Varieties of abstract concepts and their multiple dimensions

2015

In this study, we challenge this picture and support a new view of the nature and composition of abstract concepts suggesting that they also rely to a greater or lesser degree on body-related information. Specifically, we support a version of this new view which we call "x-ception theory" maintaining that abstract concepts are based on internal information of a proprioceptive, interoceptive and affective kind. Secondly, we address a methodological issue concerning the so-called concreteness and imageability measures, two tools that are widely used in (mainly psycholinguistic) empirical research to assess the degree of concreteness of specific words. On the basis of this analysis we argue that-even though the classical concreteness and imageability measures were developed in relation to the standard picture of meaning-they can also be used in the new framework of x-ception theory. In particular, we suggest that the discrepancy between these two measures provides a clue as to whether a word relies on internal information. By contrast, we argue that a new measure for concreteness recently proposed in order to address some problems with the old measure is completely inappropriate for this aim.

2021

Concepts allow us to make sense of the world. Most evidence on their acquisition and representation comes from studies of single decontextualized words and focuses on the opposition between concrete and abstract concepts (e.g. bottle vs. truth). Our study examines linguistic exchanges analyzing the differences between sub-kinds of concepts. Participants responded to sentences involving sub-kinds of concrete (tools, animals, food) and abstract concepts (PS, philosophical-spiritual; EMSS, emotional-social, PSTQ, physical-spatio-temporal-quantitative). We found differences in content: foods evoked interoception; tools and animals elicited materials, spatial, auditive features, confirming their sensorimotor grounding. PS and EMSS yield inner experiences (e.g., emotions, cognitive states, introspections) and oppose PSTQ, tied to visual properties and concrete agency. More crucially, the various concepts elicited different interactional dynamics: more abstract concepts generated higher un...

Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 2015

The "standard picture of meaning" suggests that natural languages are composed of two different kinds of words: concrete words whose meaning rely on observable properties of external objects and abstract words which are essentially linguistic constructs. In this study, we challenge this picture and support a new view of the nature and composition of abstract concepts suggesting that they also rely to a greater or lesser degree on body-related information. Specifically, we support a version of this new view which we call "xceptive theory" maintaining that abstract concepts rely on internal information of a proprioceptive, interoceptive and affective kind. Secondly, we address a methodological issue concerning the so-called concreteness and imageability measures, two tools that are widely used in (mainly psycholinguistic) empirical research to assess the degree of concreteness of specific words. On the basis of this analysis we argue thateven though the classical concreteness and imageability measures were developed in relation to the standard picture of meaningthey can also be used in the new framework of xceptive theory. In particular, we suggest that the discrepancy between these two measures provides a clue as to whether a word relies on internal information. By contrast, we argue that a new measure for concreteness recently proposed in order to address some problems with the old measure is completely inappropriate for this aim.

Handbook of Embodied Psychology, 2021

Some have recently suggested that abstract concepts do not constitute a substantial challenge to embodied cognition because they do not form a unified category. In this chapter, I argue that abstract concepts are indeed heterogeneous but as such pose several distinct theoretical challenges. After surveying the current evidence for, and responses to, these challenges, I conclude that a comprehensive embodied account that addresses the diversity of abstract concepts remains possible. Several desiderata for a future theory emerge from this critical review. A successful theory will need to embrace not only distributed multimodal representations but also recognize the importance of the emotions and the language system; to posit a hierarchical architecture that includes cross-modal convergence zones or hubs; and to provide a robust explanation for the semantic flexibility of concepts in general and abstract concepts in particular.

Psychological Bulletin, 2017

concepts ('freedom') differ from concrete ones ('cat'), as they do not have a bounded, identifiable and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of the evidence in favour of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstract concepts.

1981

Abstract Eight abstract concepts were submitted to a procedure designed to test the logical nature of their definition. The hypothesis that they would show a polymorphous prototype structure similar to that found for concrete categories (Hampton, 1979; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) was confirmed for five of the concepts. Reasons for the lack of fit of the prototype model to the remaining concepts and implications for the generality of existing theories of semantic memory are discussed.

RIFL - Rivista Italiana Filosofia del Linguaggio, 2013

Grounded and embodied theories of cognition face the problem of a consistent account of abstract concepts: if cognition is grounded in the brain modal systems and consists in modal simulations, where are abstract concepts from? After discussing some fully modal embodied theories of abstract concepts and two pluralistic approaches involving modal and amodal representational systems, we will present a way to account for abstractness without involving amodal formats: the Words as Tools theory. Combining embodied and extended approaches, the WAT theory holds that embodied experience is not enclosed inside the boundaries of our body; words are modal entities (they are perceivable and activate multimodal situations related to their meaning) and they also are social instruments to perform actions of selection and grouping; abstract words are grouping tools whose related sensorimotor experiences are so variable and dissimilar among them that linguistic information provides us with a necessary support to bind them together in the same category. Social and linguistic (embodied) experience is crucial for building the meaning of words, particularly of abstract ones.

In the last decade many researchers have obtained evidence for the idea that cognition shares processing mechanisms with perception and action. Most of the evidence supporting the grounded cognition framework focused on representations of concrete concepts, which leaves open the question how abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing. One promising idea is that people simulate concrete situations and introspective experiences to represent abstract concepts [Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher, & R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking (pp. 129–163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.], although this has not yet been investigated a lot. A second idea, which more researchers have investigated, is that people use metaphorical mappings from concrete to abstract concepts [Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press.]. According to this conceptual metaphor theory, image schemas structure and provide sensory-motor grounding for abstract concepts. Although there is evidence that people automatically activate image schemas when they process abstract concepts, we argue that situations are also needed to fully represent meaning.

Topics in cognitive science, 2018

Our ability to deal with abstract concepts is one of the most intriguing faculties of human cognition. Still, we know little about how such concepts are formed, processed, and represented in mind. For example, because abstract concepts do not designate referents that can be experienced through our body, the role of perceptual experiences in shaping their content remains controversial. Current theories suggest a variety of alternative explanations to the question of "how abstract concepts are represented in the human mind." These views pinpoint specific streams of semantic information that would play a prominent role in shaping the content of abstract concepts, such as situation-based information (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, ), affective information (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, ), and linguistic information (Louwerse, ). Rarely, these theoretical views are directly compared. In this special issue, current views are presented in their most recent a...

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2021

In psycholinguistics, concepts are considered abstract if they do not apply to physical objects that we can touch, see, feel, hear, smell or taste. Psychologists usually distinguish concrete from abstract concepts by means of so-called concreteness ratings. In concreteness rating studies, laypeople are asked to rate the concreteness of words based on the above criterion. The wide use of concreteness ratings motivates an assessment of them. I point out two problems: First, most current concreteness ratings test the intuited concreteness of word forms as opposed to concepts. This ignores the ubiquitous phenomenon of lexical ambiguity. Second, the criterion of abstract concepts that the instruction texts of rating studies rely on does not capture the notion that psychologists working on abstract concepts are normally interested in, i.e., concepts that could reasonably be sensorimotor representations. For many concepts that pick out physical objects, this is not reasonable. In this pape...