Wittgenstein and certainty

Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium, vol. 19, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 320-322, 2011

In the preface to "On Certainty" Anscombe and von Wright say that in 1949 Malcolm suggested to Wittgenstein to think again about Moore’s “Defense of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939). Malcolm himself had written on the issue in “Defending Common Sense” (1949). In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein quotes Nestroy saying that there is usually very little progress in philosophy. But I think some progress has been made from Moore and Malcolm to Wittgenstein regarding skepticism. There is more awareness of practice and perspective and this opens the discussion in novel ways. But it also gives rise to new problems, in particular of morality and relativity.

Simply Charly, 2014

The present work discusses some of the main epistemological views of the later Wittgenstein, as developed in the notes written in the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein’s life and posthumously published in "On Certainty" (1969). Chapter 1 introduces the issues that occupied Wittgenstein in those months. Hence, after presenting a typical radical sceptical argument, I briefly discuss the two articles by G. E. Moore – “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939) – which prompted Wittgenstein’s reflections, as well as Norman Malcolm’s (1949) “Defending Common Sense”. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the discussion of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore and to his grammatical investigation on the use of “know”. Here I engage critically with the "framework reading" of "On Certainty" and more specifically with the thesis according to which Wittgenstein maintained that when Moore claimed to know the truisms of common sense, he ended up producing nonsense. In chapter 3 I take issue with another tenet upheld by some members of the framework reading, namely, the idea that Moore’s common-sense propositions (also known as “hinge propositions”) are (and were held by Wittgenstein to be) grammatical proposition. I point out that this thesis has little textual support and is at odds with Wittgenstein’s overall conception of grammar. In chapter 4 and 5 I engage in two debates concerning the relations between Wittgenstein’s reflections in "On Certainty" and some traditional epistemological positions, namely foundationalism (chapter 4) and relativism (chapter 5). In chapter 4 I argue against the idea that "On Certainty" shows Wittgenstein putting forth a sui generis foundationalist theory of knowledge. In chapter 5 I distinguish between conceptual and epistemic relativism, and I endorse the view that Wittgenstein is correctly described as a conceptual relativist. Then I argue that, although the textual evidence is not decisive and different interpretative lines remain possible, the relevant passages in "On Certainty" do not commit Wittgenstein to epistemic relativism.

This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as anti-sceptical theses. Indeed, it is argued that on a reading of On Certainty which has Wittgenstein advancing a primarily epistemological thesis, there is in fact strong evidence to suggest that Wittgenstein thought that no epistemic response to the sceptic was available—at best, it seems, only a pragmatic anti- sceptical thesis is on offer. Such a conclusion is not without import to the present debate regarding radical scepticism, however, since it poses a general challenge for how the sceptical argument is conceived in the contemporary literature.

The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd Edition Michael Starks, 2019

On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all analysis of W, they fall short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in describing behavior, suffering from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments on each article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. Since this review appeared, DMS and Coliva have written brilliant articles on Wittgenstein’s OC which are mandatory reading. Also, a mostly excellent volume by Hamilton “Wittgenstein and On Certainty” (2014) has been published. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019) and ,The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd

This paper offers a deep exploration of Ludwig Wittgenstein's complex epistemological insights in his final work, On Certainty, challenging conventional understandings of certainty, knowledge, and belief. Focusing on what are known as Moorean propositions—statements like "I have two hands" or "the earth existed before my birth"—the paper reveals Wittgenstein's radical philosophical stance. Contrary to traditional epistemological frameworks that view certainty as a form of knowledge, Wittgenstein argues that these propositions occupy a unique epistemic space. They are not knowledge in the strict sense, as they cannot be demonstrated through evidence. Instead, they are deeply held beliefs that function as foundational rules governing our entire conceptual framework—what Wittgenstein calls our "world-picture." The analysis meticulously unpacks how these certainties operate. They are not justifiable through traditional evidential methods, yet they are indispensable. They form the unquestioned background against which all our reasoning and knowledge claims are made, functioning like the riverbed through which the river of our thoughts flows. Rejecting these propositions would not just challenge a specific claim, but would fundamentally disrupt our entire system of understanding. However, the paper also critically examines the potential consequences of Wittgenstein's view. By suggesting that these fundamental propositions are context-dependent and potentially shifting, Wittgenstein seems to introduce a form of epistemic relativism. This leads to a provocative philosophical challenge: if truth is relative to our conceptual framework, can Wittgenstein's own claim be universally true?

The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd Edition Michael Starks, 2019

A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe the two systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1, and how this interacts with System 2. It was a revolution in epistemology since it showed that our actions rest not on judgements but on innate undoubtable axioms leading directly to action. I situate the work of Wittgenstein and Searle in the framework of the two systems of thought prominent in thinking and decision research, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) ,The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019).

Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017)

A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe the two systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1 and how this interacts with System 2. It was a revolution in epistemology since it showed that our actions rest not on judgements but on innate undoubtable axioms leading directly to action. I situate the work of Wittgenstein and Searle in the framework of the two systems of thought prominent in thinking and decision research, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019)

2005

Does Wittgenstein’s On Certainty point to a sustained treatment of philosophical problems about knowledge and justification of the kind that Philosophical Investigations supplies for matters of mind, language and their relation to the world? Some of the reasons for pessimism are systematic. Casting about for why Moore’s pronouncements about the external world and his knowledge thereof, as well as sceptical doubts concerning them, are prone to strike him at one time as nonsense, at another as perfectly intelligible, Wittgenstein acknowledges that ‘it is…difficult to find the beginning. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning’ (OC 471). A little earlier, struggling with the idea that ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts’ (OC 401), he dismisses this way of talking as ‘thoroughly bad’ (OC 402) and complains, ‘I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say’ (OC 400).