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Abstract

Ž . This paper develops a model of a laissez-faire decentralized banking system in which banks are shown to both underinvest in, and undertransmit expertise in long-term industrial Ž . finance. Government support for one financial institution ‘the development bank’ can serve to reduce these problems, but unqualified government support alone is not enough. The efficiency of government sponsorship can be enhanced if certain conditions are attached to that sponsorship. Crucially, these include targeting of development bank intervention, co-financing arrangements andror co-ownership with private financial institutions. The relevance of the analysis for LDCs is discussed by contrasting the successful historical development banking experience of France with the more recent unsuccessful experience of Mexico. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: 016; D82; G20