THE EURO CRISIS

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2017

2014

After containing a populist backlash in May’s European Parliament elections, and with the fractious designation of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission president all but complete, there are hopes that the EU can finally turn the page on some of its most difficult years. Yet, while sovereign bond yields in countries such as Ireland and Spain have come down sharply from the heights reached during the eurozone crisis, there is little sign of a sustained recovery. Many remain unconvinced that the EU, and the currency union in particular, have done enough to fix the institutional flaws exposed by the crisis. The new Commission president faces the task of trying to restructure a still imperfect union in spite of the reform fatigue that has permeated Brussels and national capitals.

This paper argues that the boom and bust in Europe since the 1990s make more sense when seen as part of a history of displacements and dislocations within the EU since at least the 1950s. That post-war tale is part of a larger European narrative reaching back to the mid nineteenth century, driven by bloody rivalry and tense cooperation between Germany and France. In fact, these historical dramas are ‘nested’ one inside the other like a Russian doll. Note that a later and expanded version of this draft paper, originally written in 2014, has now appeared in Hans-Jörg Trenz, Carlo Ruzza and Virginie Guiraudon (eds), Europe’s Prolonged Crisis. The making or the unmaking of a political union, London: Palgrave Macmillan (2015) with the title ‘Not just singing the blues.’

Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations, 2012

embarked on the penultimate step in this progression. But only half of it-a monetary union without a fiscal union. The Euro-crisis has now called that achievement into question and, in the process, undermined the authority of those espousing a European route towards closer integration, both for themselves as well as for other nations. As a convinced federalist, myself, I would not recommend abandoning the European example altogether, but if there is a lesson to be learned from this sorry episode, it is this: "if you are going to do it, do not do it this way". This article examines the European experience with economic and monetary union from three perspectives-the design, the implementation and the management of the euro-before exploring the implications of the current crisis.

De Gruyter eBooks, 2023

Policy-making in the European Union has been shaped-if not dominated-by aw ide variety of different types of crises in recent years. Accordingly, much political activity by the EU and related actors has had ac ertain urgency,occurred under intense economic and societalstrain, and required responses in policy areas wherethe EU traditionallyonlyholds fragmented competencies. Shifting priorities, short-term policyr esponses,a nd adapted implementation schedules showcase that EU governance now most often occurs in reaction to unforeseen events, rather than following mid-to long-term planning as originallyf oreseen by its foundational actors and the underlying institutional setup in calmer times. Building on ac oncise overviewofs ome of the most impactful recent crises from an EU perspective,t his introductory chapter provides ac onceptual framework for the analysis of European crisis governance. While the chapter catalogues and categorizes avariety of different crises, it conceptualises crisisgovernance not as an exception to the regular functioning of the EU'spolitical system, but instead as aregular feature of how the EU works nowadays.Insodoing,itoffers aconceptual basis for thefollowing chapters of this volume, as well as for further empirical studieso nthei mpact of crises on EU policies and politics more generally. Following these considerations, the chapter outlinesand explainsthe volume'sstructure which considers (1) crises related to the legal and democratic foundations of the EU;(2) the EU'sr ole and behaviour as an international actor in ac hanging world; and (3) the origins and impacts of crises in various EU policy areas. Setting the scene: Crisis as the new normal in the EU? When EU member states signed the Treaty of Lisbonin2007, they did not anticipate the manifold crises that would ensueo vert he course of the following years. Instead of the intended consolidation of aUnion which had just gone through its biggest round of enlargements, the EU faced the financial and economic crises of 2007-2008,the European debt crisis of the early2010s, the Arab Springand ensuing Acknowledgments: The authorswould like to express their profound gratitude to Julia Simon forher most constructiveand helpful feedback on this chapter,and to Jamie L. Kaup forh er excellent work in proofreading all chapters of this volume.

2012

From 27 B.C. to 180 A.D., the territories now covering much of Europe shared some basic governing structures. They had a common legal system that influences Western courts to this day, and even shared a common currency — 2,000 years before the euro came along. That era of peace, known as Pax Romana, replaced two centuries of civil war and conquest. Peace didn’t last, of course. After the era ended with the death of emperor Marcus Aurelius, attempts to create a unified Europe came mostly through force, a pattern that persisted right up through World War II. After the war, Winston Churchill called for a revived notion of European political unification to promote lasting peace on the continent. Hence the idea of a “United States of Europe” is millennia old, and still in progress. Though Europe has achieved far from the degree of political and economic unification of the United States, today it enjoys greater policy coordination and more cross-border trade than ever before in the region...

2017

During 2016, "Akademska knjiga" from Novi Sad (edited by NUMMUS) published in the Serbian language this important work of the world-renowned economist J. Stiglitz. The scope of this monograph is over 380 pages, excellently structured in four special parts of equal volume, largely interdependent regarding treated issues (with a foreword, afterword and an index of terms and guidelines, as well as many bibliography items expressed in more than 200 footnotes, citations and explanations. The first part entitled "European crisis" (29-108) is very comprehensive because it introduces the reader into the issue of the crisis caused by earthquakes in the eurozone. It consists of three related, turbulent chapters: 1) The European crisis, 2) Euro expectations and reality, and 3) The sad effect of Europe. The author states that the global financial crisis of 2008 seamlessly turned into a European crisis. It is caused by events that present symptoms, not causes, of deeper problems in the eurozone structure: interest rates rose on government bonds of Greece and some other eurozone countries and some other countries could not get access to finance in any possible way. Although many factors contributed to the troubles of Europe, the basic error is only one: the creation of a common currency, the euro or more specifically, the creation of a common currency without creating a set of institutions that would enable authorities to the area as diverse as Europe to function effectively with one single currency. The second part entitled "The upside from the beginning" (109-202), also consists of three chapters: 1) Can a common currency succeed at all? 2) Euro: split system, 3) Monetary Policy and the European Central Bank; The second part of the book (from 4 to 6 chapter) reviews the necessary conditions for a successful monetary union, what Europe has actually done and how the discrepancy between what should have been done and what has been done has led to the failure of the euro, to the crisis that followed soon after its creation, and to a fork, where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer-which further complicates the success of a single currency system. The third part entitled "The wrong Policies" (203-266) consists of two chapters: 1) Crisis measures: how Troika politics deteriorated imperfect structure of the eurozone and guaranteed a depression, and 2) Structural reforms that deepened the failure; This part of the book (chapters 7 and 8), describe in detail how the eurozone reacted to the crisis and how those countries "came for help" with programs that actually deepened and prolonged the consequences. The fourth part entitled "What next?" (267-352), consists of four chapters: 1) Creation of a functional eurozone, 2) Is the amicable divorce possible?, 3) To flexible euro, 4) What next ... This part (9 to 12 chapter) explains what can be done to restore prosperity to Europe. A key hypothesis of this author is that the eurozone cannot survive because it was wrongly placed in the very beginning. Thus, he argues that the single currency in the region with enormous economic and political differences cannot easily succeed. In fact he argues that the single currency requires a fixed exchange rate between the member states and a uniform interest rate. Besides, the rules must be sufficiently

EU Policymaking at a Crossroads: Negotiating the 2021-2027 Budget (Edward Elgar), 2022

What are the historical roots of the battle of ideas that shape the euro area asymmetry and why was it conducive to the crisis? What does the response of political authorities to the crisis teach us about the battle of ideas that underlies the MFF negotiations? We answer these question by zooming on the ideational struggles about the EMU economic governance before, during and, to a lesser extent, after the euro crisis. First, we underline that the institutional design of the euro area is the outcome of ideational struggles, which are unfolding since the 1960s. Second, we analyse the battle of ideas between the different policy players who were fighting to frame the causes of the euro area crisis and the subsequent policy solutions. Finally, we draw links between the battle of ideas that took place during the euro area crisis and the negotiations on the RRF and the MFF.