'Gut-madness': Gastrimargia in Plato and beyond

2013

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato's Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato's other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic's Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato's notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic's ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite-a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation-is an essential part of this account. Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus.

In David Keyt and Christopher Shields (eds.), Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy - Studies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Honor of Fred D. Miller, Jr. Cham: Springer., 2024

In his much-explored argument for the tripartition of the soul in book 4 of the Republic, Socrates makes use of two principles, which I shall call the principle of opposition and the principle of qualification. The aim of the present paper is to explain, in particular, the second of these principles, so as to reveal its role in that argument and in the conception of an appetite and of the appetitive part that is central to the larger argument of the Republic as a whole. Section 1 briefly introduces the principle of opposition, analyzes the principle of qualification, and presents the argument for tripartition. Section 2 uses the analysis of the principle of qualification to interpret a claim Socrates makes about the soul and its relation to the good, which seems at odds with the account of appetites uncovered in section 1. Then, in section 3, the relevance of the principle of qualification to Socratic intellectualism-the view that knowledge is sufficient for virtue-is explored. In section 4, appetites are returned to with the focus now on the varieties of them that Socrates recognizes. In section 5, a view is put forward about the nature of the appetitive part (Appetite), its beliefs, and its ability to be persuaded by the rational part (Reason). In * This paper is a small token of my gratitude to Fred Miller for his inspiring work on Aristotle's Politics, for his translation of De Anima and Parva Naturalia, and for his personal kindness. Readers are encouraged to consult his excellent paper on the parts of the soul, Miller (1999). 2 section 6, it is argued that Appetite and Reason are both souls, capable of working in harmony, but also of being opposed, thereby underwriting an important part of the analogy between the polis and the soul on which much of the Republic relies. 1 1 The Principle of Opposition, the Principle of Qualification, and the Argument for Tripartition Once justice and the other virtues have been found in Kallipolis, the polis Socrates and the others are founding in words (369c9-10), the task of finding them in the soul is taken up, and with it the task of showing that there are parts in the soul corresponding to the three classes-producers, guardians, and philosopher-kings 2 (435b4-c5). Central to it is the principle of opposition, which is formulated as follows: It is clear that the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things; not, at any rate, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find that happening here, we will know that we are not dealing with one and the same thing, but with many. (436b9-c2) Though the principle of opposition looks, at least, relatively clear as it stands, Socrates spends some time making it "more exact" (436c9), by going through objections to it. 3 1 I cite and translate the Oxford Classical Texts editions of Plato's and (in one instance) Aristotle's works. Unidentified references are to the Republic. 2 At this point, the latter two are called "auxiliaries" and "complete guardians" (414b1-5), since the philosopher-kings are not introduced until book 7 (535a6-536d1). 3 An excellent discussion of the principle of opposition, and of rival interpretations of what Plato intends it to do, is Christopher Bobonich (2002), pp. 219-35.

Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, 2014

This essay provides an overview of Plato’s contribution to food ethics. Drawing on various Platonic dialogues, the discussion includes an analysis of the problem of gluttony and the correlate virtue of moderation, the diet of the Republic’s ideal city, and the harmonious order of the tripartite soul.

SUMMARY WRITING THE HISTORY OF FATNESS AND THINNESS IN GRAECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY Fatness and thinness has been a much underexploited topic in the study of classical Antiquity. After carefully analyzing the Greek and Roman vocabulary to denote the matter, I catalogue information on concrete instances of persons who were considered to have suffered from overweight, or emaciation. On a second level, I deal with popular mentality regarding overweight or thinness. Thirdly, medical and/or philosophical theory regarding weight problems are studied. In this, the moral discourse linking obesity with gluttony or weakness and avarice with underweight will be studied. I will also ask whether changed Christian attitudes towards the body and bodily functions lead to new concepts regarding the matter. For these different levels of questions, I take into account concepts of disability history, asking whether the obviously impairing factors of excess weight or the opposite of it lead to social disfunctionality, hindering people from important social functions and subjecting them to social stigma.

There is nothing more compliant to the nourishment of Man than human flesh -but for the abomination that Nature has of it.

Like many philosophers before them, Plutarch and Porphyry refused to eat animals, but unlike their predecessors, each sets out numerous arguments in favour of vegetarianism in their writings. Their arguments are many and varied. Some tell us that we should not eat animals because killing and eating them makes us more likely to kill and eat human beings, some tell us that it is because human beings may reincarnate as animals, others tell us that it is because animals are rational creatures that are owed moral consideration from humans, and yet others say that it is because meat-eating has negative effects on the bodies and souls of human meat-eaters. Notably, while in some cases, meat-eating is presented as wrong because of what it does to animals, in others, it is so only because of what it does to human beings. In the following paper, I argue that Plutarch and Porphyry are, in fact, more concerned about the effect that meat-eating has on human beings than they are about the effect that it has on non-human animals. In particular, they consider meat-eating an act of human intemperance, which distracts one's higher soul from contemplation of the Platonic forms. Thus, while their reasoning results in a number of practical recommendations regarding the treatment of animals, the Platonists are not particularly concerned about the fate of the animals themselves.

Journal of Ancient Philosophy

According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic ‘force’). I then offer an explanation of Plato’s lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues.

Israel Affairs, 2019

The writings of ancient Greece and Rome and of biblical Israel are filled with descriptions of food. Tellingly, the narratives in Greek and Roman mythology and poetry often describe violent and repulsive behavior. The biblical narratives, in contrast, tend to view food in a respectful and purposeful manner. This article compares and contrasts some of these stories with regard to the specific themes mentioned in its title: restraint, respect, purpose, and order. In each comparison, patterns of eating described in biblical laws and narratives will be contrasted with those emerging from Graeco-Roman stories and customs.

This article draws on qualitative research inside one UK secular commercial weight loss group to show how ancient Christian suspicions of appetite and pleasure resurface in this group’s language of “Syn.” Following ancient Christian representations of sin, members assume that Syn depicts disorder and that fat is a visible sign of a body which has fallen out of place. Syn, though, is ambiguous, utilizing ancient theological meanings to discipline fat while containing within it the power to resist the very borders which hold women’s bodies and fat in place. Syn thus signals both the dangers and powers of disordered eating.

Revista Archai, 2020

The preparation of food and nutrition is a pervasive techne in the classical Greek world. Indeed, food technology may be a defining characteristic of humanity (Levi-Strauss, 1964). We begin with a glimpse of a tension in the use of the word techne in relation to the preparation of food in Plato’s Gorgias 462d-e. Turning to the Presocratics, we discern three distinct perspectives on food, those of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the treatise Regimen (Περὶ Διαίτης). In Regimen, we find an anticipation of the distinctions made by Plato in the Gorgias passage, and trace some of the implications in what we may call the “food technology” of this treatise that manages to be both philosophical and technically informative.