Possibility of Asian NATO from Japanese perspective

China, the European Union and Global Governance

The US-Japan alliance, based on the 1951 bilateral Security Treaty, is one of Washington's main military partnerships that comprise America's "hub and spoke" security system in East Asia. As a product of the Cold War's bipolarity, the security arrangements between Tokyo and Washington served a purpose to deter the communist threat and expansion. However, the structural changes in East Asia after 1989 necessitated a redefinition of the alliance's strategic rationale. Those changes included the disappearance of the common enemy of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new security challenges, notably related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) nuclear developments, and, last but not least, China's rise and consolidation of its status as a major power in East Asia. In order to respond to the altered regional and global security environment, Tokyo and Washington needed to reconsider the Cold War division of allies' roles whereby the US was committed to Japan's defence, while Japan provided only bases and hostnation support to the US military forces. 1 Since the mid-1990s, the bilateral alliance has been redefined, and its scope now includes both regional and global dimensions. The US-Japan security ties saw a period of unprecedented deepening during the term of former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006), with Tokyo becoming an even stronger supporter of the American-led regional security order. Beijing, however, saw the consolidation of the alliance as directed at China and hence seeking to constrain its rising power in East Asia, notably by having impact on the Taiwan issue. The deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties under Koizumi reinforced the security dilemma between the bilateral alliance and the PRC, as well as Beijing's perception of Tokyo as a major tool in Washington's strategy of maintaining its primacy in East Asia. However, several new trends have emerged in the relations between Japan, China and the US in the post-Koizumi era and since Barack Obama became US President in 2009. These include stabilisation in Sino-Japanese ties, Tokyo's pro-Asia diplomacy under Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009-present), and America's increased focus on nontraditional security issues and multilateral engagement of East Asia under Obama. This paper examines the post-Cold War dynamics between the US-Japan alliance and China, and assesses its impact on the evolving security order in East Asia. It also explores the potential for the EU to strengthen its security engagement with the region, especially in the context of the recent trend in East Asia towards multilateral cooperation on non-traditional issues. The paper first analyses the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and Japan's so-called security "normalisation", especially accentuated during Koizumi's term in office, before focusing on the manifestation in East Asia of strategic mistrust and security dilemma between Tokyo and 1 This division of tasks was based on Articles 5 and 6, respectively, of the revised 1960 Security Treaty. 2 Washington, and Beijing. The discussion then explores recent trends of engagement and cooperation by looking at the Sino-Japanese relations post-Koizumi, Hatoyama's diplomatic priorities and Obama's East Asia approach. Finally, the paper examines the primary components of the evolving security order and outlines the EU's involvement. It concludes by arguing that while the US-led security system continues to be a main provider for East Asian stability, it is increasingly complemented by regional multilateralism in non-traditional security areas, which opens up the way for Europe's strengthened engagement with the region. Alliance Enhancement and Japan's Security "Normalisation" A series of external pressures in the 1990s served as a catalyst for a redefinition of the US-Japan alliance and Japan's security policy. The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis exposed the lack of military operability of the alliance, while the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1998 North Korean missile launch over Japan further heightened Tokyo's regional threat perceptions. The Japan-US response to these developments was the revision in 1997 of the bilateral Defence Guidelines, which committed Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to extend non-combat rear-area support to the US military during regional security crises. The result was a broadening of the alliance's scope from a narrow focus on Japan's defence, which was its primary focus during the Cold War, to include regional contingencies. Ambiguously defined in the guidelines as "situations in areas surrounding Japan", the new strategic rationale for Tokyo and Washington was to tackle "latent, unspecified sources of instability" in East Asia. 2 As will be discussed later in the paper, this definition led to apprehensions in Beijing regarding the potential inclusion of a Taiwan conflict in the remit of US-Japan security cooperation, signalling also that "Tokyo moved from protégé to partner" 3 of Washington. It was, however, in the wake of 9/11 and during the term of Prime Minister Koizumi that the strategic convergence of Tokyo and Washington on traditional security issues became more accentuated. By strengthening its defence ties with the US, expanding SDF overseas missions and modernising its military capabilities, Japan under Koizumi not only became a more reliable ally to America, arguably exceeding the expectations of the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009), but also increasingly came to be seen by a number of analysts as moving towards security "normalisation". 4 Indeed, Koizumi, a strong advocate of Japan's more robust foreign policy,

Atlantic Voices, 2013

This article analyses the progress and obstacles of NATO's emerging partnerships throughout the Asia-Pacific. It argues that NATO's partnership network in the region - currently encompassing Australia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand and South Korea - will continue to expand in the future as part of the Alliance's growing global engagement. Even so, cooperation with partner states in the Asia-Pacific is unlikely to go beyond security's 'low hanging-fruit', which will insure both internal consensus between NATO member states, as well as not interfere with existing security structures in the region. These include non-proliferation, maritime security, counter-terrorism and cyber security.

Japan Up Close, 2023

Strategic Analysis, 2003

The article critically looks at relevance of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific in the context of the changing nature of threats and challenges that the U.S. is confronted with in the light of American military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper argues that the American policy in Asia, which so far has been premised on bilateral alliances and forward deployment, is likely to undergo fundamental changes because the principal partners, South Korea and Japan, may not be very useful either in counter-terrorism efforts or low-intensity wars. This, in turn, may enhance India's importance to US policies in the Asia-Pacific. -* -Two events in the recent past -the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American attempt at regime change in Iraq through use of force -are major landmarks in contemporary international relations. They have ushered in a new era, an era that marks the end of the post-Cold War era and the beginning of a new, to use a Collin Powell phrase, 'post-post-Cold War era'; especially because it marks the start of the way the US is going to conduct its foreign policy. What these developments portend is that firstly, they bring into sharp focus the unfolding of a new unipolar movement in all its fury and vigour, and secondly, the uncertain future faced by the alliance system the US has built so assiduously in the last five decades in Asia and Europe. While America's closest allies in Asia -Japan and South Korea -proved to be of little use in counter-terrorism efforts or the war in Iraq, the other US-led European alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), remained badly divided when Washington decided

China's rise and clear ambition to change Asia poses both tactical and strategic questions, long neglected in Japan. Tactically, territorial challenges can be countered effectively by use of Anti-Access Area Denial [A2/AD] tactics, as Japan is now doing. The strategic issues: how to deal with a hostile nuclear super-power neighbor, counter nuclear blackmail, and so forth, are far more difficult. This author believes that US "extended deterrence" no longer exists. Washington in fact would never use nuclear weapons to defend Japan, whatever promises have been made. The only answer, and one that decreases rather than increases the possibility of conflict, is for Japan to acquire within a decade a minimal nuclear deterrent, too small for war-making but adequate to prevent attack, such as those maintained by Britain and France, who know America best. Without such a deterrent Japan will be defenseless against inevitable Chinese nuclear threats and blackmail.

NATO and the Asia Pacific, 2020

As a transatlantic alliance whose main focus will remain on Europe at least in the near to mid future, should NATO even spend resources to think about what role to play in the Asia-Pacific? There are no obvious answers to this question. NATO members and pundits have been engaged in an ongoing debate regarding whether NATO should (re)focus on European collective defense or broaden its strategic outlook toward global collective security. The lack of consensus on the Alliance’s geographical reach and scope of action, combined with a high degree of uncertainty about the future of international relations in the Asia-Pacific, make it difficult to draw a roadmap for a NATO Asia policy that would be welcomed as a viable option by the different stakeholders on both sides. Divergent national priorities and threat perceptions notwithstanding, in this article, I will argue that by taking a closer look at security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific over the past decades, it is possible to devise several directives on how NATO can play a constructive role for the region’s stability and, by extension, global security.

Research Paper, No. 91, NATO Defense College (NDC), 2013

2020

Because of its past, Japan founded a very unique –“abnormal”– security identity based on pacifism and the renunciation to war, rooted specifically in its Constitution. Nevertheless, many scholars are growingly worried. There are voices affirming the rebirth of nationalism in Japan, exemplified by current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s so-called “Abe Doctrine”, which will lead to remilitarization and hostile –even violent– attitudes from Japan. This, in turn, worries neighbouring countries who never truly believed on this pacifist identity and often remind Japan of their resent over historical issues. Despite its post-war identity, Japan is currently embedded in controversy due to the potentially upcoming constitutional reform. The news coming suggesting the elimination of the constitutional spirit alarmed the world, but mainly a region that still fears Tokyo’s militarism. Seeing that the Japanese Constitution is considered to be a matter of regional security, the present work examines the historical construction of the Northeast Asian geopolitical system since the end of the Pacific War and the shaping of Japanese security identity both from within and outside the country. Studying both phenomena together might shed some light over the alarmed critics of remilitarization in Japan – exponentially growing since Abe’s return to power. In this sense, this paper argues alarmism towards Prime Minister Abe must not reside in his alleged intentions to remilitarize Japan because his policies do not represent a radical shift and, thus, will most probably not destabilize the regional system.