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2020, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
This paper presents a model in which money and collateral are both essential and complement each other as media of exchange. The model has implications for asset prices, output, in ‡ation and monetary policy, both in steady state and along dynamic paths of equilibria.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.
Journal of Economic Theory, 2008
This paper presents a microfounded model of money where durable assets serve as a guarantee to repay consumption loans. We study a steady state equilibrium where money and credit coexist. In such an equilibrium, a larger investment in durable capital relaxes the borrowing constraint faced by consumers. We show that the occurrence of over-investment and the behavior of capital accumulation depend on the rate of inflation, the relative risk aversion of agents and the marginal productivity of the capital goods. is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents. Each period is divided into two sub-periods, called day and night. A perfectly competitive market opens in each sub-period. Economic activity differs between day and night. During the day, agents can trade a perishable consumption good and face randomness in their preferences and production possibilities. An agent is a buyer with probability σ in which case he wants to consume but cannot produce, whereas an agent is a seller with probability 1 − σ in which case he is able to produce but does not wish to consume. 4 During the night, agents can trade a durable good that can be used for consumption or investment. In contrast to the first sub-period, there is no randomness in the second sub-period, and all agents can produce and consume simultaneously.
2005
Consider an economy where infinite-lived agents trade assets collateralized by durable goods. We obtain results that rule out bubbles when the additional endowments of durable goods are uniformly bounded away from zero, regardless of whether the asset's net supply is positive or zero. However, bubbles may occur, even for state-price processes that generate finite present value of aggregate wealth. First, under complete markets, if the net supply is being endogenously reduced to zero as a result of collateral repossession. Secondly, under incomplete markets, for a persistent positive net supply, under the general conditions guaranteeing existence of equilibrium.
2016
In this paper we examine the effect of collateral requirements on the prices of long-lived assets. We consider a Lucas-style infinite-horizon exchange economy with heteroge-nous agents and collateral constraints. There are two trees in the economy which can be used as collateral for short-term loans. For the first tree the collateral requirement is determined endogenously while the collateral requirement for loans on the second tree are exogenously regulated. We show that the presence of collateral constraints and the endogenous margin requirements for the first tree lead to large excess price-volatility of the second tree. Changes in the regulated margin requirements for the second tree have large effects on the volatility of both trees. While tightening margins for loans on the second tree always decreases the price volatility of the first tree, price volatility of the second tree might very well increase with this change. In our calibration we allow for the possibility of disaste...
Research in Economics, 2010
In this paper, we study the effects of collaterals on business cycles and growth in monetary economies with credit market imperfections. We consider an endogenous growth model with a partial cash-in-advance constraint and inelastic labor supply. We assume that the share of consumption purchases paid with credit depends positively on the collateral available to the agent. In this framework, we find that money is no longer superneutral in the long run and short-run fluctuations, either deterministic or stochastic, can arise. On the one side, the monetary policy can enhance the growth rate and welfare, on the other side, reduce the macroeconomic volatility. Second, the sensitivity to collaterals alters the effectiveness of monetary policy in terms of welfare and stability. Finally, indeterminacy becomes more likely as long as the credit market is less sensitive to collaterals.
I present an environment for which both outside and inside money are essential as means of payment. The key model feature is that there is imperfect monitoring of issuers of inside money. I use a random matching model of money where some agents have private trading histories and others have trading histories that can be publicly observed only after a lag. I show via an example that for lags that are neither too long nor too short, there exist allocations that use both types of money that cannot be duplicated when only one type is used.
This paper extends the recent literature of "liquidity and asset prices" into monetary models by adding money-creating banks. We explain why the money creation function of banks is important to financial stability. We study an economy in which not all assets can be used to make payments, agents may have to sell assets when they need cash. Sale of assets can lead to low asset price because buyers have limited ability to buy assets. Banks can provide liquidity by creating and lending out new deposit. This will reduce the sale of assets and stabilize asset prices. We also compare two types of liquidity provision mechanisms: liquidity-risk sharing through coalitions and liquidity provision through money creation. We show that if people use mutual-fund-like non-bank coalitions to share liquidity risks, then the function of banks to relax the aggregate money constraint is important. Without banks, non-bank coalitions will not be able to insure against aggregate liquidity risks, ...
1997
Glaze prepared the camera-ready copy of the manuscript with extraordinary skill, dedication and good grace. We would also like to thank Warren Samuels and William Darity for encouraging the project, and Zachary Rolnick at Kluwer for his support and patience. This collection of papers aims to present a comparative and international perspective on the current state of research in monetary theory, and the application of monetary theory to important policy issues. The main emphasis is on views stressing the importance of credit creation in the monetary process, in a tradition which arguably encompasses Wicksell, the later Swedes and the Austrians, through the later Hicks, the circuit school and contemporary Post Keynesians. In addition, however, there are distinguished contributions from economists with a more 'mainstream' approach to the issues.
Financial innovations that change how promises are collateralized can affect investment, even in the absence of any change in fundamentals. In C-models, the ability to leverage an asset always generates over-investment compared to Arrow Debreu. The introduction of CDS always leads to under-investment with respect to Arrow Debreu, and in some cases even robustly destroys competitive equilibrium. The need for collateral would seem to cause under-investment. Our analysis illustrates a countervailing force: goods that serve as collateral yield additional services and are therefore over-valued and over-produced. In models without cash flow problems there is never marginal under-investment on collateral.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Our paper studies the role of the collateral channel for bank credit using confidential bank-firm-loan data. We estimate that for a 1 percent increase in collateral values, firms pledging real estate collateral experience a 12 basis point higher growth in bank lending with higher sensitivities for more credit constrained firms. Higher real estate values boost firm capital expenditures and lead to lower unemployment and higher employment growth and business creation. Our estimates imply that as much as 37 percent of employment growth over the period from 2013 to 2019 can be attributed to the relaxation of borrowing constraints.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper we examine the effect of collateral requirements on the prices of longlived assets. We consider a Lucas-style infinite-horizon exchange economy with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints. There are two trees in the economy which can be used as collateral for short-term loans. For the first tree the collateral requirement is determined endogenously while the collateral requirement for loans on the second tree is exogenously regulated. We show that the presence of collateral constraints and the endogenous margin requirements for the first tree lead to large excess price-volatility of the second tree. Changes in the regulated margin requirements for the second tree have large effects on the volatility of both trees. While tightening margins for loans on the second tree always decreases the price volatility of the first tree, price volatility of the second tree might very well increase with this change. In our calibration we allow for the possibility of disaster states. This leads to very large quantitative effects of collateral requirements and to realistic equity risk premia. We show that our qualitative results are robust to the actual parametrization of the economy.
Mises ([1912] 1953; [1949] 1998) put the theory of money on a sound basis by integrating it with marginal utility theory and clearly explaining the value of money in these terms (Mises 1990). One of the most important conclusions of Misesian monetary theory is that the demand for money is always demand to hold, i.e., money performs its utility by being owned and held in a cash balance (Hutt 1956; Hoppe 2012), not by being exchanged. This function could also partly be fulfilled by what Mises termed secondary media of exchange: Commodities and claims held by a person in order to economize on the need to hold money, as their high degree of secondary marketability make them suitable for this purpose. Salerno (2015), building on Rothbard's ([1962] 2009) extension of Misesian monetary theory, presents a simple model distinguishing between the exchange demand for money and the reservation demand for money. Building on this model, we aim to show how we can better grasp the difference between money and secondary media of exchange by considering them in terms of the different kinds of demand for each. Only money proper has any appreciable exchange demand in the Rothbardian sense, whereas secondary media of exchange are only subject to monetary reservation demand in addition to non-monetary demand. Considering the demand for money and secondary media of exchange in these terms allows us to address what in recent literature has been called the quality of money (Hendershott 1969; Bagus 2009; 2015; Bagus and Howden 2016; Žukauskas Forthcoming). High quality money will have a higher reservation demand, while lower quality money will have a lower reservation demand. Similarly, the higher the quality of money, the lower the demand for secondary media of exchange and vice versa. In this way, we can consider the existence and importance of secondary media of exchange a proxy for the quality of money. At the same time, the fuller development of monetary theory presented by Rothbard and Salerno explains how low quality money can continue to exist without leading to an inflationary collapse: So long as there is widespread and strong exchange demand for the monetary medium, this is all that is needed to secure the continued existence of even low-quality money with little or no reservation demand.
Journal of Mathematical Finance, 2015
The author examines the role of collateral in an environment where lenders and borrowers possess identical information and similar beliefs about its future value. Using option-pricing techniques, he shows that a secured loan contract is equivalent to a regular bond and an embedded option to the borrower to default. The author finds that the lender will not advance to the borrower, a loan that exceeds the market value of the collateral, and that the supply of loans increases with a rise in the market value of the collateral. Increases in the volatility of the value of the collateral, interest rate, and dividend rate of the collateral independently depress the loan supply. The author also derives the cost of a third-party guarantee of a loan and an implied risk premium.
2003
The author examines the role of collateral in an environment where lenders and borrowers possess identical information and similar beliefs about its future value. Using option-pricing techniques, he shows that a secured loan contract is equivalent to a regular bond and an embedded option to the borrower to default. He finds that the lender will not advance to the borrower a loan that exceeds the market value of the collateral, and that the supply of loans increases with a rise in the market value of the collateral. Increases in the volatility of the value of the collateral, interest rate, and dividend rate of the collateral independently depress the loan supply. The author also derives the cost of a third-party guarantee of a loan and an implied risk premium.
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2007
We show, in an exchange economy with liquidity constraints, that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of . Two agents trade goods and nominal assets (Arrow-Debreu (AD) securities) to smooth consumption across periods and future states, in the presence of cash-in-advance financing costs. We show, with Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and relative risk-aversion greater than 1, that the price of AD securities, are inversely related to liquidity. A closed-from solution is obtained for a CRRA utility function, even when including aggregate uncertainty and different subjective probabilities for the two agents. The upshot of our argument is that agents' expectations computed using risk-neutral probabilities give more weight in the states with higher interest rates. This result cannot be found in a Lucas-type representative agent general equilibrium model where there is neither trade nor money. Hence, an upward yield curve can be supported in equilibrium, even though short-term interest rates are fairly stable, and even in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. The risk-premium in the term structure is therefore a pure liquidity risk premium.
Economic Theory, 2014
Much of the lending in modern economies is secured by some form of collateral: residential and commercial mortgages and corporate bonds are familiar examples. This paper builds an extension of general equilibrium theory that incorporates durable goods, collateralized securities, and the possibility of default to argue that the reliance on collateral to secure loans and the particular collateral requirements chosen by the social planner or by the market have a profound impact on prices, allocations, market structure, and the efficiency of market outcomes. These findings provide insights into housing and mortgage markets, including the subprime mortgage market.
Review of Political Economy, 2011
The discussion on endogenous money has led to a rich understanding of banking. The determination of creditworthiness though remains a black box in Post Keynesian economics. After a critique of the New Keynesian banking literature this paper argues that creditworthiness to a large extent is endogenous to the monetary economy and the credit system. It is argued that a solvency multiplier exists that affects the willingness of banks to grant credit. The multiplier works via the valuation of collateral goods. It can accelerate the growth but also the contraction of credit and explains both endogenous financial crises and credit rationing.
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