Time, Being and Language in Plato’s Timaeus

Time and Cosmogony in Plato and the Platonic Tradition, 2022

I defend, against its more recent critics, a literal, factual, and consistent interpretation of Timaeus’ creation of the cosmos and time. My main purpose is to clarify the assumptions under which a literal interpretation of Timaeus’ cosmology becomes philosophically attractive. I propose five exegetical principles that guide my interpretation. Unlike previous literalists, I argue that assuming a “pre-cosmic time” is a mistake. Instead, I challenge the exegetical assumptions scholars impose on the text and argue that for Timaeus, a mere succession of events and the relations derived from it (before, after, simultaneous with) imply no time, given the narrow definition of the term used in the dialogue. For Timaeus, I explain, time is measurable, regular, and dependent on the motion of the celestial bodies. A mere succession of events like the one needed to understand the creation story and the pre-cosmos requires none of these elements. Readers of Plato erroneously assume that a succession of events implies time, but that is to impose a conception of time absent in the text. The chapter offers a detailed reconstruction of the pre-cosmic stage under a literalist interpretation and argues how it is compatible with the immutable relationship between the Demiurge and the cosmos. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license. chapter 4

This article explores the concepts of eternity and time as employed by Plato in his metaphysics and natural philosophy. It focuses on the Timaeus, which is the main source used in the attempts to reconstruct Plato's theory of time and to gain insights into his understanding of time's paradigm and counterpart, i.e. eternity. The chief thesis regarding Plato's concept of eternity presented here is that Plato conceived of it not as infinite duration (sempiternity), but as timeless, unchanging present (eternity proper). It thus, in accordance with the original meaning of the Greek term for eternity (αἰών), signifies the state of being of the Forms. As far as time (χρόνος) and its nature is concerned, an attempt is made here to argue that Plato did not identify time with a) the heavenly sphere in motion, b) number, nor with c) motion in general, motion of the heavenly sphere, or motion of some of its part –as suggested by some ancient, as well as contemporary commentators. In fact, time is inseparable from motion, however not as being motion, but as being characterized by regular motion, through which it enlivens the world of Becoming and makes it what it is. So it turns out that Plato's somewhat poetic description of time as moving image of eternity is more than just a metaphorical expression – eternity, the state of being of the Forms, reflects itself into time, the never-ending-life of the universe in constant motion. Time, as every image, has to be imperfect and therefore, unlike its paradigm, entails permanent change and instability.

2018

Plato’s Timaeus is the first philosophical work that discussed the concept of Time in the history of Western philosophy. The dialogue explains the creation of Time as the Demiurge’s imitating the Eternity of the model Being. This explanation is based on the ontological distinction between the forms, which always are in themselves, and the sensible things, which constantly change but never remain the same. The article examines the key text (37C-38C) in order to observe how Plato defines Time as “the moving image of eternity” (37D). He argues that Time has three parts, namely, “was”, “is” and “will be”, while it is a mistake to attribute “was” and “will be” to the eternal being. This claim corresponds to the Parmenidean notion of Being, in that it excludes “was” and “will be” (DK B8.19-20), contra Melissus, who accepts “was”, “is” and “will be” for the one Being. Parmenides, on the other hand, drops the word “always” (aei) from Xenophanes’ notion of the god (B26). In describing Eterni...

Please find here some very, very preliminary notes on the first few sections of Plato's _Timaeus_. These were prepared for a seminar-style discussion of Plato's much-talked-about-but-seldom-understood 'definition' of time as the movable icon of the everlasting. These notes don't quite make it up to that line in Section 37D, but they do frame the dialogue as a whole and begin to discuss its opening remarks on myth, historicity, and the shape of the universe.

Time and Cosmology in Plato and the Platonic Tradition, 2022

Time and cosmology are strongly interconnected in the Platonic corpus. The way Plato’s characters discuss these topics has puzzled and divided readers from the very beginning, giving rise to rich and diverse interpretations. Do Plato’s dialogues argue for an eternal cosmos or one with a punctual beginning? What is the nature of time, and how should we understand its relation to eternity, change, and transition? How should we understand the relation between God, the cosmos, and time? The present volume assembles an international team of ancient philosophy scholars to engage with Plato’s texts, and their ancient and modern interpretations, and to answer these and other closely related questions. The overall purpose of the volume is to push forward the study and understanding of Plato’s conception of time and the cosmos as a way of finding fresh insight into the interpretation of his philosophy and his reception in antiquity. I begin with an introduction to these topics in Plato and the Platonic tradition broadly understood, before explaining the motivation and overall structure of the volume. I conclude by offering a concise description of the contents of each chapter.

Research Article, 2022

In one of the most famous but equally obscure passages in the Timaeus, Plato describes the generation of time and the heavens. The “moving image of eternity” (37d5) is commonly read as Plato’s most general characterisation of time. Rémi Brague famously challenged the traditional interpretation on linguistic grounds by claiming that Plato actually did not conceive of time as an image (εἰκών) but rather as a number (ἀριθμός). In this paper, I shall claim that this controversy is by no means a modern one. The traditional interpretation is mostly owed to Plato’s most prominent reader, Plotinus, who famously conceives of time in relation to eternity (Enn. III.7.13.24-25). Brague’s alternative reading, however, is anticipated by Simplicius’ attempt to refute the Plotinian interpretation, as I shall show. According to my reconstruction, Simplicius’ reading of the Timaeus not only shows why the traditional interpretation falls short, but it also offers a systematic argument that bolsters Brague’s alternative reading. Finally, I shall show that this is consistent with Plato’s text. It shall become clear that current interpretative problems are essentially prefigured in the late ancient debate.

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition

Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2025

In this paper, I discuss Plato's famous passage about τὸ ἐξαίφνης (to exaiphnēs) in Plato's Parmenides 156c-e. I argue that we should resist interpreting this notion as a subset of the now (to nun). Instead, we should understand it as a basic and sui generis feature of the word of becoming, something that has a relative temporal location (in the past, present, or future concerning other events and processes) but does not constitute time (chronos) or is a part of it. Yet, I explain, its oddness lies not only in its lack of duration but in its capacity to secure the persistence of the things that switch between motion and rest (and all other incompatible states and processes) without causally interacting with them.

2020

The thesis presents an original interpretation of the account of time in the Timaeus (37c6-39e2), arguing that time in Plato is best conceived of as a cosmic phenomenon. In Part I, my view is contrasted in crucial respects with the consensus reading, that focuses on the metaphysical definition (time is a moving image of eternity, 37d5) and downplays the importance of the cosmos and the planets in the creation of time. I reject the standard reading of αἰών as 'eternity' and take it instead as a feature that is essential to the model qua living being. It follows that the creation of timebeing the image of αἰώνis essential to the cosmic living being. Time, however, is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon, because it is constituted by the living motion of the cosmos and identified with the visible revolutions of the planets. In the continuation of the thesis, I examine two essential aspects of Plato's account that need further enquirylife and structure. In Part II I focus on the semantic history of αἰών and argue that in Plato, αἰών acquires a paradigmatic function in relation to time, while still retaining the core of its traditional meaning as 'lifespan'. In fact, αἰών and time are both defined by Plato as totalities of life, although αἰών consists in an undivided unity, whereas time is structured in sequences of parts composing a whole. In Part III I focus on how the planets make the periods of the cosmic soul visible and, as a consequence, display the enumerable structure of time. That structure consists in fact in the visible patterns of changing configurations the planets display. In doing so, they mark out sequences of units, whose optimality makes time the best instantiation of number in the physical world. 41 This division does not aim to assess each author's view individually. For instance, Taylor's can be taken as an instance of (1) or (2), depending on the passages chosen (see fn. 43). My goal is rather to recognise that the two views stand as distinct exegetical stances and to evaluate each in its own merit. 42 These considerations will be further articulated once I set out the positive part of my thesis, in Section 2.1 and 2.3. As for my use of 'fundamental ontology' with a distinct meaning from 'metaphysical', see fn. 62. 43 "His general concern is (A) to establish a strong distinction between eternity and time consonant with his basic division between Being and Becoming, where there is yet (B) a natural association between the two. The distinction he draws is in effect that between two types of stability: one a matter of absolute immutability, the other of everlasting regular mutation" (