Kant on Virtue

This paper argues the case for the centrality of virtue in Kant’s ethics. It argues that Kant has plenty to contribute to the normative turn away from utilitarian and deontological ethics, with increasing emphasis coming to be placed upon agents and the sorts of lives they lead rather than upon atomic acts and the rules for making choices, even less upon the consequences of such acts It argues that although Kant has been understood as a deontologist pure and simple, Kant sought not to turn away from virtue, but to place virtue ethics on a more secure foundation. In recovering Kant’s conception of virtue, this paper argues that Kant sought to build an ethical theory based not just on rules but upon agents and the kinds of lives they lead. The paper argues that Kant’s great achievement is to have created a moral theory which, in paying close attention to both the life plans of moral agents and to their discrete acts, combined rule ethics and virtue ethics. First published praxisphilosophie.de This paper is now published

Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy

My main concern in this paper is to develop some ideas within the Kantian ethical tradition. More precisely, my aim is to develop an ethical perspective that is grounded upon the Kantian ideas of autonomy and ideal of the person (Kant's notion of humanity) as fundamental starting points for a coherent account of Kant's ethics in contrast to the deontological duty-based interpretation of his moral philosophy, then sketch, subsequently, some suggestions to show why this reading has more philosophical import than what a deontological reading may provide. I take no issue for the time being, however, as to whether or not the perspective I have in mind leads to either a Kantian orthodoxy or a revisionist direction in Kant scholarships.

2022

This book examines the significance of Kant’s moral philosophy in contemporary philosophical debates. It argues that Kant’s philosophy can still serve as a guide to navigate the turbulence of a globalized world in which we are faced by an imprescriptible social reality wherein moral values and ethical life models are becoming increasingly unstable. The volume draws on Kantian ethics to discuss various contemporary issues, including sustainable development, moral enhancement, sexism, and racism. It also tackles general concepts of practical philosophy such as lying, the different kinds of moral duties, and the kind of motivation one needs for doing what we consider the right thing. Featuring readings by well-known Kant specialists and emerging scholars with unorthodox approaches to Kant’s philosophy, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy, politics and ethics. It will also appeal to moral theorists, applied ethicists and environmental theorists.

Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, 2018

A new book by Jeffrey Edwards Associate Professor of Philosophy, Stony Brook University (State University of New York) entitled Autonomy, in Moral Worth, and Right. Kant on Obligatory Ends, Respect for Law, and Original Acquisition has been published this year in the excellent Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte series. The book incorporates some published materials from Edwards’ previous articles and anthology chapters but, at the same time, it makes a coherent unity aimed at investigation of the problems related to Kant’s practical philosophy and its relation to the history of modern ethics. The analysis of Kant’s last major work on ethics, Metaphysics of Morals of 1797, which forms the basis of that research, allows Edwards to unveil new implications and consequences of Kant’s theory of practical reason’s obligatory ends and his juridical theories of right and property. The book has got a clear structure of contents and is divided into four main parts: each one has got detailed divisions...

Eighteenth-Century Studies

While many philosophers still know Kant"s ethics primarily from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and perhaps the Critique of Practical Reason, recent scholarship has shown that to truly understand his moral philosophy we must widen our perspective to include the full range of his ethical writings, including the Metaphysics of Morals, the Religionschrift, his lectures on ethics, and various essays on politics and history (e.g. "Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History"). A new monograph by Ann Margret Baxley and a new collection of essays edited by Lara Denis show, in different ways, the philosophical value of expanding and enriching our understanding of Kant as a moral philosopher. The Kant that emerges from these texts is a much more subtle and wide-ranging theorist of human moral life than narrow focus on the Groundwork or the second Critique would suggest. Readers who know Kant"s ethics mainly from the Groundwork might, understandably, have the impression that he holds an objectionably austere view of ethical life. In the first section Kant distinguishes between actions done in conformity with the moral law (pflichtmässig) and

2018

Introduction Kant"s Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals was published in 1785. It is in fact a preliminary section of his philosophy, directed to the discovery of the supreme principle of morality. The Critique of Practical Reason was published in 1788. This is a full-scale examination of the practical activity of reason. Taken together with the Groundwork, it represents the most abstract side of Kant"s ethics. Kant"s Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone was published in 1793. The relevant sections of this contain an account of the evil principle in man and a discussion of the relations between morality, religion and theology. The Metaphysic of Morals was published in 1797. This is a systematic working-out in their application to human beings of the rational principles of morality laid down in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. This paper mainly focuses on Kant"s primary ethical principles as laid down in Groundwork. In Groundwork Kant argues that every person is worthy of respect as a rational being, capable of reason and capable of acting and choosing freely. Kant does not mean that we always succeed in acting rationally. Sometimes we do and sometimes we don"t. He means that we have the capacity for reason and for freedom and that capacity is common to human beings as such. When reason governs our will, we are not driven by the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Our capacity for reason makes us distinctive and sets us apart from mere animal existence. It makes us more than mere creatures of appetite. Discussion According to Kant, the moral worth of an action consists not in the consequences that flow from it, but the intention from which the act is done. What matters is the motive. What matters is doing the right thing because it is right not for some ulterior motive. Kant writes, "A good will is not good because of what it affects or accomplishes.... Even if... the power is completely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing... even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself"(Sandal 111).

I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field, contrasting two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. I connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. I end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics.

Review of Political Economy, 2009

Applied Ethics, 2017

Kant's moral theory has acquired the reputation of being forbiddingly difficult to understand and, once understood, excessively demanding in its requirements. I don't believe that this reputation has been wholly earned, and I am going to try to undermine it.... I shall try to reduce some of the difficulties.... Finally, I shall compare Kantian and utilitarian approaches and assess their strengths and weaknesses.

Ratio, 1998