Secure and Decentralized Anonymous E-Voting Scheme

Computer Standards & Interfaces, 2003

An electronic voting system makes it possible for the voters to cast their ballots over the computer network. Hence, voters 11 can participate in elections without having to go to the polling places, which is more convenient and efficient. To design a 12 practical voting scheme, Mu and Varadharajan have recently proposed an anonymous secure electronic voting scheme to be 13 applied over the network. It does not only protect voters' privacy and prevent double voting, but also suits large-scale elections. 14 However, the scheme has a weakness in security; that is, some voters may still double vote without being detected and may 15 even reveal information they should not. In this paper, we shall show this weakness and improve the scheme to increase the 16 protection against fraudulence. 17 D 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. 18 19 23

We present an online voting architecture based on partitioning the election in small clusters of voters and using a new Multi-party Computation algorithm for obtaining voting results from the clusters. This new algorithm has some practical advantages over other previously known algorithms and isn't bound to any specific cryptographic concept; so it can be adapted to future cryptographic exigencies. Compared with other online voting technologies, we see that this new architecture is less vulnerable to hacker attacks and attacks from dishonest authorities, given that no sensitive information is stored in any public server and there is no need for any trustee to safeguard the legality of the election process. Even in case of an attack succeeding, the risks associated with the overall election are far lower than with any other voting system. This architecture can also be combined with any other voting system, inheriting advantages from both systems.

Regular Issue, 2019

Although there are many e-voting systems present by analysis it is found that they all are vulnerable to privacy risk and weakness of unreliable protocols and denial of service attacks. Here is the need to implement the public key encryption e-voting system. The primary objective of this system is to make ensure reliability, privacy and security of the protocol and voting is convenience to users. As a result of the specification requirements, the system was summarized into three parts: access control process which limit access to a system or to any other resource. Secondly, voting process was done by encrypting voter's electronic ballot before submitting to the server. Finally, the final result was sorted through deciphering the received encrypted information. The System is more efficient than other E-Voting systems, since voters can vote from their devices without extra cost and effort, and encryption ensures the security. A pseudo random number is generated using the OTP principle, is used by the voter for authentication purpose while casting the vote. These techniques provide a secure platform, thus exceeding vulnerabilities of the traditional voting system.

The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'07), 2007

We propose a practical verifiable e-voting protocol which guarantees e-voting requirements: privacy, eligibility, uniqueness, uncoercibility, fairness, accuracy, robustness, individual verifiability, and universal verifiability. Unlike existing e-voting protocols we employ dynamic ballot instead of predefined usual ballot in order to strengthen accuracy and fairness of the protocol. In dynamic ballots, the ordering of candidates in the ballots is dynamically created and changes for each voter. Therefore the proposed protocol is called as "DynaVote". DynaVote does not use complex cryptographic algorithms such as homomorphic encryption and does not require anonymous communication channels such as mix-nets since it employs PVID (Pseudo-Voter Identity) scheme which relies on blind signature. Besides it has no physical assumption such as untappable channels. Hence, DynaVote is a practical e-voting protocol for large scale elections. DynaVote is performed over a network such as the Internet. In order to achieve uncoercibility, DynaVote allows recasting without sacrificing uniqueness.

International Journal of Electronic Government Research, 2000

Electronic voting has found wider acceptance both in developed and developing countries in the recent past. The current research focuses mainly in the area of privacy and security aspects of e-voting. In spite of the good security and privacy features, the existing e-voting protocols remain useful only to small elections or just to support the conventional voting, mainly because of their high computational overhead. Naturally, e-voting is not in wide use, even in the developed countries. Thus, there is a need for e-voting protocols which are secure and practical, but with less complexity. This paper proposes an efficient protocol and framework for the practical implementation of the electronic election process. An analysis on the largest election process in the world shows that the proposed protocol has the potential to serve as an efficient polling system with increased voter turnout. This protocol can be adopted easily in the developed world too.

1997

Computer Standards & Interfaces, 2007

In this paper we present a fully functional RSA/DSA-based e-voting protocol for online elections that corrects and improves a scheme previously proposed by Lin-Hwang-Chang [I. Lin, M. Hwang, C. Chang, Security enhancement for anonymous secure e-voting over a network, Comput. Stand. Interfaces 25 (2) (2003) 131-139.]. We found that Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme and a recent modification of it by Hwang-Wen-Hwang [S. Hwang, H. Wen, T. Hwang, On the security enhancement for anonymous secure e-voting over computer network, Comput. Stand. Interfaces 27 (2) (2005) 163-168.] have an important weakness. Moreover, the scheme proposed by Yang-Lin-Yang [C. Yang, C. Lin, H. Yang, Improved anonymous secure e-voting over a network, Information and Security 15 (2) (2004) 185-191.] also suffers from this same problem. We describe in detail our findings and propose a new scheme to overcome the weakness we found in these schemes effectively. Finally, we describe the implementation details of our protocol and present its preliminary performance evaluation.

Advances in Information Security, Privacy, and Ethics, 2018

Most of the voting protocols proposed so far can be categorized into two main types based on the approach taken: schemes using blind signatures and schemes using homomorphic encryption. In the schemes using blind signatures, the voter initially obtains a token-a blindly signed message unknown to anyone except himself. In the schemes using homomorphic encryption the voter cooperates with the authorities in order to construct an encryption of his vote. Due to the homomorphic property, an encryption of the sum of the votes is obtained by multiplying the encrypted votes of all voters. This chapter reviews schemes based on blind signatures and homomorphic encryption and proposes improvements to the existing schemes.

International Journal of Security and Networks

In this paper, we present a new electronic voting protocol. It is based on the ballot's encryption function defined by Schoenmakers in 1999. We use this encryption function in a different way such that we reduce time, communication and computational complexity. In addition, compared to Schoenmakers' protocol, we satisfy the receipt-freeness property. For this, we rely on the protocol defined by Lee and Kim in 2002 and we use a secure hardware engine called SE. This engine re-encrypts ballots through the use of randomisation technique. Our protocol uses a simple encryption function which requires less computational costs than the one used by Lee and Kim. Our protocol becomes then more secure than the protocol of Lee and Kim. Moreover, an extended version with a multi-way election is provided to allow voters to choose between a number of several candidates.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2016

Nearly all verifiable e-voting schemes require trustworthy authorities to perform the tallying operations. An exception is the DRE-i system which removes this requirement by pre-computing all encrypted ballots before the election using random factors that will later cancel out and allow the public to verify the tally after the election. While the removal of tallying authorities significantly simplifies election management, the pre-computation of ballots necessitates secure ballot storage, as leakage of precomputed ballots endangers voter privacy. In this paper, we address this problem and propose DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced privacy). Adopting a different design strategy, DRE-ip is able to encrypt ballots in real time in such a way that the election tally can be publicly verified without decrypting the cast ballots. As a result, DRE-ip achieves end-to-end verifiability without tallying authorities, similar to DRE-i, but with a significantly stronger guarantee on voter privacy. In the event that the voting machine is fully compromised, the assurance on tallying integrity remains intact and the information leakage is limited to the minimum: only the partial tally at the time of compromise is leaked.