India's Doctrine Puzzle Limiting War in South Asia

Behind every doctrinal decision that states have to make—especially in relation to nuclear weapons—are two basic questions: one, at the substantive level, what kind of role it envisages for (in this case) nuclear weapons in meeting the country's most important security challenges; and two, with how much clarity and specific-ity, or conversely ambiguity, should the doctrine be expressed. Well-thought-out nuclear doctrines are ideally founded on a strong conception about the role, purposes and limitations of nuclear weapons, how those weapons fit into the pursuit of a country's grand strategy, and a set of core beliefs and ideas about the operationalization of the weapons to reflect a sound balance of all these different facets. The potential for nuclear instability is greatest where a doctrine reflects either a lack of strategic thought or some kind of strategic drift in conceptualizing how nuclear weapons feature within a country's grand strategy, or where there is a clear mismatch between the security challenges faced by a state and the kind of role it assigns to nuclear weapons. The choice between ambiguity and clarity often feeds into this dynamic. Ambiguous doctrines, when they reflect either kind of strategic uncertainty noted above, can be a source of dangerous miscalculation and inadvertent escalation of tensions. This is especially true in new nuclear states that lack experience with respect to the limitations of nuclear weapons. Yet new nuclear states also tend not to state their doctrines unequivocally, relying on ambiguity to maximize the deterrent effects and political utility of their nascent nuclear forces. Ambiguity, then, may be a short-term necessity, but in the longer term can end up being counterproductive. Against the background of the dilemmas presented by the doctrinal and posture choices of nuclear states, this article offers a discussion of nuclear doctrines, and their significance for war, peace and stability in what is possibly the most active nuclear region in present times—south Asia. The cases of India and Pakistan are offered to show the challenges new nuclear states face in articulating and implementing a proper nuclear doctrine. It is argued here that the nuclear doctrines and postures of both India and Pakistan are problematic from a regional security perspective, but for somewhat different reasons. In India's case, newer challenges and a lack of strategic focus have led to increasing ambiguity in a doctrine that at its inception suggested both a certain level of clarity and

The strategic culture of South Asia is characterized by the hostility between India and Pakistan. Conventional arms' race, wars, growing insecurity and ultimately nuclearization of the region is the consequence of this continual enmity. To match this threatening environment both Pakistan and India has opted nuclear arms. After the nuclear explosions of 1998 the world started to talk about the nuclear doctrine for the region. This present study is an effort to understand doctrine, nuclear doctrine and it's ramifications for South Asia. It will be analyzed whether these doctrines fulfill the required qualities and what implication they do have on both countries in general and the region in particular. It is essential to analyze them as the changing global scenario demands for the clear picture of the nuclear posture of both paramount states of the South Asian region. This region casts its impact not only on the residing actors but the neighboring region as well. The research concludes that the re-establishment of constant dialogue and diplomatic efforts are more beneficial for the region to counter the threat and insecurity.

2019

This project aimed to review the India's nuclear doctrine (as officialised on 4 January 2003), and through a constructive critique, attempt an alternative blueprint to suit the new developments in the security and political environment within and outside India over the last decade. Towards achieving this, the Nuclear Security Programme (NSP) at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) constituted a task force of experts from the Indian strategic community -academia, bureaucracy, military and scientific.

The persistence of restraint, stability and minimalism in India's nuclear policy is best explained with reference to its strategic culture. This constitutes an intermediate structure between the power-acquisition imperative of the structure of the international system and domestic choices on how power is actually constituted. Disaggregation of strategic culture into three analytically distinct componentsthe level of assumptions and beliefs, the operational level and the structural frame -facilitates identification of the precise areas of continuity and change in a dynamic structure. The disjunctures observed, whether at one level or between levels, can then be subjected to social action in the pursuit of peace and stability. An examination of Indian strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons on the basis of official and non-official preference structures reveals (a) high levels of continuity in the form of restrained responses to external and domestic pressures for change, and in a positive disposition toward arms control; and (b) a significant shift from high to low tolerance of ambiguity resulting from the steady growth of an operational, as opposed to a political, conception of nuclear weapons. The last creates space for nuclear instability. The anomaly can be corrected by exposing the deficiencies in the operational conception of deterrence, thereby reinforcing strategic stability.

2014

In May 1998, after conducting a series of nuclear tests India declared itself a state with nuclear capability. What is noteworthy is that India had achieved the capability to assemble nuclear weapons and developed the essential delivery systems (both missiles and aircraft) much before the historic 1998 tests. India has always asserted discomfort with the existence of nuclear weapons. After years of debate on the global elimination of nuclear weapons, and nearly losing hope of the nuclear weapons states ever moving towards nuclear disarmament, India exercised prudence in declaring its strategic capability. India's decision helped it to cross the nuclear rubicon and break free from years of established nuclear apartheid between the nuclear haves and have- nots. Thereafter, India decided to construct a practical doctrine for a system of deterrence that was reasonable, effective, affordable, and defensive. The nuclear doctrine drafting group, constituted out of the National Security...

2002

The persistence of restraint, stability and minimalism in India's nuclear policy is best explained with reference to its strategic culture. This constitutes an intermediate structure between the power-acquisition imperative of the structure of the international system and domestic choices on how power is actually constituted. Disaggregation of strategic culture into three analytically distinct componentsthe level of assumptions and beliefs, the operational level and the structural frame -facilitates identification of the precise areas of continuity and change in a dynamic structure. The disjunctures observed, whether at one level or between levels, can then be subjected to social action in the pursuit of peace and stability. An examination of Indian strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons on the basis of official and non-official preference structures reveals (a) high levels of continuity in the form of restrained responses to external and domestic pressures for change, and in a positive disposition toward arms control; and (b) a significant shift from high to low tolerance of ambiguity resulting from the steady growth of an operational, as opposed to a political, conception of nuclear weapons. The last creates space for nuclear instability. The anomaly can be corrected by exposing the deficiencies in the operational conception of deterrence, thereby reinforcing strategic stability.

Stability On the Brink, Indian New Normal Policy and Threat of Nuclear War in South Asia

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan faced a constant challenge by its eastern neighbour. India’s attitude towards Pakistan had always centred on hostility and undermining its stability. Various methods have been employed to undermine Pakistan’s sovereignty; its disintegration in 1971 would not have been possible without India’s crucial role. While Kashmir remains a bone of contention between the two South Asian states, India’s aspiration to become the regional hegemon has complicated the relations between the two rivals even further. India desires regional hegemony while Pakistan deems it unacceptable. After the inception of Nuclear weapon in the South Asian Theater, it was believed that a permanent balance had been achieved, but it was unacceptable for India. To overcome the nuclear dilemma, India came up with the Cold Start doctrine. Cold Start Doctrine is a conventional military strategy under which India will increase the efficiency of its force so that it can invade Pakistan any time in a very short period. Though immediately this strategy was neutralized by Pakistan. Pakistan introduced shortrange, tactical nuclear and asserted that it would use these short-range missile in case of aggression by the Indian military. Even in the presence of tactical nuclear weapons, India did not back out from its plan to become a regional hegemon or to acquire enhanced capability and capacity to undermine Pakistan at any given time. To achieve this goal, India is discussing to change its nuclear doctrine, which will be supported by a missile defence system. With already present nuclear shadow in South Asia, aggressive Indian policies to create a new kind of hegemonic order in the region can lead South Asia to destruction.