Reasoning with Expectations About Causal Relations
Peter GärdenforsStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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Abstract
Reasoning is not just following logical rules, but a large part of human reasoning depends on our expectations about the world. To some extent, non-monotonic logic has been developed to account for the role of expectations. In this article, the focus is on expectations based on actions and their consequences. The analysis is based on a two-vector model of events where an event is represented in terms of two main components – the force of an action that drives the event, and the result of its application. Actions are modelled in terms of the force domain and the results are modelled with the aid of different domains for locations or properties of objects. As a consequence, the assumption that reasoning about causal relations should be made in terms of propositional structures becomes very unnatural. Instead, the reasoning will be based on the geometric and topological properties of causes and effects modelled in conceptual spaces.
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