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129 Ibid., p. 41. Dopo aver osservato che la somiglianza è precisamente l'idea dell'universale, N. Kemp Smith conclude: «What makes his argument (contro le idee astratte) so unsatisfactory, and the section as a whole so misleading, is…that the main problem, as defined in the opening sentence, is evaded, not solved». (N. KEMP SMITH, The Philosophy of David Hume, Macmillan, London, 1941, pp. 261-262). Secondo N. Kemp Smith, Hume stesso avrebbe implicitamente riconosciuto l'insufficienza della sua teoria sulle idee astratte quando, più tardi, nelle Ricerche, non dice che le idee sono copie di impressioni, ma che le impressioni costituiscono «tutto il materiale del pensiero», che è una cosa ben diversa.
The agnosticism of the sensist pan-phenomenalist David Hume (1711-1776) concerning the existence of God is a direct consequence of his gnoseological immanentism (we only know our subjective perceptions, internal states of consciousness, which ends up in an ontological agnosticism concerning the existence of the extra-mental beings of an external reality and a denial of the affirmation that objective metaphysical efficient causality truly operates among the beings of extra-mental reality). Hume writes in A Treatise of Human Nature: "Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can we conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced." 1 For Hume, "nothing can be present to the mind but an image or perception. We cannot prove that perceptions are caused by external objects entirely different from them, though perhaps resembling them in some way. Experience is silent here, for we have before the mind only perceptions. We observe a relation of cause and effect between two perceptions, but we can never observe it between perceptions and objects; hence we cannot proceed by causal inference from perceptions to objects...For Hume, the objects of all our knowledge are impressions and ideas derived from them. There is no evidence that these are caused by external objects, or an unknown substance, or by God. Impressions and sensations simply appear and reappear in our experience. All we can do, then, is to limit ourselves to the world of our impressions and ideas." 2 Against immanentism and its principle of immanence, and in favor of metaphysical realism, Juan José Sanguineti writes: "In quanto l'essere è fonte d'intelligibilità e prima condizione della conoscenza, l'essere è indipendente dal venir conosciuto e non viceversa (il che non si oppone al fatto che gli enti più nobili conoscono, poiché la conoscenza appartiene alla pienezza dell'essere). Questo principio così ovvio è il cardine del realismo metafisico. Le posizioni non realistiche, invece, in base all'apparente fatto che «non possiamo uscire dal nostro pensare», ritengono che un essere indipendente dal pensiero sarebbe incomprensibile o almeno ignoto (principio di immanenza). Viene bloccata in questo modo la trascendenza metafisica della mente umana. La tesi immanentistica poggia sul falso principio dell'impossibilità di trascendere il nostro intelletto pensante.
For the immanentistic phenomenalist David Hume (1711-1776) we are unable to have an a posteriori effect to cause demonstration of the existence of God, since his sensist and phenomenalist gnoseology attempts an elimination of metaphysics (the science of being as being [ens qua ens]) and together with it the affirmations of the objective extra-mental existence of substance and efficient causality, 1 for in Hume, intellectual knowledge suffers a reduction to a
2018
One of the most important causes for comparative studying on philosophical systems is to find their commonalities for responding common questions and to emphasize on their differences for taking functional answers encountering modern philosophical challenges and problems. Here, causality is chosen as the case study. Causality is of the basic philosophical issues that have been continually considered by both Islamic and Western philosophical traditions, but the answers which have been rendered by modern western philosophers with empirical approach and Muslim philosophers, like Mulla Sadra, with intellectual and intuitive approach, is necessitated to compare such answers and clarify the efficacy of each one towards the other one. Mulla Sadra’s philosophical, intellectual and illuminative thought in Islamic tradition, in comparison to Hume’s modern empirical and phenomenal tendencies, is able to remove fundamental ahead problems concerning causality and to answer skepticism derived fro...
2009
The goal of this dissertation is to follow the discussion about causation on David Hume's philosophy. First, I try to show how such concept was treated by previous philosophers that might somehow have influenced Hume. I then analyze his contribution to the subject up to the point in which he introduces the idea of necessary connection. The final part of the work is aimed at studying the most important interpretative branches that try to make sense of Hume's ambiguous statements about necessary connection, and the implications the correct understanding of this concept has for his theory of causation.
Hume presents two definitions of cause in his Enquiry which correspond to his two definitions in his Treatise. The first of the definitions is ontological and the second is psychological; indeed, the definitions are extensionally and intensionally distinct. The critical mistake of the skeptical interpretation is the assumption that the two definitions are equivalent, and the critical mistake of the necessitarian is the assumption an association of ideas can be had from one experiment. This paper attempts to clarify Hume’s finally considered position of causality.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014
In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume (1779/1993) appeals to his account of causation (among other things) to undermine certain arguments for the existence of God. If ‘anything can cause anything’, as Hume claims, then the Principle of Causal Adequacy is false; and if the Principle of Causal Adequacy is false, then any argument for God’s existence that relies on that principle fails. Of course, Hume’s critique has been influential. But Hume’s account of causation undermines the argument from evil at least as much as it undermines arguments for theism, or so I argue. I then suggest that Hume’s account of causation can be used to formulate an alternative argument against classical theism.
We give a brief introduction of Hume’s epistemology and his penetrating analysis of causality. It is pointed out that there are some flaws in his epistemology and his theory of causation. Alternative theories of causation are then briefly introduced. Partly inspired by Hume’s analysis of necessary connexion, we present a new argument of causation. We argue that Hume’s removing necessary connexion from causality can help to provide a promising way to unify the law of causality and indeterminism. We then propose a generalized principle of causality, according to which there are two kinds of causes: concrete causes and universal causes, and correspondingly there are two kinds of effects: lawful events and random events. Each actual effect is composed of both lawful element and random element. A detailed analysis of the motion of objects is also given to support the new principle.
International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH), 2019
This work is a critical exposition of the core aspects of Hume's empiricist epistemological views. The epistemological problem of the origin, scope and certainty of knowledge was a subject of fierce debate between the Continental Rationalists and the British Empiricists. While the rationalists argued for the supremacy of reason, the empiricists stood for experience. As an empiricist Hume believed that certain knowledge is only gained through experience which consists of sensations, emotions and passions. Hume reduced the contents of the mind to perception which he divided into impressions and ideas. He also copiously addressed the idea of causality questioning the impressions that provide one with such an idea. This work employing the critical and expository methods surveyed the key points in Hume's discussion on perception and the association of ideas as well as Hume's analysis of the idea of causality. It gave a background of the empiricists project before presenting his epistemological theory of perception. The work further treated Hume's position with regard to the association of ideas and his analysis of causality. In the area of causality, the work critically looked at Hume's consideration of temporal succession, contiguity and necessary connection. In conclusion the work praised Hume's courageous, rigorous and consistent empiricist stance whose intensity led to a skeptic logical conclusion which is a necessary "antidote to dogmatism and fanaticism."
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