Juriswriting: The Law of Being Social

Through the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, and following recent publications that champion the theoretical significance of jurisdiction, this article reads jurisdiction as a technique of legal fiction-making and as capable of exposing an originary ontological category of “being-with.” Rather than thought of purely as an expression of the law’s sovereign authority, it is argued that jurisdiction is a privileged point at which we can see the law’s fragility and thus open to critical intervention and interruption. Following Nancy’s understanding of “writing” and “literature” as that which exposes being-with, I suggest that we might name such strategies of creative intervention “juriswriting.” This account of jurisdiction, developed by thinking with Nancy’s account of ontology, is explored with reference to the common law constructions of jurisdiction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Journal of Law and Society, 2007

2014

Foreword [1994] 1–4 LAW AS PRACTICE QUELQUES QUESTIONS MÉTHODOLOGIQUES DE LA FORMATION DES CONCEPTS EN SCIENCES JURIDIQUES [1970] 7–33: 1. Introduction 7 / 2. La particularité de l’objet des sciences juridiques 8 / 3. La particularité de la méthodologie des sciences juridiques 10 / 4. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques: Quelques problèmes 15 [4.1. Le concept du droit 16 / 4.2. Le concept dogmatique du contenu du droit 21 / 4.3. Le concept de la normativité juridique 23 / 4.4. Le concept des lacunes en droit 24] / 5. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciencesjuridiques: Quelques conclusions 26 / 6. La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques et la réalité: Conclusion finale 29 / 7. Annexe: Des bases d’une classification possible des définitions en sciences juridiques 31 // GELTUNG DES RECHTS – WIRKSAMKEIT DES RECHTS [1978] 35–42 // MACROSOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LAW: A SURVEY AND APPRAISAL [1983] 43–76: I. Issues of the Macrosociological Theories of Law 46 / II. The Role of the Macrosociological Theories in the Social Science Foundation of Legal Thinking 63 // REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ITS INNER MORALITY [1984] 77–89: 1. Law and Morals As Two Systems of Norms, and the Inner Morality of Law 77 / 2. Law As A Value Bearer and As A Mere External Indicator 78 / 3. The Inner and External Moral Credit of Legislator 83 / 4. The Inner Morality of Law 86 // THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS [1985] 91–96 LAW AS TECHNIQUE DOMAINE »EXTERNE« ET DOMAINE »INTERNE« EN DROIT [1983] 99–117: 1. Le »juridique« et le »non-juridique« 99 / 2. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que groupes de phénomènes 104 / 3. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que points de références 112 / 4. Conclusion 116 // DIE MINISTERIELLE BEGRÜNDUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER SICHT [1977] 119–139: I. Die prinzipiellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Herausforderung der ministeriellen Begründungen 120 / II. Die möglichen und erwünschten Funktionen der ministeriellen Begründung im sozialistischen Rechts 128 / III. Die ministerielle Begründung und ihr Wert in der Auslegung derRechtsnormen 132 // THE PREAMBLE: A QUESTION OF JURISPRUDENCE [1970] 141–167: I. The Notion of the Preamble 142 / II. Content and Functions of the Preambles 146 / III. Normativity of the Preamble Content 150 / IV. The Problem of the Justifiability of Preamble-drafting in the Light of Socialist Legal Policy 161 // PRESUMPTION AND FICTION: MEANS OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 169–185: I. Presumption 169 [1. In the Judicial Process of Establishing the Facts: praesumptio homini vel facti 170 / 2. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris tantum 170 / 3. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris et de jure 171 / 4. In a Possible Theoretical Reconstruction 171] On »Presumption« 172 [1. Function 172 / 2. Presumption and Fiction 173 / 3. Irrelevancy of Epistemological Foundation 173 / 4. The Technique of Presumption 174] II. Fiction 175 [1. In the Linguistic Formation of Legal Norms 175 / 2. In the Judicial Application of Legal Norms 175 / 3. In the Doctrinal Processing of Legal Norms 176 / 4. In the Theoretical Reconstruction of Legal Norms 176 / 5. Approaches to and Understandings of Fiction 177] On »Fiction« 178 [1. History and Understandings 178 / 2. Classification 180 / 3. Law as Fiction 181 / 4. Presumption and Fiction 182] // LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 187–198: I. Legal Technique 187 [1. In the Large Sense 1987/ 2. In Legal Practice 189 / 3. In Legal Science 189 / 4. As a Special Technique 190] II. On Legal Technique [1. Definition and Function 190 / 2. Legal Technique and Legal Cultures 192 / 3. Postulates of Legal Technique in the Cultures of Modem Formal Law 195 {a) The Principle of Consequentiality 195 / b) The Principle of Coherency 195 / c) The Principle of Conceptual Economy 196 / d) The Principle of Non-redundancy 196}] LAW AS LOGIC MODERNE STAATLICHKEIT UND MODERNES FORMALES RECHT [1982] 201–207: 1. Die Klassifizierung als logisches und als gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Verfahren 202 / 2. Typologie der staatlichen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen 202 / 3. Der moderne Staat und das moderne formale Recht: Frage der Zusammenhänge und Entwicklungsalternativen 204 // HETEROGENEITY AND VALIDITY OF LAW: OUTLINES OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION [1986] 209–218 // LEIBNIZ UND DIE FRAGE DER RECHTLICHEN SYSTEMBILDUNG [1973] 219–232: 1. Aktualität von Leibniz 219 / 2. Der Gedanke der universalen mathematischen Methode 221 / 3. Die logischen Konzeption der Rechtswissenschaft 224 / 4. Die geometrische Vision der rechtlichen Systembildung 227 / 5. Das Scheitern der Leibnizschen Idee und seine Lehre 230 // LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM [1975] 233–255: 1. The Logical Structure of Law as a Historical Product 233 / 2. Tendencies of Formal Rationalization in Legal Development 234 / 3. Historical Development of the Approach to Law as a System 239 / 4. Present State of the Attempts at a Logical Reconstruction of Law and Legal Reasoning 243 / 5. Question of the Axiomatic Conception of Law 248 / 6. Heuristic Value of the Approach to Law as a System 250 // LOGIC OF LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: A GAP BETWEEN IDEALS, REALITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES [1982] 258–288: 1. Historical Background 259 / 2. Ideals 264 / 3. Reality 270 / 4. Future Perspectives 277 // KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW – YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW [ms] 289–293, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NORMS: SCIENCE- AND LANGUAGE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [ms] 295–314: 1. Presuppositions 295 / 2. The Context of the Application of Norms 300 [2.1 Actualisation in Concrete Meaning 300 / 2.2 Linguistic Undefinedness 304 / 2.3 Lack of Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere 308] LAW AS EXPERIENCE ON THE SOCIALLY DETERMINED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING [1971] 317–374: 1. Interrelation of the Creation and Application of Law 317 / 2. The Socially Determined Nature of the Application of Law 332 / 3. The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning 337 / 4. The Question of Perspectives 363 // TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: SOME THESES ON THE BASIS OF LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY [1983] 375–390, IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? [1984] 391–398: 1. Working Models of Law 391 / 2. Senses of ContExtuality in Law 393 / 3. Jurisprudential Approach and Socio-ontological Approach 394 / 4. Conclusions 396 [4.1. Law as Historical Continuum 396 / 4.2.Law as Open System 396 / 4.3. / Law as Complex Phenomenon with Alternative Strategy 396 / 4.4. Law as an Irreversible Process 397 / 4.5. The Genuinely Societal Character of Law 397] // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES [1992] 399–411: 1. The Philosophical Framework 399 / 2. Law as Tradition 403 / 3. European Integration and the Preservation of the Uniqueness of National Legal Orders 407 // INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS: NOTES ON THE CLOSED SETS, OPEN VISTAS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSCENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS [1991] 413–424: I. A Logic of Systems 413 / II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 416 / III. Ideal Type As A Normative Ideology 418 / IV.Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 420 / V. Limits and Bonds, ConsEquEntiality and Practicability of a System 423 LAW AS HISTORY FROM LEGAL CUSTOMS TO LEGAL FOLKWAYS [1981] 427–436, ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE? LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CULTURES [1985] 437–457: 1. Rule, Fact and Principle in the Concept of Law 438 [a) Abstract rules 439 / b) Abstracts from actual behaviour 439 / c) Principles Upheld by Legal Decisions 440] 2. Attributes of Law 445 [a) Authority 446 / b) Intention of Universal Application 446 / c) Obligatio 447 / d) Sanction 447] 3. Law and its Social Functional Definition 450 [(1) Law is a Global Phenomenon 451 / (2) Law is a Phenomenon Able to Settle Conflicts of Interests 451 / 3) Law is a Phenomenon Prevailing as the Supreme Controlling Factor 452] 4. Conclusion 454 // LAW AS A SOCIAL ISSUE [1985] 459–475: I. The Social Prestige of Law 459 / II. The Social Nature of Law 463 / III. Law and Language in the Service of Social Mediation 466 (1. Passive Mediation and Active Intervention 468 / 2. The Dilemma of the Mediation of Values 472) // LAW AS HISTORY? [1986] 477–484: 1. Understandings of the Term »Law« 477 / 2. Law and History 478 / 3. Law as History 481 // RECHTSKULTUR – DENKKULTUR: EINFÜHRUNG ZUM THEMA [1988] 485–489 Curriculum Vitae 491 / Bibliography 493 // Index 515 / Index of Normative Materials 523 / Index of Names 525

English Language Notes

In t r o d u c t i o n : M a k i n g S p a c e FOR JU RIS-D lC TIO N S N a n G o o d m a n uris-of the la w -dictio-speech. I invoke the Latin etym ology of this crucial legal concept to highlight the connection between tw o of the three term s that concern us in this special issue of ELN-language and the law. The law is made through and by language.The law is speech and, perhaps less obviously but no less undeniably, speech is law. Both sides of this equation have been at the heart of interdisciplinary studies of law and literature from the start. Indeed, the focus on discourse in both disciplines has form ed the com mon thread between them from the early work of James Boyd W hite to the m ore recent exploration of the "inter-discipline" by Kieran Dolin and others.1 To begin w ith the etym ology of the word "jurisdiction," however, is to obscure the third and perhaps m ost im portant feature of ju risdiction-space-the area or territory over which the law prevails or a given court can rule. Indeed, there is no general definition of jurisdiction that does not depend on the concept of space.2 The O xford English Dictionary gives as one o f its prim ary definitions, "The extent or range o f judicial or adm inistrative power; the ter ritory over which such power extends." To the definition of jurisdiction as a site of law and language, then, we must add the concept of "space" (or place or territory), noting crucially that it is the recognition of a given space as distinct from others that gives the court its ju ris dictional authority. Cornelia Vismann gives the com plexity of this thought a com pellingly concrete articulation. "The prim ordial scene of the nomos [or law]," she writes, "opens with a drawing o f a line in the soil.This very act initiates a specific concept of law, which derives order from the notion of space."3 At the same time, in the focus on nomos and the drawing of lines as acts o f jurisdiction, she draws in my other tw o concepts. Space, law, and lan guage-the three concepts are inextricably intertwined. The new essays in this special issue on jurisdiction engage this description of legal order and to varying degrees the confluence o f all three aspects of jurisdiction. In attem pting to juggle all three term s at once, moreover, these essays depart from previous studies of ju ris diction that have tended to focus on one or another aspect o f it. Shaun McVeigh's Jurisprudence o f Jurisdiction, for example, though innovative and wide ranging, focuses largely, as its title suggests, on the im plications of jurisdiction for the law;4 conversely, Bradin Cormack's brilliant and richly textured, The Power to Do Justice, tends to study jurisdiction from a literary point of view.s The m ajor purpose of bringing scholars together

NyUL Rev., 1985

Recent legal scholarship has engaged in a growing dialogue tying literary cn"licism to jurisprudence. In this article, Pro/essor Robin West adds her voice by advocating the reading oj legal theory as a form of narratil'e. Drawing from Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Crilicism. Professor West first derails four literary my/Its thot combine contrasting)f,wld visions and norrotilYi methods. She then applies Frye's categories to Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions and employs aesthetic principles to analyze influential/egol theorists within these traditions. Finally. Professor West argues thot recognizing rhe aesthetic dimension of legal debate/rees u.s to realize our moral ideals. I NTRODUCTION It is now a commonplace that lawyers and legal theorists have much to learn from literature.' We surely can learn something about the law NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:145 persistently employ narrative plots at strategic points in their arguments. relating romantic sagas about mythical commanders and communities and saturating their writings with realistic anecdotes from lawyers' and judges' subjective experiences of law.) Fictive protagonists also play an important role in legal theory: Dworkin's heroic "Herculean" judge and Holmes's one-dimensional "bad man," for example, are central devices by which these jurists convey their conceptions of the meaning of law. It is not surprising that legal theory should rely so heavily upon narrative form. The subject matter of legal theory is the "nature of law." This nature is partly revealed by the content of law-its history and political and economic underpinnings. Examining law as a "fact" can help us understand what law is and what it has been in the past. But law is also an ever-present possibility, potentially bringing good or evil into our future. The nature of law is also revealed, then, by our aspirations for and our fear of law: fantasies and nightmares revolving around power, reason, and authority. When we discuss what is, we rely quite rightly upon description and analysis. But when we discuss what is possible, what we desire and what we dread, we quite naturally tum to stories about hypothetical communities and the legal actors and forms within those communities. If legal theories are, in part, aesthetic objects, then we should be trying to understand them in that sense. This Article argues that the narrative plots, protagonists, and images of major legal theories do, in fact, fall into recognizable literary categories. It develops this thesis by applying to legal theory the insights of a classic work of literary criticism, Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. 4 In this work, Frye, premiere

Chicago Kent Law Review, 1995

Law, like fiction, is one of those domains in which the saying so makes it so. The main purpose of this essay is to show how various aspects of law and fiction are closely related, and how they exhibit features that are generally shared by expressive artifacts. Both law and fiction belong to a type of intangible artifacts, created by communicative means, giving rise to closed prefixed contexts in which truths in that context are constituted by performative speech acts. The law, however, is very much unlike fiction in that it is essentially authoritative. I conclude by showing how law’s spacio-temporal aspect, which it does not share with most other expressive artifacts, derives from its authoritative nature.