Free will, moral responsibility and automatisms

SSRN Electronic Journal

The paper provides an analysis of the main approaches to the interpretation of volitional actions in analytical legal philosophy, in the context of legal responsibility and discussions about free will. The most famous examples of the possibility of applying the neuroscience arguments in legal philosophy, in particular when assessing the effect of a volitional act performed consciously on human behavior, are considered. The paper argues that the philosophical argumentation in Gilbert Ryle's logical behaviorism can be used as a rational approach to refute neuroscience data and interpret actions correctly, in terms of legal language.

The Journal of Ethics, 2000

Philosophical Studies, 1992

Sytsma/A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, 2016

International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, (IJHSSE), volume 10, Issue 6, pp. 25-29 , 2023

As we know, there is a difference between a simple wish and the will of an individual. Not only a concrete action is required in order to alleviate the impact of various factors that inhibit the former before it becomes ‘will’, but also a deep level of human consciousness. It implies conscientious motivation, clear goals, etc. My paper introduces some of the elements instrumental in the leap from the wish to the human will. As the issue of Free Will shall be central to the paper because when I say ‘human will’ I refer to ‘free will’, I have to mention that I adopt a pragmatic perspective on this notion. I. e. even though, as quantum physics tell us, any decision we make is conditioned by realities pertaining to it, we do not think of this state of affair when we carry out our activities – at least not always. Because of that we feel free – free enough to be able to function according to social norms.

2017

█ Abstract The long dispute between incompatibilists (namely, the advocates of the contemporary version of the illusory nature of freedom) and compatibilists is further exemplified in the discussion between Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. In this article, I try to add to the discussion by outlining a concept of free will linked to five operating conditions and put forward a proposal for its operationalization and quantifi-cation. The idea is to empirically and pragmatically define free will as needed for moral blame and legal liability, while separating this from the debate on global determinism, local determinism, automatisms and priming phenomena on a psychological level. This is made possible by weakening the claims of de-terminisms and psychological automatisms, based on the latest research, and by giving a well-outlined definition of free will as I want to defend it. █ Riassunto Un approccio pragmatico ed empirico al libero arbitrio-La lunga disputa tra incompatibilisti (va-le a...

THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL, 2024

The debate over free will—whether it is an illusion or a genuine aspect of human experience—has long intrigued philosophers, scientists, and the general public. This essay explores the complex interplay between free will and various theoretical models, including determinism and stochastic theories. We begin by defining free will, clarifying it as the ability to make choices unconstrained by external factors, and distinguishing it from related concepts such as autonomy and agency. We then delve into deterministic models, which argue that every event, including human actions, is the result of preceding causes, and discuss how these models challenge traditional notions of moral responsibility. In contrast, stochastic models introduce the idea of randomness and uncertainty into the equation. By examining quantum mechanics—where particles behave probabilistically rather than deterministically—we investigate whether quantum indeterminacy offers a pathway to free will. The observer effect in quantum mechanics, which suggests that observation can influence outcomes, is explored as a potential link between consciousness and free will, though its implications remain speculative. We further consider consciousness and its role in decision-making, discussing the concept of qualia and how it might suggest a degree of autonomy within complex systems. The essay also addresses emergent properties—phenomena that arise from complex interactions and cannot be solely explained by their components—as a possible framework for understanding free will. Through real-life examples, such as legal cases and everyday decision-making, we illustrate the practical implications of the free will debate. We also engage with counterarguments from neuroscience, including findings on subconscious decision-making, to provide a balanced perspective. Prominent philosophical views, from Kant’s advocacy of free will for moral responsibility to Spinoza’s deterministic outlook, are examined to enrich the discussion. In conclusion, this essay reflects on the broader implications of the free will debate for our understanding of morality and human behavior. It emphasizes the importance of continued research in neuroscience, physics, and philosophy to address this enduring question and enhance our grasp of human agency.

The need to explore free will arises from continuous reflection and discussion about the nature of human existence and the ability of humans to make free decisions. This need is compounded by ambiguity in views and approaches to this concept and its meaning for various aspects of life. The examination of free will becomes relevant due to the need to understand the causes of actions, moral responsibility, and the possibilities of human influence on the world. This study was devoted to the disclosure of key aspects of free will through the analysis of historical and modern theories. In the course of the study, a literary analysis was involved, which included work with papers on related subjects. The conceptual analysis allowed defining and understanding the main concepts and terms of the subject under study. Comparative analysis was applied to the papers of other researchers who worked on the same or similar subjects to identify similarities and differences and determine prospects for future research in this area. The study shows that there are two main directions in this discussion: determinists believe that all events, including human actions, are predetermined, and compatibilists state that free will is compatible with determinism. The study provides a detailed analysis of deterministic and compatibilist concepts of free will. Arguments for and against free will, which indicate the influence of external factors on human choice, are considered. Through the analysis of historical and modern theories, the examination of various concepts and argumentation, this study identifies the main approaches to the interpretation of the concept of free will in the context of philosophical thought. The main results indicate the complexity and versatility of the concept of free will and the importance of considering various factors that influence human choice

Philosophy Compass, 2009

In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck.

The subject of study and critical analysis in this article is the concept of “free will” which is commonly used in the philosophical literature to designate self-determinateness of human consciousness, i.e., a person’s ability to make decisions arbitrarily, regardless of any external factors. The belief that the above-noted ability is really peculiar to man as a reasonable being, is widely held in ethics, law, theology and in the popular mind; free will is thus considered to be a necessary condition for responsibility of the agent for his decisions and actions. This paper presents a number of arguments in support of an alternative position recognizing the fictitiousness of the concept of free will and universality of the principle of determinism. It shows that the notion of the reality of free will is based on an incorrect understanding of the mental mechanisms of motivation, on the wrong identification of the concepts of “free will” and “freedom of action” as well as the denial of determinism as a fundamental methodological principle, without which human cognition is generally unthinkable. Moreover, the concept of free will is contradictory: protecting the social institution of responsibility, it thus actually undermines its own methodological foundation, i.e., indeterminism, because responsibility is a factor that determines the will. In general the recognition of the reality of free will is incompatible with the obvious fact of causal dependence of the moral and other values of people, their goals and actions on the social circumstances in which their mentality is formed. Therefore moral philosophy does not need to use the concept of free will. The origin of morality, its social functions and psychological mechanisms, the content of its principles and norms and their historical changes can be adequately described and explained only within the deterministic picture of the world.

Philosophical Explorations, 2009

Research on moral responsibility and the related problem of free will is among the liveliest areas in contemporary analytical philosophy. Traditionally, these problems have been dealt with in connection with actions and decisions. More recently, they also have been extended to beliefs, and this extension has thrown some more light on the more traditional concerns. These problems were the central subject of a recent philosophical meeting, the International Workshop on Belief, Responsibility, and Action, which took place in Valencia (Spain) in November 2008. This special issue of Philosophical Explorations takes its origin in this meeting. It was a complementary activity of the research project Belief, Responsibility, and Action (HUM2006-04907), financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (in collaboration with the European Regional Development fund of the European Community), the Autonomous Government of the Valencian Community, and the University of Valencia. Some of the papers included in this special issue were actually presented and discussed during that meeting, while others have been written especially for the occasion. All the authors and S.E. Cuypers, associate editor of Philosophical Explorations-whose paper does not appear here, owing to the journal's deontological code-were invited speakers to the workshop in Valencia. The main contenders in the debate on free action, free will, and moral responsibility are the following. Compatibilism is the view that free will, free action, and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is the denial of compatibilism. Libertarians are incompatibilists who believe that at least some of us, at times, perform free decisions and actions for which we are responsible. Therefore, they deny determinism. Hard determinists are incompatibilists who accept determinism and, consequently, hold that there are no free decisions or actions, and no moral responsibility, either. Although incompatibilists may also remain agnostic about determinism, they hold that, if it is true, then hard determinists are right in denying free will and moral responsibility. Hard incompatibilists concur with hard determinists about the contention that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, but add that these properties are also incompatible with indeterminism. Hard incompatibilists are, then, sceptical about the reality of free will and moral responsibility at whatever world.

Zenodo, 2024

One of humanity's oldest philosophical puzzles is the debate over free will vs. determinism. Do our actions proceed from prior causes, and are we therefore enslaved? Or are we free to choose? What used to be a purely philosophical question has become a scientific one, with support from neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence.

Autonomous agency is complex, bound up as it is with moral agency. Indeed, “a moral agent is necessarily an autonomous agent.”(Smithers, 1997, page 95) And, moral agency is anything but clear, bound up as it is with things like freewill, responsibility, intention, conscience, personal identity and selfhood. Confronted with so many unanswered questions, researchers often operate under two distinct notions of autonomy, one associated with human and another with artificial agents. This lack of uniformity is theoretically unappealing, impedes progress on both forms of agency, and its constructive resolution is the focus of this paper.

Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility: An Analysis of Event-Causal Incompatibilism, 2017

In this project, I will analyze, summarize, and critique the incompatibilist theory known as source incompatibilism, which argues that a moral agent is morally responsible for an action only if they are the proper source of that action. More specifically, I will analyze the source incompatibilist views of event-causal incompatibilism, which argues that an agent has free will only if there exists indeterminacy in her decision-making process, either before the formation of a decision itself of during the formation of a decision. I will argue that event-causal incompatibilist views suffer from problems of control and moral chanciness. Thus I will argue that event-causal incompatibilism is no more philosophically tenable than its compatibilist counterparts. If this is true, the event-causal incompatibilist ought to abandon it due to considerations of parsimony. After I have successfully refuted event-causal incompatibilism, I will introduce a novel theory of moral responsibility compatibilism of my own, which I will argue is the only tenable philosophical theory left for the proponent of event-causal incompatibilism. I will attempt to reconcile moral responsibility with causal determinism, utilizing an argument from the philosophy of David Enoch in his book Taking Morality Seriously. When this is complete, I will defend my compatibilist theory from various objections by philosophers Saul Smilansky and Ishtiyaque Haji. I will end the discussion with a brief introduction to other non-libertarian views of moral responsibility and determinism, which do not require libertarian notions of free will and thus do not require indeterminacy for freedom. These include Saul Smilansky’s illusionism and Derk Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism. I will analyze these views, but ultimately I will critique them. I will argue that these theories also are lacking, and so they are not viable alternatives to the proponent of moral responsibility.