Free Will: A New Formulation

THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL, 2024

The debate over free will—whether it is an illusion or a genuine aspect of human experience—has long intrigued philosophers, scientists, and the general public. This essay explores the complex interplay between free will and various theoretical models, including determinism and stochastic theories. We begin by defining free will, clarifying it as the ability to make choices unconstrained by external factors, and distinguishing it from related concepts such as autonomy and agency. We then delve into deterministic models, which argue that every event, including human actions, is the result of preceding causes, and discuss how these models challenge traditional notions of moral responsibility. In contrast, stochastic models introduce the idea of randomness and uncertainty into the equation. By examining quantum mechanics—where particles behave probabilistically rather than deterministically—we investigate whether quantum indeterminacy offers a pathway to free will. The observer effect in quantum mechanics, which suggests that observation can influence outcomes, is explored as a potential link between consciousness and free will, though its implications remain speculative. We further consider consciousness and its role in decision-making, discussing the concept of qualia and how it might suggest a degree of autonomy within complex systems. The essay also addresses emergent properties—phenomena that arise from complex interactions and cannot be solely explained by their components—as a possible framework for understanding free will. Through real-life examples, such as legal cases and everyday decision-making, we illustrate the practical implications of the free will debate. We also engage with counterarguments from neuroscience, including findings on subconscious decision-making, to provide a balanced perspective. Prominent philosophical views, from Kant’s advocacy of free will for moral responsibility to Spinoza’s deterministic outlook, are examined to enrich the discussion. In conclusion, this essay reflects on the broader implications of the free will debate for our understanding of morality and human behavior. It emphasizes the importance of continued research in neuroscience, physics, and philosophy to address this enduring question and enhance our grasp of human agency.

Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 2007

Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 2007

The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, (IJHSSE), volume 10, Issue 6, pp. 25-29 , 2023

As we know, there is a difference between a simple wish and the will of an individual. Not only a concrete action is required in order to alleviate the impact of various factors that inhibit the former before it becomes ‘will’, but also a deep level of human consciousness. It implies conscientious motivation, clear goals, etc. My paper introduces some of the elements instrumental in the leap from the wish to the human will. As the issue of Free Will shall be central to the paper because when I say ‘human will’ I refer to ‘free will’, I have to mention that I adopt a pragmatic perspective on this notion. I. e. even though, as quantum physics tell us, any decision we make is conditioned by realities pertaining to it, we do not think of this state of affair when we carry out our activities – at least not always. Because of that we feel free – free enough to be able to function according to social norms.

2017

█ Abstract The long dispute between incompatibilists (namely, the advocates of the contemporary version of the illusory nature of freedom) and compatibilists is further exemplified in the discussion between Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. In this article, I try to add to the discussion by outlining a concept of free will linked to five operating conditions and put forward a proposal for its operationalization and quantifi-cation. The idea is to empirically and pragmatically define free will as needed for moral blame and legal liability, while separating this from the debate on global determinism, local determinism, automatisms and priming phenomena on a psychological level. This is made possible by weakening the claims of de-terminisms and psychological automatisms, based on the latest research, and by giving a well-outlined definition of free will as I want to defend it. █ Riassunto Un approccio pragmatico ed empirico al libero arbitrio-La lunga disputa tra incompatibilisti (va-le a...

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia

The long dispute between incompatibilists (namely, the advocates of the contemporary version of the illusory nature of freedom) and compatibilists is further exemplified in the discussion between Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. In this article, I try to add to the discussion by outlining a concept of free will linked to five operating conditions and put forward a proposal for its operationalization and quantifi-cation. The idea is to empirically and pragmatically define free will as needed for moral blame and legal liability, while separating this from the debate on global determinism, local determinism, automatisms and priming phenomena on a psychological level. This is made possible by weakening the claims of de-terminisms and psychological automatisms, based on the latest research, and by giving a well-outlined definition of free will as I want to defend it.

In this paper, I explore various views of free will (or lack thereof) without taking a firm position on any one view. (My view is still a work in progress.)

Human Affairs 32 (4), 2022

The problem that Tallis attempts to address in Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021) is that science appears to describe the entire world deterministically and that this seems to leave no room for free will. In the face of this threat, Tallis defends the existence of free will by arguing that science does not explain our intentional awareness of the world; and it is our intentional awareness that makes both science and free will possible. Against Tallis, it is here argued that his argument is vulnerable to two criticisms. Firstly, his characterisation of science as apparently deterministic is inaccurate. Secondly, he has not solved the problem he has set himself but rather recast it, so that his conclusion leaves us having to account for free will, not in a deterministic universe, but either as a product of chance or as a miracle. It is here suggested that when we set aside the illusory threat of scientific determinism, we also set aside the temptation of free will (as its spurious answer). That done, we may better focus upon agent's freedom of action-as discussed by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume-the rational capability of an agent to act upon their wishes, given the constraints under which they find themselves.

Synthese, 2014

Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists.