Winnicott and the (un)integrated self

2018

The purpose of this article is to develop the assumption that Winnicott’s work can correspond to a possible realization of the elaboration project of a non-naturalistic scientific psychology, as it is found in phenomenology and modern existentialism philosophical conceptions. After distinguishing the clinical aspects of these philosophical propositions, I try to show that Winnicott, on one hand, rejects the use of naturalistic metapsychological speculations, on the other hand, reformulates the ontological model of psychoanalysis, introducing the notion of being; additionally, he introduced a notion of health and redescribed the theory of socioemotional development of the human being, focusing on dependency relationships. Such changes would place psychoanalysis in a non-naturalistic epistemological framework, in accordance with the philosophical influences above mentioned, changing at the same time the psychoanalytical practice itself, both in its objectives and handling.

The article focuses on the consequences of Winnicott's style for his work and for the psychoanalysis inspired by his work. Within this framework, the article discusses possibilities and deadlocks for an appropriation of Winnicott's work and the complex relation between his work and dogmatism, formation, innovation and filiation.

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2016

Dr. Spelman, who has published previously on the contributions of D.W. Winnicott, offers in this volume a vibrant, alive appreciation of the application of Winnicott's theories, with a rich section devoted to "baby observation." The fact alone that Spelman uses the term "baby observation" rather than "infant observation" conveys the naturalness and humanism of her devotion to Winnicott's work, her recognition of the naturalness and humanism of his approach to understanding development relationally. The book is organized in six chapters, the first four focusing on a major aspect of Winnicott's thinking, transitional space, in relation to the origins of his theories, and the importance of transitional space in the child's developing independence from the original object, while maintaining relationality. The last two chapters are journal entries of baby observation, bringing theory alive, as it is connected so intimately to what actually can be seen, noted, interpreted. This is of major importance, because so many psychoanalytic institutes offer excellent education in the theory of psychoanalysis, and clinical experience with adults, but do not offer courses in infant observation. If indeed those psychoanalytic institutes ever do offer such courses, I hope they will call them baby observation courses. Adding to the charm of this humanistic and scholarly book is how personal the writing is. Spelman begins not with a preface alone, nor a prologue alone, but both. She begins, in the preface, by saying, "This book marks many beginnings. It retraces the beginning of my personal journey as a psychodynamic psychotherapist and my simultaneous discovery of the thinking of D.W. Winnicott (1896-1971), paediatrician, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, communicator, broadcaster, and writer" (p. xiii). Part of the charm of this statement is that she has more than three decades of clinical experience, and retains her joy in her discoveries, and her journey. Her statement evokes the title of a book, Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind (1970), as she still retains the eagerness of her beginner's mind. Spelman's ability to resonate with Winnicott's vast contribution to psychoanalysis and child studies, communicates to the reader, and in such a way that it is clear she is not idealizing him, but using him, in the spirit of Winnicott's famous essay, "The Use of an Object" (1969). In that essay, Winnicott relates the concept of the infant's use of an object to the infant's capacity to play. Of course, these are developmental achievements, which we can enjoy in the creative work of adults, and Spelman easily and readily uses her capacity to play, and to use the contributions of Winnicott, in original and creative ways. In the introduction she sketches out the schema of her book, as a mother might introduce one toy at a time, or one new food at a time, to a baby, so that the baby might fully assimilate the offering. Spelman begins with the roots of Winnicott's thinking, his "use of his objects," Freud and Klein, and then leads us to a major area of interest for her, Winnicott's concept of dependence, "absolute dependence," "relative dependence," and "toward

American Imago, 2024

While this article begins by noting the positive role that constructivism has played in the development of psychoanalytic theory over the past 50 years, it also points to the limitations of the approach and argues they must be corrected. For at the same time as constructivism’s criticisms of biologism and essentialism have provided powerful weapons for combating psychoanalytic conservatism, an exclusively constructivist approach has also made it difficult, if not impossible, to address an essential issue for psychoanalysts: namely, the normative basis of the enterprise and the goal(s) of development and treatment. The author claims that Winnicott’s theory provides a way out of this difficulty. For although Winnicott is often construed as a strict constructivist owing to his introduction of the notion of the environment, it is argued that his concept of “inherited potential” retains biological foundation for psychoanalysis while avoiding the dangers of essentialism.

This paper argues for the psychoanalytic relevance of the works of James Gibson and Susanne Langer in explicating the early development of the human child and makes use of this combined formulation of development to think about psychoanalytic theory and practice. From the insights of James Gibson’s ecological psychology we can appreciate the embodiment and embeddedness of the child’s growing mind within both her physical and social environments. Making use of Susanne Langer’s concept of feeling to redefine ecological psychology’s perceptual counterpart to action allows us to understand the child’s seamless transition into active participation in her culture, as she learns to project her animalian capacity to feel into intersubjectively defined forms of behavior and experience with others. The paper presents a lengthy exposition of Gibson’s ecological psychology, before explaining Langer’s thinking and launching into the combined insights of these scholars to explicate the nature of the child’s mind as she feels her way in the world and makes a life for herself within it. This is the life she will be able to remake in the embeddedness of a psychoanalytic therapeutic relationship where she can learn to feel her way in the world in a new light.

British Journal of Psychotherapy, 2009

£19.99.

Revista latinoamericana de psicopatologia fundamental, 2002

The main objective of this paper is to present a unified view of Winnicott’s contribution to psychoanalysis. Part I (Sections 1-4) starts off by recalling that, according to some important commentators, Winnicott introduced a change in paradigms in psychoanalysis. In order to show that this change can be viewed as an overall “switch in paradigms”, in the sense given by T. S. Kuhn, this paper presents an account of the Kuhn’s view of science and offers a reconstruction of Freud’s Oedipal, Triangular or “Toddler-in-the-Mother’s-Bed” Paradigm. Part II (Sections 5-13) shows that as early as the 1920’s Winnicott encountered insurmountable anomalies in the Oedipal paradigm and, for that reason, started what can be called revolutionary research for a new framework of psychoanalysis. This research led Winnicott, especially during the last period of his life, to produce an alternative dual or “Baby-on-the-Mother’s-Lap” Paradigm. This new paradigm is described in some detail, especially the paradigmatic dual mother-baby relation and Winnicott’s dominant theory of maturation. Final remarks are made regarding Winnicott’s heritage and the future of psychoanalysis.

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb (instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he fi rst elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non-speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.

International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2007

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb (instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he fi rst elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non-speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.