. The analyzed text is an illustration of populist-inflected rhetoric and, in virtue of its "theoretical" nature, also a blueprint for a particular kind of political culture informed by a populist epistemology which on central points is at odds with ideals of deliberative democracy. Analysis of the text reveals that it sets up its argument in a way that perpetuates the reason/emotion dichotomy that has marred the Western tradition and rhetorical studies for centuries; only it does so in an inverted version that promotes the role of emotions at the expense of knowledge. "People vs. elite" appeals recognizable from populism inform this move in an "emotions vs. academic/ technocratic knowledge" version, and the newsletter's disarming
Alice News, 2021
The interplay of emotions and politics has gained increasing attention in the social sciences over the past few decades and is revealing potential ways to improve processes of democratisation. While psychologists and especially philosophers have engaged with emotions for much longer, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists are steadily devoting a growing interest in analysing the role played by emotions in society and politics. The consolidation of populist phenomena of recent years has certainly contributed to cultivating this interest, because there is little doubt that populism deals very intensely with emotions, whilst populist politics is often associated with a lack of rational arguments. The centrality that populism has gained over the last two decades in representative politics worldwide urges social scientists to address political categories such as representation, sovereignty, participation, and behaviour with a reinforced analytical focus on emotions. A debate is currently unfolding in relation to how research could nd evidence that pursues a wider understanding of the topic, both at the theoretical and methodological levels. This article inaugurates a series of publications aimed to contribute to this debate, the series is framed within the project UNPOP, 'UNpacking POPulism: Comparing the formation of emotion narratives and their effects on political behaviour' , a research initiative coordinated by the Centre for Social Studies, in cooperation with the Centre for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive and Behavioural Intervention, both at the University of Coimbra and funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology.
2021
Much attention has been devoted to how right-wing populists in Europe challenge the consensus on the benefits of European integration, but left-wing resistance to the EU is less discussed. Existing analyses tend to distinguish between three constructions of political community: a postnational EU, the populist right invoking national sovereignty, and the populist left invoking popular sovereignty. However, empirical analyses struggle to find consensus on how left populists relate to the EU, and if they invoke claims to national or popular sovereignty. This article argues that this empirical impasse stems from that populism and Euroscepticism are performative categories and not simply analytical tools, and serve to produce exclusion. There are two dichotomies in this exclusionary frame: emotional populists/rational EU, and the postnational EU/nationalist populists. Through an analysis of Podemos in Spain and the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, I show how the lines between the pos...
International Journal of Cultural Studies , 2020
Focused on the case of Turkey, this article interrogates the relation between populist politics and affective mediations by social media platforms, or, more precisely, the disjunctions between them that result in weaknesses and reconfigurations of populism. It explores the uncertain interplay between the capillary micropolitics of affect mediated by online platforms and the macropolitics of populism as a political project of managing the body politic. Studying two Twitter campaigns, I look at what I call issue crowds that are assembled by hashtags and propagate through memetic, connective logics, but that also feature homophilic disconnections. It is such disconnections rather than the (over)connectedness of the affective crowd, as the liberal critique of populism has it, that endanger democratic possibility. By analysing connectedness and disconnection, this article captures the political possibilities and dangers of affective communication and the transindividual crowd, meanwhile rethinking the liberal critique of populism
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