When, How, and Why Did “Pain” Become Subjective?

Gestalt Theory, 2017

This paper develops a phenomenological approach of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the socio-historical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: 1) only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and socio-historical sciences; 2) the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; 3) the phenomenological account here offered identifies three fundamental levels that make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a pre-reflective experience, or as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; 4) such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and socio-historical sciences. Arguably, the natural and socio-historical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sciences address pain as an object of cognitive reflection, socio-historical sciences first and foremost deal with pain as a pre-reflective experience and as an object of affective reflection.

In Jennifer Corns (ed.) Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Pain, 2017

Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of pain to account for pain’s unpleasantness or painfulness. Once it was common for philosophers to contrast pains with perceptual experiences (McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980). It was thought that perceptual experiences were intentional (or content-bearing, or about something), whereas pains were representationally blank. But today many of us reject this contrast. For us, your having a pain in your toe is a matter not of your sensing “pain-ly” or encountering a sense-datum, but of your having an interoceptive experience representing (accurately or inaccurately) that your toe is in a particular experience-independent condition, such as undergoing a certain “disturbance” or being damaged or in danger (Armstrong 1962; Tye 1995). But even if such representational content makes an experience a pain, a further ingredient seems required to make the pain unpleasant. According to evaluativism, the further ingredient is the experience’s possession of evaluative content: its representing the bodily condition as bad for the subject. In this chapter, I elaborate evaluativism, locate it among alternatives, and explain its attractions and challenges.

Like other fundamental experiences, the phenomenal qualities of pain seem to defy description. But unlike these experiences it is difficult to define pain in terms of a consistent relationship with the extra-mental world. The IASP’s solution is to qualify an imprecise characterisation of pain’s phenomenal qualities through an association with tissue damage and an ability to recognise pain sensation. In this paper I will argue that the IASP’s definition lacks the clarity and coherence necessary to provide an adequate definition of pain. I begin by setting out the difficulties of defining pain. I then describe the IASP’s solution and provide a detailed criticism of their approach. I also discuss inconsistencies evident in their wider taxonomy. In the final section I argue that pain can be objectively grounded by reference to pain’s evolutionary role and suggest an alternative definition.

Pain reports, 2018

The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) is widely accepted as a pragmatic characterisation of that human experience. Although the Notes that accompany it characterise pain as "always subjective," the IASP definition itself fails to sufficiently integrate phenomenological aspects of pain. This essay reviews the historical development of the IASP definition, and the commentaries and suggested modifications to it over almost 40 years. Common factors of pain experience identified in phenomenological studies are described, together with theoretical insights from philosophy and biology. A fuller understanding of the pain experience and of the clinical care of those experiencing pain is achievable through greater attention to the phenomenology of pain, the social "intersubjective space" in which pain occurs, and the limitations of language. Based on these results, a revised definition of pain is offered: Pain is a...

The Open Pain Journal

Based on a research and clinical work conducted in a pain treatment centre in France, the author shows that the conceptual dichotomies of psyche-soma that dominate the current discussion of the phenomenon of pain cannot ultimately account for its clinical realities. Although pain manifests in the body, it cannot be reduced to organic causes. The psychoanalytic approach to the body on the other hand allows us to make sense of the reality of pain, of the objectivity and certainty that mark its experience for the suffering subject and, in parallel, of the cases where no organic substrate has been identified. The body is not only organic. It is then up to the clinician, whether a physicalist or a psychoanalyst, to know how to work with this sign – one that does not call for interpretation -- regardless of its presumed aetiology.

Pain Forum, 1999

Filozofia, 2024

The aim of this article is to show how the inseparability of its objective and subjective dimensions renders pain such a complex phenomenon that it poses a challenge for both the biomedical sciences and philosophy. Neurophysiology has ascertained the variability of the relationship between damage and pain, showing that it is the result of interaction between the sensory and affective-emotional constituents of the human being. However, the process of defining the clinical concept of suffering appears comprehensively laborious and ongoing. Philosophy, while declaring the impossibility of identifying the essence of pain, makes a valuable contribution to the discovery of the singularity of the experience, thanks to the phenomenology of the homo patiens. Finally, we examine the debate on the possibility and the different ways of narrating and appraising suffering, a need with obvious ethical implications, perceived more and more within the field of care, also given the chronicity of many medical conditions.

Gestalt Theory, 2017

Summary This paper develops a phenomenological approach to the concept of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the sociohistorical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: (1) only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and sociohistorical sciences; (2) the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; (3) the phenomenological account offered here identifies three fundamental levels that make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a prereflective experience, as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; and (4) such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and sociohistorical sciences. Arguably, the natural and sociohistorical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sc...

Journal of pain and …, 2005

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2017

The standard view of pains among philosophers today is that their existence consists in being experienced. The typical line of support offered for this view is that it corresponds with the ordinary or commonsense conception of pain. Despite this, a growing body of evidence from experimental philosophers indicates that the ordinary understanding of pain stands in contrast to the standard view among philosophers. In this paper, we will survey this literature and add to it, detailing the results of seven new studies on the ordinary understanding of pain using both questionnaire and corpus analysis methods.