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2022, Digital Capitalism and Distributive Forces
So far, we are still searching for a digital capitalism that is analytically defined by more than its digital means (see Chapter 2). Marx would associate the altered, now digital means with the level of phenomena, the materiality of which must by all means be taken seriously. And yet, he would only proclaim a new stage of capitalism if the economic principles as such had altered in some way or another. Consequently, our search ought to continue by investigating what lies 'behind' the phenomena and venturing into the domain of economic principles. At the same time, the fundamental economic principles of capitalism must remain in place to some extent if the term capitalism is still to apply. At least with regard to use value and exchange value, we have seen that this is the case (see Chapter 3): both sides of value and their relation to one another do not disappear in digital capitalism; instead, what becomes clear, quite paradoxically, is that human labour continues to be the crucial factor for the generation of exchange value and the appropriation of use value even in the (allegedly) new type of capitalism. And indeed, some intriguing shifts do become apparent. However, one question raised by all diagnoses of digital capitalism remains unanswered: what new aspect is really underlying the fact that many things are becoming (more) digital? What would be the justification for a discourse on digital capitalism in which the 'digital' were to refer not only to the-without question, utterly dramatic-otherness of the means, but also signal a more fundamental economic shift within capitalism? The platform economy, as a new form of marketplace, appears to constitute an important-yet inconclusive-response by digital capitalism. Whether or not we are seeing only a temporary formation of monopolies, which may be swiftly brought under control by government regulation and market competition-both of which constitute common self-descriptions of democratic states and economic actors-is impossible to say at this point. 1 For now, it seems promising to continue
The Political Economy of Digital Monopolies, 2021
The Introduction opens with contextual factors surrounding digital monopolies and a set of research questions addressed in subsequent chapters. The key problem relates to the fact that there are few alternatives to companies providing web searching, social networking and online retailing in much of the Western world regardless of the nominally competitive character of their economies. The argument then moves to briefly introduce value form and social form approaches in comparison to other Marxian approaches such as cognitive capitalism and digital labour. Regardless of advances in computing technology the chapter closes by arguing that capitalism remains the same mode of production based on surplus value extraction.
International Critical Thought, 2021
This article discusses digitalization and its connection with the political economy of transformation. Its point of departure is Karl Polanyi's historical analysis as presented in The Great Transformation. Polanyi analyzed the development of "self-regulating" markets-with transformative and destructive consequences for individuals, nature, and society-and government efforts to contain these consequences. Polanyi's perspective is compared to Marx's theorem of the development of productive forces. Their respective focal points are different but complementary. For Polanyi, the decisive historical and theoretical break (and the cause of the destructive effects) lies in the act of purchasing human labor, whereas for Marx it lies in the act of producing value and in the relations of production as well as the relations of distribution linked to it. Working from this theoretical basis, current developments in digitalization are analyzed not as a further development within productive forces but as a transforming development of distributive forces. Following the logic of The Great Transformation, current developments should thus not be interpreted as a second great transformation but as the augmentation of the first, leading to a "greater" transformation associated with even more destructive potential. This leaves little hope for a smooth transition into any form of post-growth society.
Prometheus, 2023
Critical Review of Digital Capitalism and Distributive Forces by Sabine Pfeiffer (2022). Pfeiffer's analysis of "Digital Capitalism" provides a plausible account for the development of the current economic paradigm. On her account, what has changed primarily in the digital era are "distributive" forces rather than productive, such as advertising and marketing, transport and warehousing, and control and prediction. One of the underexplored implications of her work is that the profit needed to sustain capitalism is nearing crisis, as there are decreasing ways to enhance profit generation.
Theorists of post capitalism have recently argued for a more or less inevitable end to capitalism. They assume that private accumulation is systematically blocked by the inability of capitalist corporations to create revenues by setting prices as they lose control over the reproduction of their commodities and that in this process, capitalist labour will eventually disappear. Drawing on a case study of Amazon and thoughts on the policies of other leading digital corporations, we challenge these assumptions. Key corporate players of digitization are trying to become powerful monopolies and have partly succeeded in doing so, using the network effects and scaling opportunities of digital goods and building socio-technical ecosystems. These strategies have led to the development of in part isomorphic structures, hence creating a situation of oligopolistic market competition. We draw on basic assumptions of monopoly capital theory to argue that in this situation labour process rationalization becomes key to the corporation's competitive strategies. We see the expansion of digital control and the organizational structures applied by key corporate players of the digital economy as evidence for the expansion of capitalist labour, not its reduction.
X-Texte zu Kultur und Gesellschaft, 2022
Are robots taking away our jobs? Those who ask this question have misunderstood digitalisation - it is not an industrial revolution by other means. Sabine Pfeiffer searches for the actual novelties brought about by digitalisation and digital capitalism. In her analysis, she juxtaposes Marx's concept of productive force with the idea of distributive force. From the platform economy to artificial intelligence, Pfeiffer shows that digital capitalism is less about the efficient production of value, but rather about its fast, risk-free, and permanently secured realisation on the markets. The examination of this dynamic and its consequences also leads to the question of how destructive the distributive forces of digital capitalism might be.
2016
Anything that can be automated, will be. The “magic” that digital technology has brought us — self-driving cars, Bitcoin, high frequency trading, the internet of things, social networking, mass surveillance, the 2009 housing bubble — has not been considered from an ideological perspective. The Critique of Digital Capitalism identifies how digital technology has captured contemporary society in a reification of capitalist priorities, and also describes digital capitalism as an ideologically “invisible” framework that is realized in technology. Written as a series of articles between 2003 and 2015, the book provides a broad critical scope for understanding the inherent demands of capitalist protocols for expansion without constraint (regardless of social, legal or ethical limits) that are increasingly being realized as autonomous systems that are no longer dependent on human labor or oversight and implemented without social discussion of their impacts. The digital illusion of infinite resources, infinite production, and no costs appears as an “end to scarcity,” whereby digital production supposedly eliminates costs and makes everything equally available to everyone. This fantasy of production without consumption hides the physical costs and real-world impacts of these technologies. The critique introduced in this book develops from basic questions about how digital technologies directly change the structure of society: why is “Digital Rights Management” not only the dominant “solution” for distributing digital information, but also the only option being considered? During the burst of the “Housing Bubble” burst 2009, why were the immaterial commodities being traded of primary concern, but the actual physical assets and the impacts on the people living in them generally ignored? How do surveillance (pervasive monitoring) and agnotology (culturally induced ignorance or doubt, particularly the publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific data) coincide as mutually reinforcing technologies of control and restraint? If technology makes the assumptions of its society manifest as instrumentality — then what ideology is being realized in the form of the digital computer? This final question animates the critical framework this analysis proposes. Digital capitalism is a dramatically new configuration of the historical dynamics of production, labor and consumption that results in a new variant of historical capitalism. This contemporary, globalized network of production and distribution depends on digital capitalism’s refusal of established social restraints: existing laws are an impediment to the transcendent aspects of digital technology. Its utopian claims mask its authoritarian result: the superficial “objectivity” of computer systems are supposed to replace established protections with machinic function — the uniform imposition of whatever ideology informs the design. However, machines are never impartial: they reify the ideologies they are built to enact. The critical analysis of capitalist ideologies as they become digital is essential to challenging this process. Contesting their domination depends on theoretical analysis. This critique challenges received ideas about the relationship between labor, commodity production and value, in the process demonstrating how the historical Marxist analysis depends on assumptions that are no longer valid. This book therefore provides a unique, critical toolset for the analysis of digital capitalist hegemonics. This open access publication contains the full text of the book.
Review of International Political Economy, 1997
Pre-copy-edited version: 'Capitalism and its future: remarks on regulation, government, and governance ', Review of International Political Economy, 4 (3), 435-455.
Sociologia, 2020
Digital platforms disrupt – not just incumbent industries, but also academic imaginations about the future course of capitalism. While some scholars envision the next great transformation towards the ultimate marketization, others anticipate a post-capitalism based on digitally revitalized notions of community and reciprocity. Starting from this controversy, the article advances a Polanyian perspective to push beyond the ostensibly antagonistic dynamics of more or less market. More specifically, the emergence of digital platforms is perceived from the angle of three key drivers that propelled the great transformation towards marketization: technology, science, state. While the break-through of marketization, in Polanyi’s view, was prompted by the steam engine, the emergence of platforms is driven by the digital infrastructures of cloud computing, big data and algorithms; and while markets were scientifically legitimized by economics, platforms deploy network theories that, through t...
This paper talks about the evolution of capitalism starting with Adam Smith model of this system as a framework that improves opportunities for all.However, the majority of the paper covers Karl Marx insights about capitalism and several articles are discussed as well along the piece to support Marx's view. At the end the analysis about capitalism made by Marx is very realistic as he talks about the the deprivation of freedom, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, and the conflict existing between social classes. However, his argument can not be set as " the right way to see capitalism " as this one has proved to be way better his idea of socialism which has been already tried by several countries that up to date live in an endless poverty.
Ctheory, 2010
On June 17th 2010, a new CTheory Global Online Seminar on Critical Digital Studies was launched with a discussion of the "Future of Digital Capitalism." Seminar discussion was based on a CTheory article by Michael Betancourt, "Immaterial Value and Scarcity in Digital Capitalism." Live commentaries were provided by Arthur Kroker and Simon Glezos. What follows are the two commentaries as well as a formal response by Michael Betancourt.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2004
2015
This essay tries to outline the general aspects of a political agenda for a gradual transition to a commons-oriented, social knowledge economy. In doing so, we first articulate some transitional proposals concerning both the micro-economic and the macro-economic levels, shedding light on the concept of the “partner state”. Next, a discussion follows that attempts to argue why our proposals would imply post-capitalist developments, as well as to explain the role of the capitalist sector in such a scenario. We, then, conclude by addressing some issues for future research and action.
AntePodium, 2002
In recent times much has been said about the possibility of online discourse revitalizing democracy by extending the public sphere at large. However, many commentators now fear that this democratisation is being restricted by the Internet's privatisation and commercialisation. This paper provides a general assessment of the threat presented by corporate power to the extension of the public sphere through cyberspace. I first establish the extent of corporate ownership and control of the Internet. I then examine the limitations that this ownership and control poses to online democratic interaction by looking at issues of access, monopoly formation, commercialisation, and the development of the Internet's form.
Since 1994 when the first browsers made their appearance the internet became the ‚new medium' par excellence. As is always the case with new media, there was an intense discussion about the future usage and effects of the new technology. One of the central arguments of this discussion was that the new medium might solve the problems of capitalism-Bill Gates coined the phrase ‚frictionless capitalism'. In the first part of my paper some of these discourses are analyzed. These discourses, often publicly uttered by conservative and liberal politicians, try to construct the internet as commercial medium solving problems of late capitalism. But already the dotcom-crash 2001 hinted at problems with that construction. In the second part there is a discussion of a special interpretation of Marx' theory of capitalist crisis. It is arguedalso with recourse to Norbert Wiener-that the internet is part of the third industrial revolution which might lead to a very deep and even terminal crisis of capitalism. Instead of solving the problems of capitalism the internet might deepen them. We are witnessing since 2008 a chain of ever increasing symptoms of a deep crisis. By using Marx' approach some of the important effects of the new medium can be described far more accurately than does the unreflected euphoria of Gates and others.
Fast Capitalism, 2007
This paper revisits Habermas's notion of 'technology as ideology' in the context of contemporary political culture. It argues that the methodological and substantive contours of Habermas's framework are still valid today. However, the role that technology plays as ideology has changed dramatically in the context of contemporary capitalism. No longer does it provide a legitimation for the political administration of the economy in the context of the Social Democratic state; instead, it legitimizes a new, neoliberal regime, whereby political intervention in the workings of the market is highly prohibited. This argument is substantiated with an empirical analysis of contemporary discourse on information technology, or the 'digital discourse'. It shows how neoliberal tenets regarding the workings of the market are rearticulated as technological realities, and their ideological undercurrents are neutralized. According to this digital discourse, with information technology the promise of a self-regulating market has been materialized. As the market becomes more rational and frictionless by the force of information technology it also gains and further deserves more autonomy from political intervention. This new (network) 'technology as ideology', therefore, legitimizes key processes entailed in the shift from a Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal state: the insulation of the market from political intervention and the corollary trends of the marketization of society and the disorganization of the economy. The last few decades have been marked by a new constellation of power between markets and states, and market and society, with markets becoming increasingly disembedded from society (Polanyi 2001; Harvey 2005). This disembeddedness-part of a broader social transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism-is dominated by two trends: marketization and disorganization: Marketization entails the increasing dominance and scope of markets in social life: markets have gained more autonomy vis-à-vis the state, becoming more deregulated, and more globalized (Castells 1996; Sassen 1999); the state withdrew not only from intervening in the workings of the market, but also from ownership of "the commanding heights" (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998) of the economy through privatization as well as the funding and operation of many welfare mechanisms that were put in place in order to provide a buffer zone between individuals and the market (Piven and Cloward 1997); more and more spheres of social life are being administered by the free market or modeled after a market-like rationale (Somers and Block 2005); there has been a trend of privatization of risks and responsibility from the state to individuals; there has also been a process of privatization in the world of work, where a class compact has been substituted by individual contracts; the decline of market regulation and downward income redistribution has also led to an increase in class inequality within national boundaries and between nation states (Harvey 2005; Milanovic 2007). Disorganization (Offe 1985; Lash and Urry 1988)-partially a consequence of the marketization of society-refers to a process whereby markets, the economy, and social life in general have become more liquid (Bauman 2000), more chaotic and complex (Urry 2002); the globalization of financial markets has made capital more mobile, leaving local markets more volatile and unstable as a result (Sassen 1999; Harvey 2005; Sennet 2006); production has become more flexible, constantly adapting to changing markets' demands; production and consumption cycles have been accelerating (Harvey 1989; Rosa 2003; Agger 2004); companies have shifted in their organization from a model of a top-down hierarchized bureaucracy to a horizontal, dehierarchized, and decentralized network (Castells 1996; Sennet 2006); flexible, lean, 'just-in-time' production has made work-life more "mean" (Harriso, 1997), and increasingly precarious, unstable, and unpredictable (Bauman 2001, chap. 2); tenured workers are replaced by part-timers and flexitimers, working on ad-hoc projects, rather than developing a linear career path (Castells 1996; Sennet 2000); and economic risks (as well as spoils) have been individualized (Beck 1992;
Frontiers in Political Science 6, 2024
The idea of the inextricable relation between the capital and the state has again become popular since the financial crisis of 2008-09. Political analysis needs to focus on this trend that is related to a much more comprehensive and intrusive restructuring of the capital-state relationship in the digital era. In order to explore this form of capitalism, the article seeks to bring to the fore in an innovative way input from political capitalism’s literature.
Over the past three decades, technological evolution has profoundly reshaped the architecture of global powers, triggering many changes in society and in the life of institutions. In particular, the spread of the Internet has led to the growth of new entities, so-called G-techs, which have progressively acquired a dominant role in the world and have become de facto supranational actors. These new economic actors are characterized by a financial and influential capacity that sometimes exceeds that of many nation-states. Furthermore, we cannot overlook the conditioning of public power by private powers, so much so that the problem no longer appears to be merely to regulate and limit the latter, but to defend public power from the risk of being "caught" within the net of private powers. In addition, these companies have progressively built their own governance structures, dispute resolution systems, as well as embryonic forms of "private jurisdiction". This is the case, for example, of the dispute resolution function, which can be carried out by alternative remedies to litigation (this happens with, say, e-Bay workers) or by ad hoc bodies (think about the Facebook Oversight Board).
Journal of Economic Issues
Conceived in the 1930s as a way to renew free market liberalism, neoliberal doctrines aim to institute a competitive order that would regulate the market as well as society. Yet, interpretations of how competition should be enforced have varied throughout history. The European Union, with its ordoliberal origins, tends to follow an interventionist approach while the United States, where the Chicago School has gained influence, fears that inadequate public interventions may diminish global efficiency. The digital revolution and the appearance of the Tech Giants introduces a new challenge. Faced with massive increasing returns to scale, the competition authorities initially reduced their interventionism to enjoy more market efficiency. But the emergence of digital platforms and the will to protect personal data from abusive uses pushes them now to adopt a new strategy for more interventions that goes beyond the economic and efficiency issues. This paper argues that the neoliberal vision is no longer accurate to regulate the digital economy. It shows that the platform economy is not an alternative way to manage the market, but an alternative to the market itself. To face these issues, a completely new conception of public regulation is therefore needed.
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