How to 'Know Thyself' in Plato's Phaedrus

Knowledge of oneself is not easy to attain. Plato was aware of this and in this paper we aim to show that he suspected then, like psychologists know now, that one's introspective capacity to attain knowledge of oneself is very much restricted and that we must rely on the other as a source of such knowledge. We further argue that, for Plato, this knowledge is not easily achieved given not only the shortcomings of the first-person perspective but also the limitations of the third-person one.

Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, 2015

The aim of this paper is to examine how the Greek motto γνῶθι σεαυτόν plays a central role in Plato's philosophy in order to show how ethics and knowledge go hand in hand in his model of παιδεία. The question of self-knowledge is a practical and theoretical task in life which is developed implicitly in his dialogues, it is for this reason that i examine some passages of the Charmides, Alcibiades I, Phaedo and Republic in order to show how Plato discovers the human interiority (Phaedo) and how self-knowledge is refined and articulated with the tripartition of the soul in the Republic.

Care of the self in early Greek philosophy, 2012

The ancient Greek notion of “care of the self” and the self-knowledge it presupposes is premised on the concept of introspection. Introspection obviously involves “consciousness”; more precisely, it implies a “conscious” notion of the “self.” Consciousness itself can be notorious difficult to define and explain. In this paper, I examine some of the historical precedents for “caring for the self” as we find them in Plato’s earlier dialogues, notably the Apology, and the kind of consciousness it presupposes. This was an invited paper for a panel on “Care of the self in early Greek philosophy” organized by Annie Larivée for the 80th Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New Brunswick, May 2011. I’ve added a few references to my more recent work on the topic.

In this paper, I intend to argue that within the early Platonic dialogues, the activity of Socratic ignorance is equivalent to self-knowledge, which, if practiced expertly, is necessary and sufficient for virtuous action.

Knowledge and Ignorance of Self in Platonic Philosophy, 2018

I use Plato’s Symposium to examine a tension that I believe to be key to self-knowledge. On the one hand, knowledge proper refers to noetic insight into the ultimate explanatory principles and causes, which “objects” are often referred to in the dialogues as forms. On the other hand, self-knowledge refers to basic modes of self-awareness and self-understanding that are at once embodied and interpersonal, and which are not explicitly related to the study of form. I believe these two basic commitments, to knowledge and self-awareness, tend to obscure one another in the dialogues and in contemporary interpretations. My basic thesis is that the demands of theoretical knowledge and self-awareness are in tension with one another but that Platonic philosophy demands that we understand the nature of these opposed demands and endure the strife between them. Self-knowledge, understood in its most encompassing sense, is the life of reflectively enduring that strife, of reconciling the existential burdens of philosophy with the demands of theoretical knowledge proper.

One of the most noticeable aspects of Plato’s dramatization of Socrates in the Apology is that many themes of philosophical relevance emerge by way of a series of self-images that Socrates crafts throughout the defence speech he delivers at the trial held against him in 399 B.C. Coming to grips with such images may turn out to be a particularly baffling experience for the Platonic reader, especially when one attempts to draw a coherent picture of Socrates’ personality and conduct at the trial in the light of the various forms of self-representation proposed in the text. In fact, one might entertain the impression that different voices and attitudinal approaches are unleashed from one and the same character, and also that these might not provide an internally consistent portrait of his own professed values, abilities, and epistemological limitations. For instance, some images convey the idea of a shameless and boastful Socrates (cf. Apology 30d and 31a, where he describes himself as a gift of god, or 28b-29d, where he compares his own condition to the one experienced by the Homeric hero Achilles), whereas others express the view that Socrates is a man aware of his own limits and, what is more, one respectful of divine signs and messages (cf. 21b). I will offer a tentative reconstruction of some of such self-images and argue that, despite the fact that these are prima facie open to opposing interpretations, Plato supplies his readers with some conceptual tools for understanding the following idea: the Socrates of his Apology, rather than aiming to present himself as a boastful character, seeks to express the non-negotiable value of truth and philosophical examination, i.e. ideals he endorses and exemplifies in his individual life. In this way, I hope to demonstrate that Socrates’ respect of cultural and religious traditions can be pursued compatibly with the innovations introduced by epistemic devices such as the elenchos and the critical comparisons he stages between the self-perception cultivated by others and Socrates’ own awareness of his wisdom.

Philosophie antique, 2012

at Santa Barbara RÉSUMÉ. Cet article est ma contribution au débat sur la nature du moi idéal chez Platon ; débat commencé dans l'antiquité, mais qui se poursuit jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Les positions sont à peu près les suivantes. D'un côté, à la suite du platonicien Numénius, de nombreux interprètes (que j'appellerai universalistes) soutiennent que, puisque le moi chez Platon est un élément rationnel immatériel, ce ne peut être un moi personnel et individuel, mais il doit être impersonnel et universel. Dans cette perspective, l'âme contemplative n'est pas à proprement parler un moi ; elle se confond plutôt, selon les termes du Premier Alcibiade -un texte clé pour les universalistes -avec « Dieu et la sagesse » (Alc. 133c). De l'autre côté, quelques commentateurs (que j'appellerai individualistes ou particularistes) suivent Plotin et supposent ou affirment l'individualité du moi platonicien. Mais, à la différence de Plotin, les particularistes n'ont jamais reconnu qu'il y a là matière à controverse et n'ont jamais réellement affronté le problème de savoir de quelle façon le moi est individuel et ce que son individualité pourrait impliquer. C'est donc une nouvelle défense de l'individualité du moi que je présente ici. En outre, je suggère que son individualité n'est pas incompatible avec la sorte d'universalité qu'implique la contemplation et même qu'elle constitue une précondition de sa propre transcendance. Cependant, mon argumentation se tient dans les limites du Phèdre ; je ne prétends pas tirer de conclusions pour l'ensemble du corpus platonicien. Dans la première partie, j'expose l'aporie à laquelle est confronté Socrate, l'énigme qui motive l'enquête qui va suivre ; j'avance également l'hypothèse que les deux discours qui précèdent le Grand Discours de Socrate, sa palinodie -le premier étant censément composé par Lysias, le second par Socrate -, frayent la voie à la palinodie elle-même en avançant des conceptions rivales de l'amour-eros, de la connaissance de soi et de la rationalité. Dans la seconde partie, je défends une lecture particulariste de la palinodie et plus spécialement du mythe sur la nature de l'âme. SUMMARY. This paper is a contribution to a debate that has its origins in antiquity and still continues to this day, which concerns the nature of the ideal self in Plato and which takes roughly the following form. On the one hand, following the Platonist philosopher Numenius, many interpreters (which I call universalists) maintain that,

Plato, 2022

At the beginning of the Phaedrus, Socrates distinguishes between two kinds of people: those who are more complex, violent and hybristic than the monster Typhon, and those who are simpler, calmer and tamer (230a). This paper argues that there are also two distinct types of Eros (Love) that correlate to Socrates's two kinds of people. In the first case, lovers cannot attain recollection because their souls are disordered in the absence of self-knowledge. For the latter, the selfknowledge of self-disciplined lovers renders them capable of recollecting the Forms by ordering their souls naturally.