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On the proper treatment of connectionism

1988, Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models and neural models. The explanations of behavior provided are like those traditional in the physical sciences, unlike the explanations provided by symbolic models.Higher-level analyses of these connectionist models reveal subtle relations to symbolic models. Parallel connectionist memory and linguistic processes are hypothesized to give rise to processes that are describable at a higher level as sequential rule appli...

Key takeaways

  • In particular, much of the work in formal linguistics differs from the symbolic paradigm in cognitive modeling in many of the same ways as the connectionist Smolensky: Proper treatment of connectionism approach I will consider; on a number ofthe dimensions I will ose to divide the symbolic and subsymbolic paradigms, much linguistics research falls on the subsymbolic side.
  • (16) The competence to represent and process linguistic structures in a native language is a competence ofthe human intuitive processor; the subsymbolic paradigm assumes that this competence can be modeled in a subconceptual connectionist dynamical system.
  • 4 that "the competence to represent and process linguistic structures in a native language is a competence of the human intuitive processor, so the subsymbolic paradigm assumes that this competence can be modeled in a subconceptual connectionist dynamical system," By competence Smolensky means ability, I assume.
  • Smolensky compares neUl'al and connectionist architectures along a variety of dimensions (Table 1 in target article), and the lesson he draws from this comparison is that the subsymbolic and neural levels are conceptually distinct.
  • There is no reason why the subsymbolic connectionist model, which is approximately instantiated by the neural structure at some level of description, might not be an implementation of a symbolic model, which is instantiated at a higher level of description.