Science denial as a form of pseudoscience

IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 2015

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

It has been much debated whether epistemic relativism in academia, for instance in the form of social constructivism, the strong programme, deconstructionism, and postmodernism, has paved the way for the recent upsurge in science denial, in particular climate science denial. In order to provide an empirical basis for this discussion, an extensive search of the social science literature was performed. It showed that in the 1990s, climate science was a popular target among academic epistemic relativists. In particular, many STS scholars used it as an allegedly clear example of claims by natural scientists that should be treated as mere social constructions, rather than as reports on the actual state of the natural world. A few connections between social constructivists and corporate science denialism were also uncovered, but the extent of such connections could not be determined. With few exceptions, the stream of criticism of climate science from academic relativists has dwindled sin...

PLoS ONE, 2013

Background: Among American Conservatives, but not Liberals, trust in science has been declining since the 1970's. Climate science has become particularly polarized, with Conservatives being more likely than Liberals to reject the notion that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the globe. Conversely, opposition to genetically-modified (GM) foods and vaccinations is often ascribed to the political Left although reliable data are lacking. There are also growing indications that rejection of science is suffused by conspiracist ideation, that is the general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories including the specific beliefs that inconvenient scientific findings constitute a ''hoax.'' Methodology/Principal findings: We conducted a propensity weighted internet-panel survey of the U.S. population and show that conservatism and free-market worldview strongly predict rejection of climate science, in contrast to their weaker and opposing effects on acceptance of vaccinations. The two worldview variables do not predict opposition to GM. Conspiracist ideation, by contrast, predicts rejection of all three scientific propositions, albeit to greatly varying extents. Greater endorsement of a diverse set of conspiracy theories predicts opposition to GM foods, vaccinations, and climate science.

Psychological Science, 2013

Although nearly all domain experts agree that carbon dioxide emissions are altering the world's climate, segments of the public remain unconvinced by the scientific evidence. Internet blogs have become a platform for denial of climate change, and bloggers have taken a prominent role in questioning climate science. We report a survey of climate-blog visitors to identify the variables underlying acceptance and rejection of climate science. Our findings parallel those of previous work and show that endorsement of free-market economics predicted rejection of climate science. Endorsement of free markets also predicted the rejection of other established scientific findings, such as the facts that HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer. We additionally show that, above and beyond endorsement of free markets, endorsement of a cluster of conspiracy theories (e.g., that the Federal Bureau of Investigation killed Martin Luther King, Jr.) predicted rejection of climate science as well as other scientific findings. Our results provide empirical support for previous suggestions that conspiratorial thinking contributes to the rejection of science. Acceptance of science, by contrast, was strongly associated with the perception of a consensus among scientists.

PLOS ONE, 2021

Since the 1970s, there has been a growing interest in how individuals appropriate scientific knowledge, which has recently been reinforced by societal issues such as vaccine releases and skepticism about global warming. Faced with the health and social consequences of the mistrust of scientific knowledge, there is an urgent need for tools to measure the acceptance or rejection of scientific knowledge, while at the same time gaining a more detailed understanding of the processes involved. This is the purpose of this article. Thus, we conducted 4 empirical studies to provide a validation of the Credibility of Science Scale from the perspective of a French population, which aims to assess the credibility that individuals attribute to science and to empirically evaluate the link that may exist between the different levels of credibility attributed to science and the social representations of science. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated good structural validity, the good fidelity (homogeneity...

Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin, 2020

While concern about public irrationality and antiscientific movements is not new, the increasing power of right-wing populist movements that promote distrust of expertise and of scientific institutions gives such concerns a new context. Experience with classic pseudosciences such as creationism, and the long-running efforts by defenders of science to oppose such pseudosciences, may also help us understand today’s post-truth populism. The politics of creationism and science education in the United States and in Turkey does not, however, suggest easy answers. Moreover, there are important features of politics in liberal democracies that drive a populist backlash, which makes it counterproductive for defenders of science to call for deference to all forms of expertise claimed by professionals. There is a danger that the rhetoric of reason that is used to defend science will become part of a more general apologetics for an unsustainable status quo.

Global Environmental Change, 2015

2021

Explanations of science denial rooted in individual cognition tend to focus on general trait-like factors such as cognitive style, conspiracist ideation or delusional ideation. However, we argue that this focus typically glosses over the concrete, mechanistic elements of belief formation, such as hypothesis generation, data gathering, or hypothesis evaluation. We show, empirically, that such elements predict variance in science denial not accounted for by cognitive style, even after accounting for social factors such as political ideology. We conclude that a cognitive account of science denial would benefit from the study of complex (i.e., open-ended, multi-stage) problem solving that incorporates these mechanistic elements.

Synthese, 2017

There is a robust scientific consensus concerning climate change and evolution. But many people reject these expert views, in favour of beliefs that are strongly at variance with the evidence. It is tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to ignorance or irrationality, but those who reject the expert view seem often to be no worse informed or any less rational than the majority of those who accept it. It is also tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to epistemic overconfidence. However, this kind of overconfidence is apparently ubiquitous, so by itself it cannot explain the difference between those who accept and those who reject expert views. Instead, I will suggest that the difference is in important part explained by differential patterns of epistemic deference, and these patterns, in turn, are explained by the cues that we use to filter testimony. We rely on cues of benevolence and competence to distinguish reliable from unreliable testifiers, but when debates become deeply politicized, asserting a claim may itself constitute signalling lack of reliability.

We are working on a workshop proposal to be submitted to the Societas Linguistica Europaea for its 54th Annual Conference (SLE 2021, 31 August – 3 September 2021, Athens, Greece, https://societaslinguistica.eu/meetings) The purpose of this workshop is to explore the textual expression of science denialism, with special emphasis on grassroots sources and agents in digital spaces. Abstracts of ca. 500-800 words, excluding references, should be sent by 10 November 2020 in Word (doc) format to the workshop organisers, Ourania Hatzidaki ([email protected]) and/or Ioannis E. Saridakis ([email protected]) and/or Panagiotis Karampelas ([email protected]).

2014

Rhetorical patterns of history and science denial: The Holocaust, evolution, and climate change never happened The public sphere has been flooded with denialist arguments that no longer respond but simply deny certain realities, facts, and counter-arguments. The quintessential example of denialism is Holocaust denial, where the events of mass incarceration of Jews (among others) in concentration camps and the genocide committed against them is merely a fabrication. Despite

The Skeptic. , 2017

In these challenging times of 'alternative facts' and anti-science attitudes, it may sound strange to be warning against excessive scientific exuberance. Yet to help defend science from these attacks, I think we need to encourage science to maintain its credibility amongst non-scientists. Despite the recent growth of various anti-science movements, science is still widely regarded as the 'gold standard' for the discovery of empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from observations and experiments. Even theoretical physics is supposed to be empirically verifiable in principle when the necessary technology becomes available, as in the case of the Higgs boson and Einstein's gravitational waves. But empirical observations are not our only source of knowledge – we also use reasoning to make sense of our observations and to draw valid conclusions from them. We can even generate new knowledge through the application of reasoning to what we already know, as I shall discuss later. Most skeptics (with a 'k') see science as a kind of rational antidote to the irrationality of pseudoscience, quackery and other varieties of woo. So we naturally tend to support and promote science for this purpose. But sometimes we can go too far in our enthusiasm for science. We can mistakenly attempt to extend the scope of science beyond its empirical capabilities, into other fields of inquiry such as philosophy and politics – even ethics. If only a small number of celebrity scientists lessen their credibility by making pronouncements beyond their individual fields of expertise, they render themselves vulnerable to attack by our opponents who are looking for any weaknesses in their arguments. In doing so, they can unintentionally undermine public confidence in science, and by extension, scientific skepticism.

Science & Education, 2014

ABSTRACT The intrusion of pseudoscience into science classrooms is a problem in science education today. This paper discusses the implications of constructivist pedagogy, which relies on the notions of viability and inter-subjectivity, in a context favourable to the acceptance of pseudoscience. Examples from written statements illustrate how prospective science teachers in Turkey readily accept pseudoscientific explanations of the origin of species. Constructivist pedagogy underestimates, if not ignores, the difficulty of holding rational discussions in the presence of pseudoscientific or absolute beliefs. Moreover, it gives a higher priority to learners’ exposure to alternative constructions through social negotiation than to furthering their appreciation of science. Under these circumstances, self-confirmation and social pressure to accept existing pseudoscientific beliefs may be unanticipated consequences of social negotiation. Considering the aim of science education to foster an appreciation of science, the implications of constructivist pedagogy are, or should be, of great concern to science educators.

Global Environmental Politics, 2012

The question at hand is, “Why is there a social counter-movement that rejects climate change?” This article begins by first naming this counter-movement “climate denial” and working through the various apparent options by specifically looking at the scholarship on Holocaust denial for insight. Through this insight, we can understand the counter-movement as a reactionary force working to sow confusion for ideological reasons that promote a specific privilege. At the same time, privilege is also protected by the presentation of climate change science as a binary position of “acknowledgement or rejection” that itself promotes privilege and dysfunction across the intersection of science and society. In the end, at least one answer to the question “why denial?” appears to be “because it is serious and threatening” and this, at least partially, explains the existence of this counter-movement.