The Multiple Uses of Proper Nouns

Although the view that sees proper names as referential singular terms is widely considered orthodoxy, there is a growing popularity to the view that proper names are predicates. This is partly because the orthodoxy faces two anomalies that Predicativism can solve: on the one hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. But multiple bearerhood is (prima facie) a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual as referent. On the other hand, as Burge (1973) noted, proper names can have predicative uses. But the view that proper names are singular terms arguably does not have the resources to deal with Burge's cases. In this paper I argue that the predicate view of proper names is mistaken. I first argue against the syntactic evidence used to support the view and against the predicativist's methodology of inferring a semantic account for proper names based on incomplete syntactic data. I also show that Predicativism can neither explain the behaviour of proper names in full generality, nor claim the fundamentality of predicative names. In developing my own view, however, I accept the insight that proper names in some sense express generality. Hence I propose that proper names - albeit fundamentally singular referential terms - express generality in two senses. First, by being used as predicates, since then they are true of many individuals; and second, by being referentially related to many individuals. I respond to the problem of multiple bearerhood by proposing that proper names are polyreferential, and also explain the behaviour of proper names in light of the wider phenomenon I called category change, and shown how Polyreferentialism can account for all uses of proper names.

In this essay, I address the following question posed by Glezakos (after Kaplan): What determines the form of a name-containing identity statement? I argue that uses of names are determined by the specific names uttered and the presence (or absence) of coco-referential intentions of the speaker. This explains why utterances of the form a=a are uninformative or knowable a priori, more generally than utterances of the form a=b. My approach has the additional benefit of providing an account of empty names.

Dialectica, 2000

This paper embeds a theory of proper names in a general approach to singular reference based on type-free property theory. It is proposed that a proper name “N” is a sortal common noun whose meaning is essentially tied to the linguistic type “N”. Moreover, “N” can be singularly referring insofar as it is elliptical for a definite description of the form the “N” Following Montague, the meaning of a definite description is taken to be a property of properties. The proposed theory fulfils the major desiderata stemming from Kripke's works on proper names.

Philosophical Studies, 2013

In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant literature. Secondly, two general motivations for an indexical view on names will be introduced and defended. Thirdly, I will criticize the two most popular versions of the indexical view on names: formal variable accounts and salience-based formal constant accounts. In the fourth and final section, I will develop my own use-conditional indexical view on names in three different steps by confronting an initial version of this view with three different challenges. Keywords Proper names Á Indexicals Á Determination of reference Á Reference to past bearers of a name Á Multiple bearers of a name Á Empty names 1 Setting the stage: Indexical views on proper names Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose semantic reference depends in a certain way on specific parameters of the context of use. Therefore, an indexical expression can have different semantic referents relative to different contexts of use. Prototypical and uncontroversial examples of indexicals are expressions like 'I', 'here', 'now' and 'this'. The view that proper names are indexical expressions is

Voprosy onomastiki, 2018

The paper presents an overview of the generativist approaches to the syntactic analysis of proper names which are only very little known in the field of onomastics. The authors start with the general outline of basic theoretical ideas of generative grammar pertaining to the syntactic nature of words and phrases, the nature of the determiner phrase, and the main issues of transformational semantic syntax. The authors further proceed to present the cornerstone theories related to proper names within the generativist paradigm: Giuseppe Longobardi’s idea of proper names as determiner phrase projections, followed by Hagit Borer who elaborated a detailed analysis of nominal functional sequences; Ora Matushansky’s analysis of constructions of naming and nominating, and its critique by Alexandra Cornilescu. The overview leads the authors to conclude that, although generativism does not offer a unified syntactic theory of proper names, in some respects it can be a more promising theoretical framework than constructivism which now constitutes the basis for the modern “pragmatic” theory of properhood. Unlike constructivism, generativism considers proper names as a part of universal grammar seeking for explanations that would have crosslinguistic relevance. However, the approaches discussed in this paper clearly demonstrate the contribution of the syntactic environment to the interpretation of a noun as a proper or common name, which is a strong argument in favour of the “pragmatic” theory of properhood. The authors show that the generativist framework may also be used in the future for creating a more comprehensive description of some specifically proprial syntactic constructions.

In my book Eigenname und Bedeutung (1996) I started from the observation that modem theories of proper names fail to do justice to the specific and complex semantic nature of proper names. Since the 1960's and 1970's, theorizing about proper names has been dominated largely by scholars working in the traditions of analytic philosophy and logic, in particular John R. Searle and Saul Kripke. I urged, therefore , that the highly specific kind of meaning characteristic of proper names should be studied within a theory more in touch with general linguistics proper. The main philosophical (especially referential) and logical (especially formal) accounts start from the assumption that a proper name is "backed up" by encyclopedic information held by speakers of the referents (Searle), or that a proper name is a meaningless , yet rigidly designating sign (Kripke). In contrast to these views, I argue that a general linguistic definition of proper names must focus, not only on logical and philosophical issues, but upon the intra-linguistic semantic function of the proper name as " a part of speech" in actual utterances. This approach has nothing to do with "discourse analysis", but aims at describing proper names and appellative nouns as categories of speech in language use, bringing into play afunctional focus on proper names that has largely been lacking in definitions so far. An outline of a semantic theory of proper names is then proposed based on some aspects of a "phenomenology of language and linguis-tics" as found in the work of Edmund Husserl and Eugenio Coseriu. Roughly speaking, Husserl represents the general epistemological implications of the paper, Coseriu its specifically linguistic aspects.

Philosophy Compass, 2015

The Millian view that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent has long been popular among philosophers of language. It might even be deemed the orthodox view, despite its well-known difficulties. Fregean and Russellian alternatives, though widely discussed, are much less popular. The Predicate View has not even been taken seriously, at least until fairly recently, but finally, it is receiving the attention it deserves. It says that a name expresses the property of bearing that name. Despite its apparent shortcomings, it has a distinct virtue: It straightforwardly reckons with the fact that proper names generally have multiple bearers and are sometimes used to ascribe the property of bearing a name rather than to refer to a particular bearer of the name. It holds that proper names are much the same as common nouns, both semantically and syntactically, with only superficial differences. They both can be quantified and modified. The main difference, at least in English (and some other languages), is that when used to refer a proper name, unlike a common noun, is not preceded by the definite article. The Predicate View accounts for manifestly predicative uses, but to be vindicated, it needs to do justice to the fact that the main use of proper names is to refer. (1) Nikola Tesla was a brilliant electrical engineer. (2) Salem has always been free of witches. Yet like common nouns, names can also be quantified and modified: (3) Many Nikolas live in Croatia. (4) There are more than a dozen Salems in the United States. (5) An electric car company is named after the brilliant engineer Tesla. (6) The only Salem that is a state capital is the one in Oregon. These examples might suggest that the names 'Nikola' and 'Salem' are ambiguous, meaning one thing when used to refer, as in their bare, unmodified singular occurrences, and meaning something else when used as count nouns. But simply to claim that proper names have two meanings, depending on whether they occur by themselves or as parts of larger phrases, leaves unexplained why they have these two uses. Surely it is not a massive linguistic coincidence. Besides, this view fails to explain why, for example, since Teddy Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt were both U.S. presidents, it follows that two Roosevelts were U.S. presidents. So, could proper names each have only one meaning

In Sawyer (ed.) New Waves in Philosophy of Language (Palgrave MacMillan Press), 2010

This is a defence of the claim that names are predicates with a demonstrative element in their singular use.

Proper names (PN) are presumably a universal class of expressions which comprise prototypically anthroponyms and toponyms. There is a long standing tradition of scientific research of PN particularly in philosophy and onomastics. Philosophers were mostly interested in PN as referential expressions and in the nature of this kind of reference vis-à-vis definite descriptions. On the other hand, onomastics as a sub-discipline of linguistics was mostly interested in the etymology of PN and the implications for historical linguistics and the historical reconstruction of languages. General linguistics and in particular linguistic typology has almost completely neglected the study of PN (some exceptions are recent publications such as VAN LANGENDONCK 2007 und ANDERSON 2007). There is no systematic comparative study of the internal and external morphosyntax of PN or proper name phrases (PNP). The same lack of research holds for the usage of PN in discourse (exceptions are recent publications by DOWNING 1996; SCHWITALLA 1995; PEPIN & ELWYS (eds.) 2010). Although anthroponyms and toponyms are prototypical classes of PNs, they are so different in functional and formal respects that they are better treated separately. Therefore, the present paper deals with the grammatical properties of anthroponyms leaving aside toponyms for later research. The goal of this paper is to present a typologically informed systematic overview of the essential functional and formal properties of anthroponyms. Anthroponyms are not only terms of address and reference. They often encode certain semantic and social meanings that go beyond the pure referential function. The dimensions of these secondary meanings/ functions will be explicated in this paper. Formally, anthroponyms are not only simple words, but show an enormous internal and external complexity. Especially the external syntax of anthroponyms, i.e. the phrase structure and the usage of anthroponyms as argument of the clause will be dealt with. A proper name phrase will be postulated that is different form a classical NP. Further dimensions of typological variation such as anthroponyms and the problem of parts of speech, and anthroponyms within the Animacy Hierarchy will be discussed. The data for this study are taken from grammatical descriptions of a wide array of languages.

Erkenntnis, 2014

Proper names play an important role in our understanding of linguistic 'aboutness' or reference. For instance, the name-bearer relation is a good candidate for the paradigm of the reference relation: it provides us with our initial grip on this relation and controls our thinking about it. For this and other reasons proper names have been at the center of philosophical attention. However, proper names are as controversial as they are conceptually fundamental. Since Kripke's seminal lectures Naming and Necessity the controversy about proper names has taken the form of a debate between two main camps, descriptivists and non-descriptivists like Kripke himself. 1 Descriptivists hold that there is a close connection between proper names and definite descriptions: the meaning or sense of a proper name can be given by a (bundle of) definite description(s). The satisfier, if any, of the definite description(s) that provide(s) the meaning of a proper name is its referent. Descriptivists can allow for empty proper names that are meaningful. They also have an initially plausible account of true informative identity statements ('Marilyn Monroe is no one other person than Norma Jean Baker'). Their informativity is grounded in a difference in meaning-giving descriptions.