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2007, Controversies
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Traditions of Controversy is a comprehensive examination of the role that various forms of controversy have played across different historical and cultural contexts. The text explores ancient traditions from Greece and China, medieval and early modern disputes regarding the nature of logic, metaphysics, and dialectics, and how these controversies have evolved into modern scientific disciplines. Each chapter delves into specific debates, laws, and rhetorical practices, uncovering the significance of argumentation and discourse in shaping intellectual traditions.
Pragmatics & Cognition, 2009
Traditions of Controversy explores, in a collection of 15 chapters, issues regarding the alleged obstacles to dialogue and controversy across cultural, disciplinary, and historical borderlines and the conflict between tradition and innovation. The whole volume displays an awareness of controversy as a universal pragmatic phenomenon, present in all cultures, by assuming that the practice of controversy, in each of the cultures and disciplines where it develops, ends up constituting a tradition. By investigating various disciplinary stances researchers adopt on controversies, Traditions of Controversy embraces a multiplicity of perspectives. Whether the traditions should be considered as universal is an empirical question to be determined based on the controversies examined and their related theorizations. Traditions of Controversy is composed of three parts, each of which serves to highlight a specific time frame and its relevant themes. The editors emphasize that the volume comprises period-specific controversies as well as ancient culture-specific controversies, which defy the relatively modern notion of East versus West. In this age of fast globalization, the awareness of the multiplicity of traditions of controversy is fundamental for ensuring the harmonious integration of the various perspectives, while at the same time granting each its own place. Although different 'positions' may exist between two sides in the controversy, the editors Dascal and Chang end their introduction to the volume by hinting at the possibility that these can eventually be "rearranged or recombined innovatively" (p. xv). The first part of the volume, entitled Ancient traditions: East and West, entertains the notions of tradition, cross-cultural dialogue, and controversy with a historical dimension. The opening chapter "Toward a Taxonomy of Controversies and Controversality: Ancient Greece and China" by Geoffrey Lloyd, covers the polemical traditions of ancient China and Greece. This very first chapter also serves as a critique of the novel discipline of controversy studies, involving taxonomy. Lloyd sets the dialogic and critical tone underlying the volume by considering the claimed universality of typology as constantly questioned. Hanina Ben-Menahem's "Controversy in Jewish Law: The Talmud's Attitude to Controversy" sees these issues differently from Lloyd, assuming prima facie that the practice of
2011
What role do controversies play in the advancement of philosophical understanding and the progress of scientific knowledge? In both cases, from the beginnings of modern philosophy, the prevailing responses have been skeptical of such a possible role. At best, it is granted that controversies may occasionally be beneficial, although their value would hardly be more than anecdotal. At worst, they are regarded as a clear sign of the deplorable state of the respective field of inquiry, especially when they continue indefinitely without reaching any consensus, as so often happens in philosophy. This view began to change only in the second half of last century. A growing corpus of literature has contributed to the reevaluation of the cognitive significance of controversies. According to this perspective, whose origins can be traced to the ancient Sophists, the progress of knowledge has an essentially controversial or dialectical nature. However, dialectics, in the sense of "adversarial dialogue", has not yet become a widely accepted alternative to the monolectic view adopted by early modern philosophers. One of the main reasons behind this limitation is a hidden assumption according to which controversies may be approached as specific, isolated phenomena. However, at least in most cases any controversy is embedded from its very start in a network of relationships with other controversies. Therefore, a unit of analysis larger than "controversy" is badly needed in intellectual history. In the same way that units larger in scope than "theory"-such as "paradigm", "research programme", "research tradition", etc-have been useful in bringing to light new aspects of the dynamics of scientific change, I am persuaded that the introduction of "controversy space" as a unit of analysis wider than "controversy" will have the same effect. This new notion would turn the dialectical approach into an effective tool for reconstructing the intellectual history of entire fields, not just of isolated episodes. Before turning in the fourth section of this essay to the concept of "controversy space" and its related notions, we should first ask why a new model of scientific and philosophical change is needed at all. In order to answer, I shall sketch and assess in the next two sections the main positions that have been held on the problem of the epistemic status of controversies.
2017
Current theories of argumentation underestimate the difference, emphasized already by Aristotle, between theoretical and practical (action-oriented) argumentation. This is exemplified with the argument theories of Toulmin, pragma-dialectics, Habermas, Walton, and Perelman. Since antiquity, rhetoric has defined itself, not as argument designed to “win,” but as action-oriented argument. Several distinctive features of action-oriented argument are identified. One is that its warrants include value concepts in audiences, implying an element of subjectivity in argument assessment. Between individuals, but also inside each individual, several conflicting value dimensions are typically involved, not just the dimension of truth-falsity, which makes sustained, reasonable dissensus inevitable.
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 2014
The Series is developed in partnership with the Maison Européenne des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société (MESHS) at Nord-Pas de Calais and the UMR-STL: 8163 (CNRS). Aims & Scope: The scientific objectives of the series, where humanities and social sciences are conceived as building interdisciplinary interfaces, are: This series publishes volumes that link practices in the Humanities and Social Sciences, with theories in Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, such as: Decision theory and action theory, Argumentation Theories in: cognitive sciences, economy, sociology, law, logic, philosophy of sciences. The series is open towards research from the Analytic and the Continental traditions, and has four main focus areas: Pragmatic models and studies that develop a dynamic approach to reasoning in which argumentation is structured as an interaction or as a game, in which two or more participants play moves defined by the type of argumentation in question, communication, language and techniques of argumentation: studies between the practical and theoretical dimensions of argumentation, as well as the relationships between argumentation and other modes of communication, reception, persuasion and power: studies in which reasoning practice is considered from the point of view of its capacity to produce conviction of persuasion, and focusing on understanding what makes an argument performative, Diachronic transformations of reasoning practices studies that emphasize the invention and renewal of reasoning forms, with respect to its performance and its effectiveness.
Pragmatics & Cognition, 2016
In his Theory of Controversies, Marcelo Dascal proposed three types of polemic exchange, in which Controversy was added to the classic types of Discussion and Dispute. For example, in Dascal's lights, logic is associated with polemic discussions, power manipulations with disputes, and 'soft logic' with controversies. The theory was remarkably successful in providing a realist framework for polemic exchanges. In this paper, I provide a conceptually independent substantiation and expansion of the theory, by associating it with meta-ethical analysis of thick and thin concepts, indebted to Michael Walzer, Menachem Fisch and Yitzhak Benbaji.
It has often been noted that argumentation in the early Middle Ages was mainly based on written authority, while dialectical modes of reasoning were held in suspicion. Towards the end of the eighth century, however, dialectic was back in vogue at the court of Charlemagne. Logical reasoning played a significant role in theological discussions initiated by the court. This article explores the 'rules of engagement' for conducting a debate around 800.
Dialectic and the notion of tradition 1 chapter 1 Aristotle and the art of dialectic 11 1.1 Dialectic and the aporetic method 14 1.1.1 What dialectic is and how it works 14 1.1.2 The uses of dialectic and its epistemic function 18 1.2 Disputation and knowledge: "peirastic" and "non-peirastic" dialectic 24 1.2.1 The SophisticalRefutations 25 1.2.2 The eighth book of the Topics 26 1.3 The 'topoi' in rhetoric and dialectic 30 1.3.1 Rhetorical and dialectical invention 31 1.3.2 The nature and function of the 'topoi' 32 1.4 Conclusions: dialectical reasoning, assent and necessity 34 chapter 2 Dialectic in the Latin world: Cicero, Boethius and the Scholastics 39 2.1 Cicero: rhetoric and reasoning inutramquepartem 40 2.1.1 The 'loci': Invention and judgment 41 2.1.2 Disputation and probable reasoning 43 2.2 Boethius, the Topics and the liberal arts 47 2.3 Interlude: the Topics in the Middle Ages and the 'quaestio disputata' 51 2.3.1 The topics ('loci') and scholastic dialectic 53 2.3.2 The Medieval 'quaestio disputata' and the 'obligationes' 54 viii The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric chapter 3 The revival of dialectic in the Renaissance: an introduction chapter 4 The new humanist dialectic and rhetoric: Rudolph Agricola on invention and probability 4.1 Renaissance Humanism and the revenge of rhetoric 69 4.1.1 Philosophy against persuasion 70 4.1.2 Dialectic and sophistry 72 4.2 Rudolph Agricola and the reform of dialectic 76 4.3 Invention and judgment 78 4.3.1 The places 81 4.3.2 The field of dialectical invention 83 4.3.3 The use of arguments: affects and disposition 85 4.4 Probability: proof and things 88 4.4.1 "Suitability" and audience 91 4.4.2 "Fittingness" and the world 92 4.5 Conclusions: argument, persuasion and invention 95 chapter 5 The Topics and Renaissance Aristotelianism: Agostino Nifo's commentary and his sources 5.1 Renaissance Aristotelianism and dialectic 101 5.1.1 Alexander of Aphrodisias: Aristotelian dialectic and the art of debate 102 5.1.2 Averroes: the art of logic and kinds of assent 105 5.1.3 Aristotelianism and Humanism 107 5.2 Agostino Nifo between Averroism and Alexandrinism 109 5.3 The meaning of dialectic 110 5.3.1 Dialectic and demonstration 111 5.3.2 Probability and disputation 114 5.4 The uses of dialectic and knowledge 120 5.4.1 The "invention" and "judgment" of the truth 122 5.4.2 Dialectic and the principles of the sciences 125 5.5 Different types of dialectic and disputation 128 5.6 Conclusions: Aristotle's dialectic and knowledge revisited 131 Table of contents ix chapter 6 Dialectic and dialogue: Carlo Sigonio and the "road to truth" 133 6.1 Sigonio and Tasso: dialogue as the "image" of dialectical disputation 137 6.1.1 The historical and intellectual origins of dialogue 137 6.1.2 The "force and nature" of dialogue (9r) 141 6.1.3 "Preparation" and imitation 143 6.1.4 "Contention": Dialectical proof between science and rhetoric 146 6.1.5 The forms and aims of dialogue 151 6.2 Sperone Speroni: "aporetic" dialogue as a playful game 154 6.2.1 Dialogue and opinion as the "portrait of science" 155 6.2.2 Imitation, illusion and invention 157 6.3 Conclusions: dialogue and invention 158 chapter 7 Rhetoric, dialectic and epistemology in contemporary argumentation theory 161 conclusion The epistemological value of Aristotelian dialectic 173 Notes otes 179 References 215 Name index 231 Subject index 237 This book has been in the making for several years. It reflects deep concerns that are rooted in my early involvement with the history and philosophy of science, and brings to completion the results of my reflections on the special role of a tradition of thought and on the crucial importance of a dialectical mode of inquiry. My acknowledgements themselves, therefore, span a long period of time, and mark the main steps of my intellectual journey. The members of the Department of history and philosophy of science of the University of Pittsburgh, where I obtained my PhD, first welcomed me and still provide distant intellectual support: I always profited from exchanges with James Lennox, Peter Machamer and Merrilee Salmon. I think with special gratitude of Ted McGuire and of our long conversations about the relevance of tradition and the importance of the past in shaping future choices and intellectual orientations: he has inspired me more as an example to follow than as a teacher to imitate. Marcelo Dascal of Tel Aviv University has offered me the opportunity to develop my ideas on dialectic by viewing this tradition in the larger epistemological perspective of a theory of controversies. My stay in Jerusalem in 1995, and my subsequent involvement with the events organized by the IASC group, confirmed me in giving dialectic pride of place, and afforded me the opportunity to explore this field of study in several new directions. Later, in Paris where I now live and work, Ernest Coumet who taught at the Centre Koyré (EHESS) and unfortunately died prematurely a few years ago, encouraged me to pursue the study of the tradition of dialectic, and offered me the opportunity to present my work at his seminar. My former colleague at Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre, Philippe Hamou-with whom I worked on Galileo's early Copernican writings-has always been very receptive to the importance of the practice of dialectic during the scientific revolution: our discussions were always enlightening. I thank Michel Morange of the Centre Cavaillès (ENS) as well as Edwige Rude-Antoine, Simone Bateman and Patrick Pharo of the CERSES (Université Paris-Descartes) for their intellectual and institutional support. Closer to the present purpose, Maria Lorenza Chiesara-a long-time friend and colleague-has applied her expertise in ancient philosophy as well as her keen critical abilities to make the book not unobjectionable but certainly much xii The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric stronger: her comments and corrections on an earlier version of the manuscript have made the reasoning stand on firmer ground. I am grateful to her and to the contingencies of life that have allowed me to benefit from such a careful reader. On the personal side, my father, in whose steps I decided to follow, my mother and my tightly knit Italian family always provided warm and generous support. Chantal, who skillfully helps with keeping my new family together while I attend to my personal work, also deserves special thanks. Finally, I owe Daniel my greatest debt, for making everything possible for me. chapter 1 Aristotle and the art of dialectic Dialectic enjoys a persistent presence in the Greek world. The term 'dialektikē' comes from the verb 'dialegein'-literally to talk across. The term, however, has a wide range of meanings which, according to Liddel & Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, include "to select", "to examine", and "to converse with". As a technical philosophical term, its origins can be traced back to the reductio ad absurdum of Zeno of Elea; 10 this, at least, is what Aristotle wrote in the Sophist-now lost-according to Diogenes Laertius (VIII 57). Dialectic can also be associated with the Socratic method and the tradition of the 'dissoi logoi' (manuals of pro and contra argumentation). As for the Sophists, they used the verb 'antilegein' (to speak against), rather than 'dialegein' , to designate their practice of refuting their opponent's thesis while trying to establish their own. In so doing, they employed all possible rhetorical means of persuasion, even fallacious arguments. The first philosopher to consciously use the word 'dialektikē', however, was Plato. In the Republic, he described dialectic as being composed of two distinct moments: the first consists in relying on hypotheses in order to ascend to "that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all"; the second consists in proceeding downwards to the conclusions by "moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas" (511 B). 11 It would seem, therefore, that according to Plato, dialectic was a practice that, by working through provisional premises, can attain a higher kind of knowledge, which can then be tested through some sort of Socratic criticism. 12 These two elements of dialectic, ascending towards the truth and critically discussing any thesis, provide the background for Aristotle's discussion of the art of dialectic, as we shall see, and were later developed by the Stoics and the Academic Skeptics. Whereas the Stoics built upon the first aspect of dialectic and defined it as the science of "correctly discussing subjects by question and answer ('dialegein')" and "of statements true, false, and neither true nor false" (DL VII 42), the skeptical Academics only practiced a critical form of dialectic, using Socratic 'elenchos' in the case of Arcesilaus and 'disputationes in utramque partem' in the case of Carneades. Aristotle, for his part, maintains that everybody naturally does what the art of dialectic teaches one to do in a more technical way, "for all, up to a certain point, endeavor to criticize ('exetazein') or uphold ('hypechein') an argument" (Rhet. I 1,1). Besides associating dialectic to a natural form of discourse,in the 12 The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric Topics Aristotle undertakes to describe dialectic as a well-codified form of oral disputation reminiscent of both Socrates' elenctic interrogations and the discussions that had taken place in Plato's Academy. 13 In this work, he strives to capture, analyze and evaluate different aspects of dialectic as it had been practiced before him: the Topics was the first, and has remained the only systematic treatise on dialectic, which, abstracting from practical examples, attempts to define and discuss dialectical rules, presuppositions and ends. In this "work of unstable balance" (Brunschwig 1967: LIV), Aristotle skillfully navigates between science, sophistry and rhetoric, in an attempt to carve out an epistemically significant role for...
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