Mao vs the People: A review of climate leviathan

… Environmental Agreements: Politics, …, 2013

China is the largest national source of greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution causing climate change. However, despite some rhetorical progress at the 2011 Durban climate conference, it has consistently rejected calls to take on binding targets to reduce its GHG emissions. The Chinese Government has understandably argued that developed states are responsible for the predominant share of historical GHG emissions, have greater capacity to pay for the cost of mitigation, and indeed have an obligation to do so before China is required to take action. However, due to the explosive growth in its GHG emissions, China is now in a position to single-handedly dash any hope of climate stability if its position does not change. On the diplomatic level, other big polluters, particularly the United States, will not enter into new binding agreements to reduce substantially their own GHG emissions without a credible commitment from China. Challenging the “statist” framing of the climate justice, this article explores the possibility for China to take on a leadership role in climate change diplomacy in a way that allows it to maintain its long-standing principled resistance to binding national emissions targets while making meaningful progress toward combating the problem. Action by China’s rapidly growing affluent classes may hold the key to long-term climate stability.

Climate Futures: Reimagining Global Climate Justice, 2019

This chapter starts with a brief summary of the main shifts in the Chinese government’s general attitudes on climate change and justice, and then explains the main non-state actors and NGOs in the field and their main contribution to voicing alternative opinions. Juxtaposing both governmental and non-governmental climate initiatives sheds light on the fact that NGOs are late comers and less than junior partners, in contrast with governmental agencies, in China’s climate politics. In addition to pointing out this general pattern of political dynamics and the unfinished task of merging climate policy discourse with general discussions on political reform and social justice in the country, at the end of this chapter I call attention to a number of issue areas in China that could present more visible evidence of differentiated vulnerabilities to climate change in future.

In an increasingly globalized world climate change is becoming an ever-pressing matter. A 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that climate changes threatens to destabilize ecosystems, weaken food security and precipitate severe water shortages (IPCC, 2007). Because of this and the effects of globalization, environmental issues have become increasingly prominent on the international agenda over the last fifty years. As environmental problems transcend national boundaries, they come to be a feature of international politics. This situation is rendered all the more unsustainable by the rise of new pollutants, like China and India (Vogler, 2011, p. 348). China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over the last decades. Even though this is generally seen as a good thing, the rapid economic development also has its downside. In recent years a serious degradation of the environment took place in China (Wang, 2007). China is the biggest emitter of carbon emissions in the world. Emissions transcend national boundaries, which makes this a global problem. However, China has been very reluctant to sign treaties or make any form of concessions. Therefore I will analyze the position of China in international climate politics through various theoretical frameworks. In order to explain the position of China two theories are used: classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. The way I would like to conduct my research has led to the following research question: To what extent can China’s position in climate negotiations be explained through classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism? I will use the variable treaties to give my research more focus. I will first map the climate treaties and earlier compliances by China. I will focus on the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen summit. Afterwards I will analyze them through a realist and neoliberal institutionalist perspective. However, before I can answer my research question it must first be identified what the effects are of the Chinese position to international climate negotiations. Therefore a sub-question needs to be answered first: What are the effects of the Chinese position on climate negotiations? In this sub-question there is an independent and a dependent variable. The independent variable is the Chinese position in climate negotiations, the dependent variable are the effects. After answering this sub-question and examining the variables I can proceed to answer my general research question. The hypothesis to my research question is: the current position of China in international climate negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical realism. In order to answer this question I have divided this article in various sections. Firstly I will provide a description of China’s position in the area of climate politics. I will also look at the effects of china’s position on international climate negotiations. Afterwards I’ll examine the effects, and thirdly I will give a brief description of the theoretical framework of classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. I will apply these theories to climate treaties, in particular to the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen protocol and the effect of these treaties. In this article I argue that the current position of China in international climate negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical realism. This is because climate negotiations take the form of a zero-sum game. Most countries will pursue relative gains. The most important effect of China’s position on international climate negotiations is that they are hindering a solid agreement, but they do however have the capacity to contribute in knowledge and innovative factors.

Journal of Cold War Studies, 2002

In this engaging and informative book, Judith Shapiro takes a sharp, critical look at how development policies and practices under Mao influenced human relationships with the natural world, and considers some consequences of Maoist initiatives for the environment. Drawing on a variety of sources, both written and oral, she guides readers through an historical overview of major political and economic campaigns of the Maoist era, and their impact on human lives and the natural environment. This is a bold and challenging task, not least because such topics remain political sensitive today. Yet the perspective Shapiro offers is refreshing, while the problems she highlights are disturbing, with significant legacies. The political climate of revolutionary China was pervaded by hostile struggle against class enemies, foreign imperialists, Western capitalists, Soviet revisionists, and numerous other antagonists. Under Mao and the communists, "the notion was propagated that China would pick itself up after its long history of humiliation by imperialist powers, become self-reliant in the face of international isolation, and regain strength in the world" (p.6). Militarization was to be a vehicle through which Mao would attempt to forge a 'New China.' His period of rule was marked by a protracted series of mass mobilization campaigns, based around the fear of perceived threats, external or internal. Even nature, Shapiro argues, was portrayed in a combative and militaristic rhetoric as an obstacle or enemy to overcome. While traditional philosophies had espoused 'Harmony between Heaven and Humans,' the slogan 'Humans Must Conquer Nature' came to epitomize attitudes and actions during the Mao years. This was an era when "human will was considered more powerful than objective scientific law" and political dogma held that "the earth could be miraculously transformed through ideologically motivated determination" (p.197). Shapiro suggests that Maoism rejected tradition as well as Western science, yet embraced the modernist conception of human:nature separation, creating a situation in which the human and environmental costs of living in opposition to nature were "transparent and extreme" (p.xii). Focusing on "coercive state behavior" during the Mao years, Shapiro argues political campaigns of mass mobilization, class struggle, and political repression contributed to severe environmental damage. She contends that people participated, enthusiastically or reluctantly, because of the ideological hegemony and coercive power of Maoist authority. Indeed, the "hypothesis" Shapiro seeks to explore in this book is that "abuse of people and abuse of nature are often interrelated" (p.xiv). Her conclusions may be read as emphatic confirmations. To support her thesis, Shapiro presents several "particularly telling" or "representative" cases that highlight the dynamics of "anthropogenic environmental degradation" in Maoist China. These are organized into four chapters, focusing on 'core themes:' political repression, utopian urgency, dogmatic uniformity, and stateorchestrated population relocations. Each chapter addresses development initiatives and their environmental consequences in the context of specific campaigns of mass mobilization, although political repression is a metatheme that unites each case study. First, Shapiro relates how the suppression of intellectual dissent following the Hundred Flowers movement stifled scientific critics, contributing to a series of policy actions with far-reaching environmental consequences, including China's current population pressures and controversial hydroprojects. Next, Shapiro addresses the impact of the Great Leap Forward, when collective mobilization was fuelled by fanatic idealism, and forests and birds fell to fantastical schemes to boost production in a 'war against nature' that was propagandized in explicitly military terms. The Cultural Revolution provides the context for her third chapter, which focuses on the struggle for grain and the rigid formalism manifest in the national emulation of the Dazhai agricultural model and in the destruction of the Dianchi wetlands near Kunming. The fourth chapter examines urgent war preparations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly the construction of a new inland strategic base area or 'Third Front,' as well as the compulsory relocation of 'educated youth' and former Red Guards to help develop China's frontiers. Shapiro concludes by considering the legacies of the Maoist era in the commercialization of contemporary China, suggesting elements of traditional philosophy and liberal democracy may best contribute to sound environmental management. Familiar with the impact of Maoist politics on Chinese society, Shapiro based her research for this particular book on a wide variety of source material. Some of this was collected during visits to

Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 2018

China has assumed a crucial importance in debates about climate change mitigation. On the one hand, China is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gasses and pollution. On the other, it has invested more in renewable energy than any other country and is making real efforts to address the consequences of rapid industrialisation. There are three key questions for students of comparative political economy that emerge from the Chinese experience: first, what is the relationship between economic development and authoritarian rule? Second, what role has China’s distinct social and political system played in creating and addressing environmental problems? Third, what domestic and international implications does the ‘China model’ have? In short, will China’s authoritarian leaders be able to manage the expectations of its own people and those of the so called international community? This article considers the often paradoxical and contradictory nature of the authoritarian Chinese government’s current environmental policies and suggests that while they may have some success at the domestic level, they may still be an obstacle to international cooperation.

Journal of Political Ecology

This review critiques Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro’s China Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet (2020). The authors explore what it means for the world’s longest-lasting authoritarian state to pursue “ecological civilization.” This is an important work that recasts the trade-offs of tackling catastrophic climate change.

Journal of Political Ecology, 2001

In this engaging and informative book, Judith Shapiro takes a sharp, critical look at how development policies and practices under Mao influenced human relationships with the natural world, and considers some consequences of Maoist initiatives for the environment. Drawing on a variety of sources, both written and oral, she guides readers through an historical overview of major political and economic campaigns of the Maoist era, and their impact on human lives and the natural environment. This is a bold and challenging task, not least because such topics remain political sensitive today. Yet the perspective Shapiro offers is refreshing, while the problems she highlights are disturbing, with significant legacies. The political climate of revolutionary China was pervaded by hostile struggle against class enemies, foreign imperialists, Western capitalists, Soviet revisionists, and numerous other antagonists. Under Mao and the communists, "the notion was propagated that China would pick itself up after its long history of humiliation by imperialist powers, become self-reliant in the face of international isolation, and regain strength in the world" (p.6). Militarization was to be a vehicle through which Mao would attempt to forge a 'New China.' His period of rule was marked by a protracted series of mass mobilization campaigns, based around the fear of perceived threats, external or internal. Even nature, Shapiro argues, was portrayed in a combative and militaristic rhetoric as an obstacle or enemy to overcome. While traditional philosophies had espoused 'Harmony between Heaven and Humans,' the slogan 'Humans Must Conquer Nature' came to epitomize attitudes and actions during the Mao years. This was an era when "human will was considered more powerful than objective scientific law" and political dogma held that "the earth could be miraculously transformed through ideologically motivated determination " (p.197). Shapiro suggests that Maoism rejected tradition as well as Western science, yet embraced the modernist conception of human:nature separation, creating a situation in which the human and environmental costs of living in opposition to nature were "transparent and extreme" (p.xii). Focusing on "coercive state behavior" during the Mao years, Shapiro argues political campaigns of mass mobilization, class struggle, and political repression contributed to severe environmental damage. She contends that people participated, enthusiastically or reluctantly, because of the ideological hegemony and coercive power of Maoist authority. Indeed, the "hypothesis" Shapiro seeks to explore in this book is that "abuse of people and abuse of nature are often interrelated" (p.xiv). Her conclusions may be read as emphatic confirmations. To support her thesis, Shapiro presents several "particularly telling" or "representative" cases that highlight the dynamics of "anthropogenic environmental degradation" in Maoist China. These are organized into four chapters, focusing on 'core themes:' political repression, utopian urgency, dogmatic uniformity, and stateorchestrated population relocations. Each chapter addresses development initiatives and their environmental consequences in the context of specific campaigns of mass mobilization, although political repression is a metatheme that unites each case study. First, Shapiro relates how the suppression of intellectual dissent following the Hundred Flowers movement stifled scientific critics, contributing to a series of policy actions with far-reaching environmental consequences, including China's current population pressures and controversial hydroprojects. Next, Shapiro addresses the impact of the Great Leap Forward, when collective mobilization was fuelled by fanatic idealism, and forests and birds fell to fantastical schemes to boost production in a 'war against nature' that was propagandized in explicitly military terms. The Cultural Revolution provides the context for her third chapter, which focuses on the struggle for grain and the rigid formalism manifest in the national emulation of the Dazhai agricultural model and in the destruction of the Dianchi wetlands near Kunming. The fourth chapter examines urgent war preparations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly the construction of a new inland strategic base area or 'Third Front,' as well as the compulsory relocation of 'educated youth' and former Red Guards to help develop China's frontiers. Shapiro concludes by considering the legacies of the Maoist era in the commercialization of contemporary China, suggesting elements of traditional philosophy and liberal democracy may best contribute to sound environmental management. Familiar with the impact of Maoist politics on Chinese society, Shapiro based her research for this particular book on a wide variety of source material. Some of this was collected during visits to China in 1998China in , 1999China in , and 2000, when she conducted interviews (many with former participants in these campaigns), and delivered a series of volunteer lectures on environmental philosophy and international environmental politics. Shapiro makes extensive use of secondary sources, official and popular, scholarly and literary, published and unpublished. These include newspapers and magazines, scholarly studies and unpublished doctoral dissertations, journalistic accounts and semifictionalized 'reportage literature,' autobiographies and memoirs, as well as a number of "insightful and factual" Chinese-language works (often claiming 'inside' knowledge of the leadership) that appeared in the 1990s. She also makes extensive reference to Mao's own writings and speeches, as well as to statements attributed to various Chinese Communist Pary (CCP) leaders and officials. Shapiro's first chapter, "Population, Dams, and Political Repression," concerns the 1957 Anti-Rightist campaign, and the suppression of intellectual dissent following the Hundred Flowers movement. Recounting the development of party-state policies toward intellectuals, Shapiro presents two enlightening case studies of "environmental disasters and the scientists who tried to avert them." Focusing on Ma Yinchu and Huang Wanli, prominent scholars with doctoral degrees from American universities, Shapiro seeks to illustrate how "'knowledge' based on wishful thinking was given primacy over the tested understanding of scientists" (p.60). Her account of these two men, who questioned the appropriateness of development plans favored by Mao, offers insight on two controversial issues facing China today: birth planning policies and grand hydroprojects. Ma Yinchu is perhaps best remembered for his outspoken opposition to Mao's views on population policy, which ascribed to Soviet dogma that contradictions between production and population no longer existed under socialism. Born 1882, Ma had pursued graduate studies in economics at Yale and Columbia under sponsorship of the Qing imperial government, before returning to China in 1916. Hired by Cai Yuanpei to chair the economics department at Beijing University, Ma subsequently served for a time in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government (and later, after criticizing Kuomintang corruption, in its prison camps). Following the communist victory in the civil war, Ma was appointed in 1951 as President of Beijing University, and to the standing committee of the National People's Congress. It was in this capacity that he delivered his 1957 report, 'New Demography,' warning that unchecked population growth might slow economic development. Shapiro recounts the debate over development strategy following the PRC's first national census, conducted in 1953, as part of the First Five Year Plan. The census count, Shapiro reports, was higher than expected, and raised concerns of some authorities. Ma Yinchu's essay, published in the People's Daily, advocated frequent census checks, family planning programs, public education campaigns, later marriages, rewards for small families, and encouraged use of contraceptives (Ma opposed abortion). But his position dissented from Mao's assertion that there were no population problems under socialism, and that China's population was a source of its strength. Shapiro characterizes Ma Yinchu as a man of integrity who was committed to "plain speaking in an age of slogans" (p.38), and who symbolized the freedom of thought and democracy at the university he headed. Criticism of Ma, and pressure on him to retract his report, mounted in the months that followed, and intensified during the Great Leap Forward, when the slogan 'Strength Lies in Numbers' (ren dou liliang da) represented the party line on population policy. Ma steadfastly held to his opinions, but in 1960 he was obliged to resign as Beijing University President, and was effectively 'silenced' and banished from public life until his political 'rehabilitation' in 1979, three years after Mao's death. Shapiro then turns to the case of hydro-engineer Huang Wanli, who vocally opposed plans to dam the Yellow River at Sanmenxia. Noting that political authority and water control have an intimate relationship in Chinese history and legends, Shapiro suggests that Mao's sensitivity to the traditional adage, 'When a great man emerges, the Yellow River will run clear,' was a contributing factor in his support for this controversial project. Huang Wanli had opposed the dam, arguing that its design did not fully consider potential sedimentation problems. Huang published an allegorical tale in a Qinghua University journal, criticizing those who simply said whatever party-state authorities wanted to hear, and which praised Ma Yinchu's wisdom and integrity. Huang's story drew the ire of Mao Zedong, and in 1957 he was harshly criticized in a People's Daily editorial that Shapiro contends signaled the beginning of the Anti-Rightist campaign (Huang was indeed labeled as a 'rightist'; during the subsequent Cultural Revolution, even his children...

The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory, 2015

Asian Studies, 2023

Although climate models predict that global heating will prove more devastating for China than for many other countries, and economic models have shown that a transition to a low-carbon economy would strengthen China in the long run, the Chinese leadership has failed to reduce fossil fuel consumption enough to avoid extremes of weather that are devastating the country. Not long after becoming president, Xi Jinping announced a project to ground “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in selected ideas from ancient Chinese philosophy and culture, promoting it through quotations in his speeches from the Chinese classics, and especially Confucian and Daoist thought. These ideas turn out to be perfectly suited for the ‘reframing’ of worldviews that is required to think more productively about the climate crisis and political measures for dealing with it effectively. However, the Chinese leadership has failed to live up to its inspiring words, and has instead reverted to policies that are more in line with Chinese Legalism and Stalinism than with the Confucian, Daoist, and Marxist ideas that Xi Jinping has advocated. This has dealt a severe blow to China’s standing in the world and a huge loss of ‘soft power’ that previous regimes had accumulated. With the United States a shambles, the way is open for China to follow through on its promotion of traditional Chinese philosophy and take the lead, for the sake of the long-term well-being of its own people, in tackling the climate crisis—and thereby gain the greatest soft power triumph in history.