Harman on Relativism and Moral Diversity

2017

This study examines the long-standing dispute between the moral relativist and moral Universalist. Relativism is recent years has been in the ascendancy in intellectual circles and has been associated with the intellectual fashions of different discipline in philosophy. Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the nature of moral judgment and its application to present metropolitan world. In this scenario modern moral relativist Gilbert Harman made an excellence contributes to develop and clarify the concept of moral relativism. According to him, it has no a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matterrelative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. David B Wong argues that a relativist theory can account f...

Nous, 1999

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 1996

I am not going to argue for moral relativism. The case for moral relativism is not an argument; it's a pair of observations. The first observation is that people live and have lived by mutually incompatible moral norms. The second observation is that no one has ever succeeded in showing any one set of norms to be universally valid. These observations do not prove that there is no universally valid morality, but they do lead us to wonder: If there weren't a universally valid morality, would there be any valid morality at all? Could there be multiple moralities, each of merely local validity? To explain how there could be would be to lay foundations for moral relativism. Formulating Relativism According to moral relativism, saying that an action is wrong is like saying that someone is tall, a claim that is elliptical unless indexed to a reference class, since someone who is tall for an Mbuti may not be tall for a Kikuyu, and it makes no sense to ask whether he is tall simpliciter. 1 Similarly, says relativism, it makes no sense to ask whether an action or practice is wrong simpliciter. Claims of wrongness must be about wrongness-for-members-of-x, 1 Yes, there may be a standard for human beings, tall for a human, which applies to all of us. But that standard is still relative to a reference class, namely, human beings. What's tall for a human is not tall for a giraffe. What's tall for a giraffe is not tall for a tree. The Milky Way is said to be 2,000 light years tall.

Kpanie Addy MA Philosophy 'The very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true.' Discuss. This essay discusses the view that the very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true. To reformulate the issue as a question: does the existence of other cultures with moral views dissimilar to ours constitute a condition sufficient for establishing the truth of moral relativism? A careful treatment of this issue requires understanding moral relativism; I shall therefore begin by briefly sketching out this viewpoint. A focused discussion of the matter in hand will then follow. I shall deploy arguments in support of my opinion that the case for moral relativism actually seems to founder when premised on moral diversity. I shall conclude this essay by stating why in my view moral relativism lacks viability as an ethical position. Moral relativism, as Harman explains, is the view that "moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality" (Harman and Thomson 1996: 3). Meiland and Krausz express a similar view: "moral relativism tells us that an action is morally right only relative to a particular moral code or set of moral principles" (1982: 8). The term, moral relativism (MR) or ethical relativism, thus aptly reflects the general idea underlying this viewpoint that moral truth is relative to or contingent on a specific moral framework and equally relative is the justifiability of such truth. MR contrasts sharply with the view that there is an objective, universal, absolute moral truth which exists, as Mackie picturesquely puts it, as part of the fabric of the world. It thus diametrically opposes moral objectivism and universalism, both of which, in very simple terms, are claims supporting the position that objective standards bearing on truth or falsity obtain with regard to evaluating moral judgments and that such judgments have universal application. MR, although often likened to moral scepticism, differs significantly from the latter viewpoint. Outlining this difference helps to further clarify what MR consists in. Meiland and Krausz highlight the key similarity and difference as follows:

2000

Synthese, 2009

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by

of an action as morally right and wrong is always relative to the moral framework of the judge, the critic, the appraiser, or, simply, the speaker. 2 What is unique about Harman's definition is that, although we often simply say that it is morally right or wrong of someone to do something without making reference to any such framework, Harman's definition reminds us that the form of our common moral judgment is faultlessly incomplete but has to be understood as elliptical for the complete formulation, which qualifies its truth to a particular moral framework.

Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology, 2020

This paper is a response to Park Seungbae's article, "Defence of Cultural Relativism". Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to multiple cultures at once, the concept of moral relativism is vague. Park argues that such contentions do not affect moral relativism and that the moral relativist may respond that the value of tolerance, Hitler's actions, and the concept of culture are themselves relative. In what follows, I show that Park's adroit strategy is unsuccessful. Consequently, moral relativism is incoherent.

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativ-ism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. 1