On the Russian Military Reform: A Rejoinder

Defense & Security Analysis, 2013

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Since its foundation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation has experienced numerous (attempts of) military reforms. Until the restructuring initiated by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 the previous modernisation plans to a large extent have been in vain. In the 1990s, during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, military reforms mainly focussed on troop reductions and changes in the format and number of services. In the first decade of this century, under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the minimalist approach of military restructuring of the previous decade was continued. The only crucial exception was that Putin financially prepared the way for a huge rearmament. Although the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 resulted in a victory for Moscow, it also demonstrated the status in decay of the Russian Armed Forces. Realizing that these shortcomings prevent military power from being a useful tool in Russia’s security policy, soon after this conflict President Medvedev announced huge military reforms. Other than those of his predecessors, his modernisation plans bring about a watershed with the past: a radical change from the traditional large-scale conflict orientated mobilisation army to fully filled, sophisticated equipped and well trained permanent ready forces, aimed at regional power projection. What are the chances that Medvedev’s military reforms will be carried out successfully? And if the modernisation and restructuring of the Russian Armed Forces is (partly) fruitful, does this have any consequences for military build-up and operations of the West and NATO in particular?

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This critical comment examines the incentives, major priorities, difficulties and first results of the Russian military reform that is being implemented since 2008. The authors conclude that despite numerous drawbacks and barriers to the reformist efforts certain successes can be identified. Particularly, there is a clear shift from the old-fashioned, Soviet-type army to a more compact, mobile, better equipped and combat-ready armed forces that are capable to cope with today's challenges to Russian national security.

Caucasian review of international affairs. online, 2008

After years of neglect due to financial constraints, the Russian military has entered a period of systemic development. The ongoing defense reform has introduced a few important changes, but so far the pace of the reform is slow. In order to review the current reform effort, a number of factors - the resistance of the military elite to reform, the demographic factor, the lack of a clear defense doctrine, the restructuring of the defense industry and the state of the civil control over the military - will be analyzed. These limitations will define not only the pace of the defense reform, but also Russia’s ability to play a more active role in the international arena.

The article analyzes the content of military reform in Russia by comparing official course to approach of Soldiers’ Mothers movement. The main thesis is that current reform has reproduced the Soviet vision of the army’s role outside and inside the country – based on fear. SM sees the necessity to change principles of society-military relations within democratic tradition based on respect. The paradoxical result of official military reform is that Russians consider the army to be a threat to their well-being but not a guarantee from external and internal dangers. Modern Russian army raises a fear without respect among its own citizens.

2016

La reforma militar rusa de 2008: ¿una respuesta adecuada a las amenazas y retos del siglo veintiuno? La réforme militaire russe de 2008: une réponse adéquate aux menaces et aux défis du XXIe siècle? A reforma militar russa de 2008: uma resposta adequada às ameaças e desafios do século XXI? Andres Eduardo Fernandez-Osorio a 2008 Russian military reform: An adequate response to global threats and challenges of the twenty-first century? *

This long essay is a modest attempt to reveal to a limited extent how the Red Army which evolved into the Soviet Army has played a historical role in the modern foundations of the modern Russian Federation Army. I have taken two sections of my master's thesis, which was on the Soviet Army beginning with its inciption in 1917 to the Battle of Kursk 1943, as a historical reference as to why the current Russian Army has been deployed into what I term the Great Ukrainian War. Luis Lazaro Tijerina, March 2022

Military Service in Russia - No New Model Army

* Pay and conditions for Russian servicemen, especially those on contract service, have seen substantial recent improvements. * Continuing high-profile reporting of rights abuses and violence masks initiatives taken to improve rights and welfare. * The move to one-year conscript service will disrupt the system of dedovshchina; but it is unlikely to uproot this kind of bullying altogether as it is not a purely military phenomenon in Russia. * The Russian Armed Forces are not adapting fast enough to the challenges of recruiting professional servicemen.