WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR RUSSIA?

Changing Societies & Personalities, 2021

A return of the Orthodox religion and a renaissance of the Russian Orthodox Church gave a way for politically active movements of Orthodox fundamentalists and monarchists. They were obsessed with the idea of the "end of time" and argued that the Antichrist was at the door. The article focuses on several national-patriotic newspapers and their interest to Orthodox prophecies about the end of time, which can be traced from the turn of the 1990s. It is examined who exactly, in what way and for what goals developed and discussed eschatological ideas. The major themes, rhetorical means and key words are scrutinized, which helped consumers to disclose the "enemies of Russia" and to reveal their "perfidious plans" and "harmful actions" aimed at the destruction of Russia and its people. A relationship between this ideology and theological teaching of the end of time is analyzed.

Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge, 2018) pp. 217-232., 2018

The recent “conservative turn” in Russian politics has raised to new levels the role of spiritual and moral values in political discourse. The new partnership formed between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the state, a modernized version of the traditional Byzantine symphonia, has also affected Russian foreign policy. One notable example is the emergence of the “Russian World” as a key concept in Russia's relations with Ukraine and the rest of the CIS. Although the Church plays a subordinate role in this relationship, it is far from being merely the Kremlin’s puppet. By decentering the nation, this investigation seeks to shed light on the Church’s distinct approach to politics, and show where it draws the line on cooperation with civil authorities. Only by viewing the ROC as an autonomous political and eschatological actor, will we be able to appreciate how it influences Russian foreign policy.

2012

Honorable Mention, 2012 Early Slavic Studies Association Distinguished Scholarship Award A pivotal period in Russian history, the "Time of Troubles" of the early 17th century has taken on new resonances in post-Soviet Russia. Current national narratives glorify the role of the Russian Orthodox Church during that torturous span of famine, war, and disintegration. But what was the actual history of the Church and of Orthodox Christian religion in crisis? For the first time, and just prior to the 400th anniversary of the end of the Time of Troubles, this book attempts to give a comprehensive picture of the topic on the basis of archival and other evidence. Beginning with Russia's posited status as "New Israel" and continuing to examine the business activities of monasteries, Gruber discovers the motivations behind key political and religious innovations of the period. New "voices" attributed to women and the people marked this as a unique epoch in the troubled history of one of the world's most enigmatic and influential countries. Both accessibly written and deeply scholarly, this book will appeal to a wide readership interested in history, religion, and culture.

2002

This work traces Russia's complex historical development in the last century, as well as its recent political troubles and economic misfortunes, and its place in the contemporary international system. Providing up-to-date information on Russian political developments, including the elections of 1999 and 2000, Robinson assesses the chances of future projects of political and economic reconstruction.

2012

2010

The future may be approached from different perspectives. The first is that of a professional “statesman.” His vision is often biased in favour of a particular political goal which should be fulfilled by every means possible. Following this logic, the future is a linear projection of the subsequent steps towards desirable results. The second is the vision of a “scientific man” who can allow himself a non-linear way of thinking. Unlike the statesman, he is focused on different projections, bifurcations and trajectories of existing strategies. Instead of linear extrapolation of current trends, this approach implies alternative scenarios—extreme images, ideal types or gestalts of the future. These gestalts may never come true. However they may highlight various important and sometimes unintended consequences of present trends, being rationally justified and causally linked to existing trends and strategies. Scenarios may be driven by variables such as economic factors, demographic and ...

1994

It is easy to point to facts indicating that there is no serious future for Catholicism in Russia. Catholics have very few congregations in comparison not only with the Orthodox but also with the Protestants. Although representatives of the Moscow Patriarch ate talk continually about Catholic proselytism, the Catholics' preaching activity is very weak, and those who could be called missionaries are isolated individuals. Unlike Orthodoxy and Protestanism, Catholicism was virtually wiped out during the Soviet era in Russia. The Vatican itself is apparently bowing to pressure from the Moscow Patriarchate and 'voluntarily' restricting its activity to within tight limits. Considering all this, the title I have given my article might seem an empty provocation. There is more evidence of future prospects for Protestantism. However, I want to draw attention to some very important features of the contemporary worldview of the Russian people, some peculiarities of current religious belief, and some political and cultural orientations prevailing in society today, all of which permit us to say that there are very great opportunities for Catholicism and that the soil is extremely well prepared for it. In this article I will be using the results of three all-Russian sociological surveys on the post-perestroika world view of the people of Russia, which I carried out in 1990, 1991 and 1992 with my assistant Or Lyudmila Vorontsova; but I think that the patterns we observed could be deduced not only from sociological surveys, but also from careful observation of the social and religious life of Russia today. To begin with, how do our contemporaries identify with religious labels? We put the question 'What do you consider yourself to be?' and we suggested the following answers: 'Orthodox', 'Baptist', 'Catholic', 'Old Believer', 'Buddhist', 'atheist' and 'just Christian'. Amazing as it may seem, in 1992 52 per cent of the Russian urban population replied that they were 'just Christian'. In other words, they consider themselves to be Christians, but they refuse to be linked with any specific confession. For many people, of course, this sounds scandalous-why should people not call themselves Orthodox? It is a staggering fact, and to begin with I did not believe these results myself. One automatically begins to look for some sort of explanation which would solve the problem quite simply, and within the framework of traditional concepts. When we analysed the replies of people from various social groups, we saw that a significant percentage among the inhabitants of small towns, the elderly and those with little education were calling themselves 'just Christians'. It is clear that these people are not influenced by any new ideological trends and that from a religious *This article is a revised version of a talk given at the conference 'Orthodoxy and Catholicism Face to Face with Contemporary Culture' (St Petersburg, 15-16 May 1992).

2016

In book: The moment when life changed forever: Letters from Ukraine (pp.290-296) Publisher: Research Institute for European Policy, 2023

The "Russian world" must be condemned so that it will not be returned to in the future, the names of the criminals and the repentance of the guilty must be named. Further, there should be changes in society and the state structure, overcoming the oligarchy, corruption, and rethinking the value of the human personality.

Comparative Politics, 2018

2017 marked one hundred years since the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1917, Russia embarked on one of history's most significant social, political, and economic transformations. The establishment of communism and the Soviet Union was transformational for Russia domestically, but also created over time a new global order. Although ultimately a developmental failure, the Soviet system would not only modernize a largely rural economy and illiterate population, but also lead to the establishment of a new system of international relations-one that endured until the Soviet Union collapsed under its own weight in December 1991. The Soviet collapse and the reemergence of Russia in its wake shook the world just as significantly as the Russian Revolution almost seventy-five years earlier. Almost as unexpected as its first great change seventy-five years earlier, Russia embarked upon another great social, political, and economic experiment: the transformation from communism to capitalism and a more liberal, if not democratic, form of government. Since 2017 also marked a quarter of a century since that transformation began, it is high time to evaluate what Russia has become. What kind of regime has evolved in those twenty-five years? What adjectives describe Russia after eighteen years of Vladimir Putin's rule? What did analysts get right (and wrong) in understanding the currents of change in Russia? What do Russians themselves think? Is the system that was built following communism's collapse durable? An evaluation of what Russia has become and where it will go next is particularly timely, too, as its leaders reassert Russian interests into global politics. To grapple with these and other questions, we convened a workshop with a group of leading experts spanning three generations of scholarship on contemporary Russian politics at Stanford University in January 2017. This special issue is the result of our collective attempt to understand and describe the process of Russia's bumpy transition since December 26, 1991. Although not the final word on any of these issues, this group of innovative essays points to a complicated trajectory of development that is far from complete.

Fr. Dr Daniel Payne’s contribution examines the way in which the Russian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill has drawn upon its understanding of canonical territory, spiritual security, and the Russkiy Mir to promote an ideology uniting the Russian world and those of traditional religious belief. Vladimir Putin has capitalized upon the Russian Orthodox Church's religious understandings of Russkiy Mir and has utilized these understandings to promote his foreign policy in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. While it is not the sole rationale for Putin's actions towards these nations, the critical influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on his foreign policy should not be underestimated.

Journal of Church and State, 2009

Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2023

The purpose of this article is to assess the role of the Orthodox Church during the prelude to the February Revolution. Recent historiography on the Great War in Western scholarship has foregrounded the role of the Churches, Protestant and Catholic, in sustaining popular support for a war that entailed unprecedented death, suffering, and hardship. That new research, seeking to explain the "endurance problem" (Durchhaltsproblem), point to the Churches in the West as the pillar of the existing regimes right to the very end of the war and as an effective instrument in mobilizing support and patriotism to defend each country's "civilization". Hence, no less important than brilliant military plans and effective governance, the Churches provided critical support and raised morale of both troops and civilians. Such was not the case in Russia. With few resources at its disposal, the Orthodox Church provided initial but ephemeral support. As is shown here, the Church was not only unable but unwilling to embrace the ancient regime: against a background of general war weariness, the Church elites, parish clergy, and ordinary parishioners were increasingly determined to pursue their own interests, not those of the state. By February 1917 the Church did not condemn but welcomed the overthrow of the monarchy that ultimately led to the Bolshevik seizure of power and years of brutal civil war. The monograph by I. V. Potkina "On the eve of the catastrophe. The state and the economy in Russia in 1914-1917" has many positive elements, but it is importantgiven recent historiography, which foregrounds the role of Churches and religion in sustaining society's willingness to endure the Great War-to pay attention to the role of the Russian Orthodox Church.

2022

Book Chapter of: Schneider, Christoph: Theology and Philosophy in Eastern Orthodoxy: Essays on Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Thought. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, ISBN 9781608994212, S. 32 - 52.